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The Choice of Hercules in Stoicism

Copyright © Donald Robertson, 2013.  All rights reserved.

Zeno was reputedly inspired to study philosophy after reading the second book of Xenophon’s Memorablia of Socrates. This actually begins with a chapter in which Socrates recounts a story known as “The Choice of Hercules” (or “Heracles” to the Greeks), attributed to the highly-regarded ancient sophist Prodicus (Memorabilia, 2.1). Antisthenes, the Cynics, and the Stoics apparently all agreed that Hercules, the greatest of Zeus’ sons, provided an ideal example of the self-discipline and endurance required to be a true philosopher. The story symbolises the great challenge of deciding whom we actually want to be in life, what type of life we want to live, the promise of philosophy, and the temptation of vice. Zeno himself was perhaps compared to Hercules by his followers and we know that his successor Cleanthes was dubbed “a second Hercules”, on account of his self-mastery.

The story goes that Hercules, when a young man, found himself at an isolated fork in the road, where he sat to contemplate his future. Uncertain which path to take in life he found himself confronted by two goddesses. One, a very beautiful and alluring woman, was called Kakia, although she claimed that her friends call her “Happiness” (Eudaimonia). She charged in front to ensure she spoke first, promising him that her path was “easiest and pleasantest”, and that it provided a shortcut to “Happiness”. She claimed he would avoid hardship and enjoy luxury beyond most men’s wildest dreams, produced by the labour of others. After hearing this, Hercules was approached by the second goddess, called Aretê, a plain-dressed and humble woman, though naturally beautiful. To his surprise, she told him that her path would require hard work from him and it would be “long and difficult”. In fact the path Hercules chose would be dangerous beyond belief, he would be tested by many hardships, perhaps more than any man who had lived before, and have to endure great loss and suffering along the way. “Nothing that is really good and admirable”, said Aretê, “is granted by the gods to men without some effort and application.” However, Hercules would have the opportunity to face each adversity with courage and self-discipline, and of showing wisdom and justice despite great danger. He would earn true Happiness by reflecting on his own praiseworthy and honourable deeds.

Hercules, of course, chose the path of Aretê or “Virtue” and was not seduced by Kakia or “Vice”. He faced continual persecution, from the goddess Hera and her minions, and was forced to undertake the legendary Twelve Labours, including slaying the Hydra and ultimately entering Hades, the Underworld itself, to capture Cerberus with his bare hands. He died in the most extreme agony, poisoned by clothing soaked in the Hydra’s blood. However, Zeus was so impressed by his greatness of soul that he elevated him to the status of a God in his own right. Of course, the Stoics took this all as a kind of metaphor for the good life: that it’s better to face hardships, rise above them, and thereby excel, than to embrace easy-living and idleness, and allow your soul to shrink and deteriorate as a result. It would therefore make sense if Socrates retelling of “The Choice of Hercules” was indeed the part of the Memorabilia that inspired Zeno’s conversion to the life of a philosopher. However, it may certainly have served this purpose for later generations of Stoics.

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Stoicism

The Philosophers of the Stoic School

Copyright © Donald Robertson, 2013-2018.  All rights reserved.

Cynic-Stoic-SuccessionIn the third century AD, Diogenes Laertius described an ancient philosophical “succession” that began with Socrates and led through the major figures in the Cynic tradition down to the Stoic school, ending with Chrysippus.  The diagram on this page illustrates his account of this philosophical lineage.  Below are a list of some of the most important figures in the Stoic tradition, including the major Cynic precursors.  I’ve indented less well-known or minor figures.  Links are to pages on Wikipedia but you can also find a Wikipedia navigation menu for Stoicism.  The precise chronological order is difficult to determine in some cases and so I’ve followed a rough chronology, placing the names of historically-related figures together.

The Cynic Succession

Socrates, c. 469 BC – 399 BC, the pre-eminent Greek philosopher.  He introduced the application of dialectic to ethical questions, especially the definition of the cardinal virtues, and the philosophical way of life.  There’s some evidence that certain Stoics considered themselves to be ultimately followers of Socrates.  Likewise, Epictetus mentions him twice as often as Zeno, the founder of the Stoa.

Antisthenes, 445 – 365 BC, the friend and student of Socrates, who founded a small sect after his death, and (perhaps doubtfully) was claimed to have been the ultimate founder of the Cynic school.

Diogenes of Sinope, 412/404 – 323 BC, founder of the Cynic philosophical tradition; he probably never met Antisthenes, although he may have been inspired by his writings.

Crates of Thebes, 365 – 285 BC, Diogenes’ most famous follower, and the most important teacher of Zeno of Citium.

Zeno of Citium, c. 334 BC – c. 262 BC, began his philosophical career as a follower of Crates, and clearly adopted the Cynic lifestyle, apparently for twenty years, before founding his own school, the Stoa.

Diogenes Laertius claims that the Stoics were part of a wider Ionian philosophical tradition, stretching back to the pre-Socratic philosophers Thales and Anaximander.  They were clearly influenced by Heraclitus, who stands in this tradition, although, curiously, Diogenes Laertius does not mention him as a major precursor of Stoicism for some reason.  Zeno reputedly wrote a book entitled On Pythagoreanism and the influence of many Neopythagorean ideas can be seen in the works of Epictetus and Seneca, in the Roman Imperial period.  However, the most important precursor of Stoicism was probably Socrates.  We’re told it was the desire to emulate his example, which he read about in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, that inspired Zeno to begin studying philosophy.  Zeno then spent twenty years studying philosophy at Athens, attaching himself to three major Socratic sects:

  • The Cynics, whose philosophy was his first and most important influence, after he became a follower of Crates of Thebes.
  • The Megarian school, who specialised in logic and dialectic, but held a moral philosophy similar in some ways to the Cynics; Zeno studied under Stilpo the head of the school, probably the most popular philosophical teacher of his day, but also under members of the “Dialectician” sect associated with this school, particularly Diodorus Cronus.
  • The Academy of Plato, where Zeno studied under the scholarchs Xenocrates and later his successor Polemo; Xenocrates had been a student of Plato, the founder of the school.

Athens at this time was full of thinkers influenced by Socrates.  Zeno was steeped in this Socratic atmosphere.  He was exposed to the teachings of Socrates through these three major schools, which Diogenes Laertius places in a lineage going back to the immediate circle of students surrounding Socrates.  The Cynic succession, he claims, was founded by Antisthenes, whereas the Megarian school being founded by Euclid and the Academy by Plato, that would mean these schools derive from three associates of Socrates himself.  The suggestion may be that different schools developed different aspects of Socrates’ original teaching, which were later re-united by the Stoic school.

A fourth Socratic influence was Xenophon, another friend of Socrates.  Although his small school had ceased to exist by this time, Zeno was inspired by his writings portraying Socrates as a pre-eminent sage.  It should also be noted that the Stoics appear to show more interest in poetry and drama than the other philosophical schools.  They frequently quote Homer and Euripides in particular, and such writings clearly had some influence on them, perhaps mainly in providing examples of tragic figures who they would see as pathologically attached to wealth or reputation, although also sometimes they were a source of positive sayings and examples.  Incidentally, a well-known tradition held that some of Euripides’ plays were co-authored by Socrates so the obvious interest of the Stoics in them could perhaps be more evidence of their dedication to the Socratic tradition.

The Early Stoa (Athens)

Zeno of Citium, c. 334 BC – c. 262 BC, was the founder of the Stoa, as we’ve seen.  These are some of his most notable followers, including several who appear to have broken away from the Stoic school, to some extent.

Philonides of Thebes, named by Diogenes Laertius as a student of Zeno.  Zeno sent him along with Persaeus to be an advisor at the court of King Antigonus.

Callippus of Corinth, named by Diogenes Laertius as a student of Zeno.  Nothing more is known about him.

Posidonius of Alexandria, named by Diogenes Laertius as a student of Zeno.  Nothing more is known about him.

Athenodorus of Soli, named by Diogenes Laertius as a student of Zeno.  He was the brother of the poet Aratus of Soli.  They share their home city with Chrysippus.

Zeno of Sidon, named by Diogenes Laertius as a student of Zeno.

Aristo of Chios, c. 320 – 250 BC, the most important “heterodox” Stoic mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, was an associate of Zeno who insisted on an ethical philosophy resembling Cynicism, and rejected the importance of studying logic and physics.  Diogenes Laertius said Aristo introduced the Stoic doctrine of indifferent things.

Herillus of Carthage, fl. 260 BC, an important “heterodox” Stoic mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, apparently a student of Zeno, who became critical of him, he defined the goal of life as knowledge and everything between virtue and vice as “indifferent”.

Dionysius of Heraclea, dubbed “the Renegade”, 330 – 250 BC, another important “heterodox” Stoic mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, who abandoned Stoicism in favour of the Cyrenaic school, who viewed pleasure as the chief good in life.

Aratus, 315/310 – 340 BC, an ancient poet-philosopher who studied under Zeno, his Stoic-influenced didactic poem on natural philosophy  Phaenomena survives today and was quoted by St. Paul in Acts of the Apostles, speaking to an audience of Epicurean and Stoic philosophers in Greece.

Persaeus of Citium, 307/306 – 243 BC, a favoured student of Zeno, who was sent in his place to become court advisor to King Antigonus II Gonatas of Macedonia, and became tutor to his son, Halcyoneus.

King Antigonus II Gonatas, ruler of Macedonia, who was interested in philosophy, particularly Cynicism, reputedly attended the lectures of Zeno, and was later had his student Persaeus as a court advisor.  He appears to have greatly admired Zeno, although it’s not clear if he considered himself a Stoic.

Cleanthes of Assos, c. 330 BC – c. 230 BC, was the second scholarch.  He was not renowned as a great intellectual.  Passages from his Hymn to Zeus have survived, and these perhaps suggest an emphasis on fatalism and piety.

Sphaerus of Borysthenes, c. 285 BC – c. 210 BC, was an important student of both Zeno and Cleanthes.  At some point he lived in Sparta and acted as advisor to King Cleomenes III.  Later, after Chrysippus refused, Cleanthes sent Sphaerus to live at the court of the Egyptian king  Ptolemy IV Philopater, whom he would tutor in Stoic philosophy.

Apollophanes of Antioch, fl. 250 BC, a Stoic philosopher, who was a student and friend of Aristo of Chios, although he later wrote a book criticising his love of pleasure.

Chrysippus of Soli, c. 279 BC – c. 206 BC, was the third scholarch.  He was typically contrasted with Cleanthes because he was renowned as one of the greatest intellectuals of the ancient world.  He reputedly wrote over 700 books and was greatly preoccupied with the theoretical development of Stoicism.

Aristocreon, fl. 200 BC, was the nephew of Chrysippus and his student.

Zeno of Tarsus, fl. 200 BC, was the fourth scholarch.

Diogenes of Babylon, c. 230-150/140 BC, the fifth scholarch, visited Rome as part of an important ambassadorial delegation, in 155 BC, along with the Academic Skeptic Carneades and the Aristotelian Critolaus.  He was the teacher of Antipater.  This sparked Roman interest in philosophy, particularly Stoicism.

Apollodorus of Seleucia, fl. 150 BC, an important student of Diogenes of Babylon, who may have been influential in promoting the Cynic-Stoic succession reported by Diogenes Laertius (see above).  He said that the Cynic way of life is a short-cut to virtue.

Archedemus of Tarsus, fl. 140 BC, an important Stoic mentioned by Cicero, Seneca, and Epictetus, who reputedly left Athens to found a Stoic school in Babylon.  Epictetus mentions him in connection with Antipater as one of the main authors his students apparently read.

Crinis, c. 2nd century BC, Stoic teacher mentioned by Diogenes Laertius and Epictetus.  We don’t know when he lived, although it’s believed Epictetus implies he lived at the same time or not long after Archedemus.

Diotimus, fl. c. 100 BC, Stoic who was found guilty of forging letters alleged to be by Epicurus in an attempt to discredit him.

Boethus of Sidon, student of Diogenes of Babylon, who denied that the cosmos was an animate being, and wrote four volumes of commentary on Aratus.

Crates of Mallus, fl. 2nd century BC, Stoic natural philosopher who created the first known globe of the Earth.

Basilides, fl. 2nd century BC, about whom we know little.

Antipater of Tarsus, d. 130/129 BC, was the sixth scholarch, a pupil of Diogenes of Babylon, and teacher of Panaetius.  Frequently mentioned by Epictetus in the same breath as Archedemus, also of Tarsus.

Heraclides of Tarsus, fl. 2nd century BC, was a friend and student of Antipater, he knew Athenodorus Canaanites and both argued that moral offences are not equal but have degrees.

The Middle Stoa (Roman Republic)

During this transitional and politically-chaotic period, the scholarch Panaetius travelled to Rome to lecture and Stoicism started to become increasingly popular outside of Greece, particularly among important statesman and cultural figures in the Roman Republic.  At the same time, key Stoics began to assimilate elements of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, which may have contributed to the eventual disappearance of the formal institution of the Stoa and the dispersal of its remaining students and teachers.

Panaetius of Rhodes, c. 185 – c. 110/09 BC, was the seventh and  last scholarch of the Athenian Stoa, after his death the formal institution of the Stoa apparently fragmented, and eventually disappeared.  He did a great deal to spread interest in Stoicism among the Roman elite, through his lectures at Rhodes and membership of the Scipionic Circle.

Dardanus of Athens, c. 160 BC – c. 85 BC, was a pupil of Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus, mentioned by Cicero as one of the heads of the remaining Stoic school at Athens (95 BC), along with Mnesarchus, after the main school had apparently moved to Rhodes.  By this time the school had possibly fragmented, following the death of Panaetius.

Mnesarchus of Athens, c. 160 – c. 85 BC, was a student of Antipater of Tarsus, who was apparently one of the leaders of the residual Stoic school at Athens after the death of Panaetius.

Hecato of Rhodes, fl. 100 BC, an important Stoic philosopher and student of Panaetius.

Gaius Blossius of Cumae, fl. 2nd century BC, Italian student of Antipater of Tarsus, who counselled Tiberius Gracchus.

The Scipionic Circle, a group of intellectuals gathered around Scipio Aemilianus, including the Stoic philosopher Panaetius.

Scipio the Younger, Scipio Aemilianus Africanus, 185 – 129 BC, influential Roman statesman and general, who led the final destruction of Carthage, formed the Scipionic Circle, including the Stoic scholarch Panaetius.

Gaius Laelius Sapiens, b. c. 188 BC, called “the Wise”, Roman statesman who studied Stoic philosophy, close friend of Scipio the Younger; Cicero wrote a dialogue in his name about Stoic view on friendship.

Quintus Aelius Tubero, fl. 2nd century BC, a member of the Scipionic Circle, Stoic philosopher, and student of Panaetius.  He was Scipio’s nephew and also the brother-in-law of the Stoic Cato of Utica.

Publius Rutilius Rufus, fl. 2nd century BC, Roman statesman, orator, and historian, who became a Stoic, studying under Panaetius, and a member of the Scipionic Circle.

Quintus Mucius Scaevola Augur, Roman politician and member of the Scipionic Circle, who studied Stoicism under Panaetius.

Gaius Fannius, fl. 2nd century BC, Roman statesman who studied Stoicism under Panaetius at Rhodes, and became a member of the Scipionic Circle.

Lucius Aelius Stilo Praeconinus, c 154 BC – 74 BC, Roman equestrian who was a Stoic and teacher of Cicero and Varro.

Posidionius of Rhodes, c. 135 BCE – 51 BC, was Panaetius’ most famous student, and may have led a Stoic school relocated to Rhodes, although he may eventually have abandoned Stoicism altogether.

Jason of Nysa, 1st century BC, grandson of Posidonius and Stoic philosopher.  Succeeded Posidonius as head of the Stoic school at Rhodes.

Asclepiodotus Tacitus, 1st century BC, students of Posidonius quoted by Seneca in Natural Questions. He wrote a work entitled Quaestionum Naturalium Causae, and a short work by him on military tactics survives today.

In 87 BC, during the period when Posidonius apparently led the Stoa, the Roman dictator Sulla sacked Athens and most of the formal philosophical schools closed down, perhaps fleeing to preserve their precious founding texts, transporting them to the safety of other locations.

A couple of years after the death of Posidonius, from 49-45 BC the Great Roman Civil War took place, in which the tyrant Julius Caesar overthrew the Roman Republic and established himself as dictator.  Cato (a Stoic) and Cicero (an Academic) were major political opponents of Caesar.  Cato ended up leading the remnants of the Republican army in their last stand against Caesar at Utica in North Africa.  Seneca’s nephew, the Stoic poet Lucan would later describe the events of the Civil War in his epic poem Pharsalia, which (paradoxically) portrays Cato the Younger as the real (moral) victor, though defeated by Caesar, and as the supreme Stoic hero of the Roman world.

Marcus Tullius Cicero, 106 BC – 43 BC, Roman statesman and philosopher, not a Stoic but an Academic who was greatly influenced by Stoicism and one of our main sources for discussion of Stoic ideas, friend and rival of Cato; he was particularly influenced by the more eclectic Stoicism of Panaetius.

Diodotus the Stoic, died 59 BC, was a Stoic philosopher and friend of Cicero, who lived in his house and instructed Cicero in Stoic doctrines, especially logic.

Cato the Younger, 95 – 46 BC, Roman statesman, philosopher, and military leader, who gave his life at the end of the Civil War in defiance of Julius Caesar, did not write or teach but Cicero calls him the “complete Stoic”, and he was revered by subsequent generations as a Stoic hero.

Porcia Catonis, c. 70 BC – 43 BC, the daughter of Cato the Younger and wife of Brutus, may have been a Stoic like her father.  Plutarch appears to strongly imply that she was a Stoic.

Antipater of Tyre, d. c. 45 BC, Stoic philosopher and friend of Cato the Younger, who introduced him to Stoic philosophy.

Athenodorus Cordylion, of Tarsus, fl. 1st century BC, Stoic philosopher and keeper of the library at Pergamon, where he allegedly expunged passages from Zeno’s texts, seemingly those alluding to the more controversial aspects of Cynicism; he was persuaded by Cato to become his resident philosopher and relocated to Rome.

A series of civil wars followed during the post-Republic period and the Roman Empire was eventually founded when Octavian was made the first Roman emperor, and named Augustus, in 27 BC.  The Roman Imperial period therefore follows.

The Late Stoa (Roman Empire)

By the Roman Imperial period, the formal institution of the Stoa appears to have come to an end, but Stoic lecturers still exist for at least another two centuries, and Marcus Aurelius is the last famous Stoic we know about.  Three of the most important Stoics of this period can be seen as aligned to the same branch of Stoicism: Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.  During this period, Stoicism lacked an orthodox centre of teaching and became somewhat fragmented, although there also seems to have been some desire to return to the orthodox teachings of the schools founders, through close study of the texts of Chrysippus in particular.

Athenodorus Canaanites, c. 74 BC – 7 AD, Stoic philosopher, student of Posidonius, and the first Stoicism tutor of Octavian, who became Augustus, the first Emperor and founder of the Roman Empire.

Arius Didymus of Alexandria, fl. end of 1st century BC – start of 1st century AD, Stoic tutor of Octavian (later the emperor Augustus).

Nestor of Tarsus, fl. 1st century AD, said (by Lucian) to have been a Stoic and tutor to the Emperor Tiberius.

Marcus Antistius Labeo, d. 10-11 AD, influential Stoic-influenced Roman jurist.

Thrasyllus of Mendes, or of Alexandria, fl. 1st century BC, friend and tutor to the Emperor Tiberius, who acquired an interest in Stoicism from him, according to the orations of Themistius.  He served as Court Astrologer but was a literary commentator by profession and edited the works of Plato and Democritus.  Not known to be himself a Stoic but seems to have introduced Tiberius to Stoicism.

Strabo, 64 or 63 BC – c. 24 AD, was a Greek geographer, historian, and philosopher, who was a friend and student of the Stoic teacher Athenodorus Canaanites.  By some accounts Athenodorus had considerable influence over his thought.  However, he would be best described as an eclectic thinker, influenced by Stoicism, perhaps, rather than a Stoic philosopher per se.

Horace, 65 – 8 BC, the leading Roman lyric poet during the reign of Augustus, was influenced by Epicureanism but increasingly by Stoicism in his later writings.

Quintus Sextius the Elder, fl. 50 BC, Roman philosopher who combined Stoicism, Cynicism, and Neopythagoreanism, much admired by Seneca, who studied with his follower Sotion.  Founded the first Roman school of philosophy called The School of the Sextii, which Seneca said did not like to call itself “Stoic” but in his estimation was basically Stoic.

Sotion, fl. 1st century AD, philosopher who combined Neopythagoreanism and Stoicism, a teacher in the School of the Sextii, who taught Seneca.

Marcus Manilius, fl. 1st century AD, author of the Astronomica, which survives today, generally believed to be mainly influenced by Stoicism, but also Pythagoreanism and Platonism.

Attalus, fl. 25 AD, Stoic philosopher and teacher of Seneca, whom he much admired and frequently quotes.

Seneca the Younger, c. 4 BC – AD 65, was not a Stoic teacher but probably the focus of a small informal circle of Stoic friends, and tutor to the Emperor Nero.

Lucan, 39 – 65 AD, the nephew of Seneca, a Stoic-influenced poet, and author of the Pharsalia, which portrays Cato as a Stoic sage

Persius, 34 – 62 AD, a Stoic poet, and friend of Lucan, several of whose Stoic-influenced Satires survive

Cornutus, fl. 60 AD, a Stoic philosopher and teacher, his Compendium of Greek Theology survives today.

Chaeremon of Alexandria, fl. 1st century AD, superintendent over part of the Alexandrian library.  Travelled to Rome to tutor the young Nero.  Wrote a text on Egyptian religion, interpreting it as a series of metaphors for the worship of nature.

Gaius Valerius Flaccus, died 90 AD, Roman poet who wrote a Latin Argonautica, generally considered to be influenced by Stoicism, particularly the first book.  It only survives in incomplete form today.

Rubellius Plautus, 33 – 62 AD, political rival of Nero, descended from Mark Antony.  His critics claimed he was a follower of Stoicism. In 60 AD, Nero banished Plautus and his family to his estate in Asia, and he was accompanied by the Stoic teacher Musonius Rufus.  After further rumours began to spread that Plautus was planning a rebellion against Nero, he was beheaded.  Rubellius Plautus, Barea Soranus, and Thrasea Paetus are sometimes known as the Stoic Martyrs.

Publius Clodius Thrasea, d. 66 AD, Roman senator and Stoic martyr known for his principled opposition to Emperor Nero.  He was related by marriage to Persius.  He was put on trial alongside Helvidius and Agrippinus and executed by Nero, the others were given lesser penalties.  Marcus Aurelius refers to him with admiration.

Barea Soranus, died 65 or 66 AD.  Roman senator and Stoic martyr, was a friend of Rubellius Plautus and was accused of inciting a rebellion against Nero in Asia.  Egnatius Celer, his Stoic teacher, turned informer against him after being bribed by Nero.  He was condemned to death and committed suicide.  He was distantly related to Marcus Aurelius.

Helvidius Priscus, fl. 1st century AD, Roman senator and Stoic philosopher and son-in-law of Thrasea.  He admired Brutus, the assassin of Caesar.  Executed by Emperor Vespasian.  Epictetus and Marcus held him in high regard.

Fannia, fl. 100 AD, was the wife of Helvidius Priscus and a notable Roman woman.  It’s uncertain if she was a Stoic, like her husband, but she appears to act like one.  She was part of the political opposition to Nero.

Herennius Senecio, died 93 AD, was part of the Stoic opposition to Domitian, under whose rule he was executed.  He wrote a biography celebrating the life of Helvidius Priscus.

Paconius Agrippinus, fl. 1st century AD, Roman senator and Stoic philosopher, accused alongside Thrasea and sent into exile.  He was held in very high regard by Epictetus.

Arulenus Rusticus, c. 35 – 95 AD, another Roman Senator and follower of Thrasea.  Ancestor of Junius Rusticus, the tutor of Marcus Aurelius.  Executed by Domitian for writing a public speech praising Thrasea.

Publius Egnatius Celer, fl. c. 60 AD, Stoic teacher of Barea Soranus, later accused by another Stoic, Musonius Rufus.

Musonius Rufus, c. 20/30 AD – 79/101 AD, was the pre-eminent Stoic teacher of the Roman Imperial period, the head of an important school, but not an official scholarch of the Stoa.  Fronto wrote in a letter to Marcus Aurelius: “What in our own recollection of Euphrates, Dio, Timocrates, Athenodotus? What of their master Musonius?”, suggesting that all of the above were students of Musonius Rufus.

Dio Chrysostom, c. 40 – 115 AD, eclectic philosopher who combined elements of Stoicism, Platonism and Cynicism, mainly known as a rhetorician.  However, there’s a possible reference to him in Marcus’ Meditations and Fronto appears to refer to him as a student of Musonius.  He was friends with Euphrates of Tyre.

Euphrates, c. 35 – 118 AD, Stoic philosopher and friend of Emperor Hadrian, there are several conflicting claims about his place of birth.  Pliny the Younger met him in Syria.  Marcus appears to mention him in passing (Meditations, 10.31), as does Epictetus.  Fronto appears to allude to him as a student of Musonius Rufus.

Epictetus, AD 55 – 135, was Musonius’ most influential student, and began lecturing at his own Stoic school during the same period as his teacher.

Arrian of Nicomedia, AD c. 86 – c. 160, student of Epictetus who recorded the Discourses and Handbook.  Promoted under Hadrian to consul and governor of Cappadocia.  Themistius calls him a “philosopher” and Lucian calls him a “disciple” of Epictetus.

Athenodotus, fl. 2nd century AD, Stoic philosopher and rhetorician, who studied under Musonius Rufus, is mentioned by Marcus Aurelius in passing in The Meditations, and was a friend and teacher of Fronto, mentioned in his letters.

Timocrates of Heraclea, fl. 2nd century AD, Stoic philosopher and rhetorician, mentioned by Lucian as a teacher of Demonax the Cynic, and apparently mentioned by Fronto as a student of Musonius Rufus.

Hierocles, fl. 2nd century AD, Stoic philosopher, author of Elements of Ethics

Demonax, c. 70 – 170 AD, a celebrated Cynic philosopher (rather than a Stoic per se).  However, he was both a student of Epictetus and a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, and was highly-regarded by the Athenians, and praised by his student Lucian.

Apollonius of Chalcedon, fl. 2nd century AD, was Stoic tutor to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, during his youth.  Also taught in Athens before being recalled to Rome to tutor Marcus.

Sextus of Chaerona, fl. 160 AD, Stoic lecturer who taught Marcus Aurelius, and was the nephew of Plutarch.

Junius Rusticus, c. 100 – 170 AD, highly-distinguished Stoic philosopher and personal tutor of Marcus Aurelius, who provided Marcus with his copy of the lectures (probably the Discourses) of Epictetus.  He was a descendant of Arulenus Rusticus, a prominent member of Thrasea’s Stoic circle.

Claudius Maximus, fl. 2nd century AD, was tutor to Marcus Aurelius. He was appointed legate under Hadrian then proconsul of Africa under Antoninus Pius. Apuleius, author of The Golden Ass, mentions his austere (Stoic) creed and extensive military service.  He probably died around 158 AD.

Cinna Catulus, fl. 2nd century AD, unknown outside of The Meditations and The Historia Augusta, where we’re told he was a Stoic tutor to Marcus Aurelius.

Marcus Aurelius, 121 – 180 AD, was Roman Emperor and a student of Stoicism, who attended lectures by Stoic teachers, but seems most influenced by his reading of Epictetus’ Discourses, although they did not meet.  Marcus was distantly related to Barea Soranus, one of the members of the Stoic Opposition martyred under Nero.

Marcus, Epictetus, and Musonius may perhaps be seen as representing one tradition in Roman Stoicism, perhaps different to that represented by Seneca, their predecessor, whom none of them mention in the surviving literature.  The lectures of Musonius and Epictetus were transcribed in Greek, the language used by Marcus in composing The Meditations.  Seneca, however, like Cicero, his predecessor, wrote only in Latin.

We don’t hear much about the Stoics after the death of Marcus Aurelius.  Hence, Stoicism was gradually superseded by Neoplatonism, whose main pioneer was Plotinus, 205 – 270 AD, which was, in turn, ultimately eclipsed by Christianity.  Several early Christian and Gnostic authors appear to be influenced to varying degrees by Stoicism.

Tertullian, c. 155 – 240 AD, was a church father, born in Carthage, who explicitly drew on certain aspects of Stoic metaphysics, although he was also very critical of Stoicism and philosophy in general.  He may have studied Stoicism earlier in his life.  Tertullian also claimed that the Gnostic Marcion was heavily indebted to Stoicism.

Categories
Cynicism

Verses from the Cynic Philosopher Crates of Thebes

We have several fragments of poetry attributed to Crates of Thebes, the Cynic philosopher who followed Diogenes of Sinope and was the first teacher of Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism.

The first fragment, cited by Diogenes Laertius, treats their characteristic knapsack (pera) as a metonym for the Cynic life, portraying it as an ideal city, perhaps comparable to the ideal Republic postulated by philosophers of different schools.  It is surrounded by an ocean of folly, or vapour (tuphos), the Cynic’s favourite word for the illusion of conventional values, the view of the majority that prizes “external goods” such as material wealth and public acclaim, etc.  However, because this city is populated by people who live  simple and wise life, with only the most basic possessions, ironically, they do not attract foolish or lewd citizens and their poverty means there is no reason for anyone to invade them.  By “fair and fat”, he means beautiful and wealthy, in its own paradoxical way.  The word for thyme is virtually identical to the word for courage or being highly “spirited” (thumos), which is apparently a play on words: the reader is to take it that the realm of the Cynic knapsack, by consisting of simple living, is characterised by the virtue of bravery.

There is a city, Pera in the wine-dark sea of folly,

Fair and fat, though filthy, with nothing much inside.

Never does there sail to it any foolish stranger,

Or lewd fellow who takes delight in the rumps of whores,

But it merely carries thyme and garlic, figs and loaves,

Things over which people do not fight or go to war,

Nor stand they to arms for small change or glory.

Again, from Diogenes Laertius, these lines express the Cynic notion of being a citizen of the world:

Not one tower does my country have, not one roof,

But for home and city, the entire earth lies

At my disposition for a dwelling.

Crates reputedly came from a wealthy family but disposed of all his money on becoming a Cynic.  Here he refers to his former wealth as vapour (tuphos) again, implying its insubstantial and ephemeral nature.  According to Diogenes Laertius, elsewhere he wrote:

This I own, what I have learned and thought, and the Muses’

Solemn precepts; but all my riches are gone like empty smoke.

The Greek Anthology includes the following lines of his Hymn to Frugality, which describes it as a species of temperance:

Hail, Goddess and Queen, beloved of the wise,

Frugality, worthy offspring of glorious Temperance,

Your virtues are honoured by all who practise righteousness.

Plutarch, in Rules for the Preservation of Health, cites these lines, commenting that Crates “believed that civil strife and despotism were brought about in the main by luxury and extravagance”.  Lentil soup was a cheap and simple meal traditionally associated with the Cynic way of life:

Do not throw us into strife

By preferring fine dishes to lentil soup.

Teles of Megara quotes these lines, referring again to the characteristic knapsack of the Cynic, and to lupin seeds, another typically cheap meal associated with them:

You have no idea what power a knapsack holds,

And a quart of lupins, and freedom from care.

Apparently, the meals emblematic of the Cynic way of life, lupins and lentil soup, are particularly associated with flatulence, and this happens to be a topic the Cynics also liked to mention.  For example, the following anecdote is recounted by Montaigne:

In the midst of a discussion, and in the presence of his followers, Metrocles let off a fart.  To hide his embarrassment he stayed at home until, eventually, Crates came to pay him a visit; to his consolations and arguments Crates added the example of his own licence: he began a farting match with him, thereby removing his scruples and, into the bargain, converting him to the freer stoic school from the more socially oriented Peripatetics whom he had formerly followed.

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Cynicism

The Cynic Prayer of Crates

Crates of Thebes was Diogenes the Cynic’s most famous pupil and the main teacher of Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism.

Glorious children of Mnemosyne and Olympian Zeus,

Pierian Muses, hearken to my prayer!

Grant me food without fail for my belly,

Which has ever made my life simple and unenslaved…

Make me useful rather than sweet to my friends.

Glorious goods I do not wish to gather, as one

Who yearns for the wealth of a beetle or riches of an ant;

No, I wish to possess righteousness and collect riches

Which are easily borne, easily gained, and conducive to virtue.

If these I win, I will propitiate Hermes and the holy Muses

Not with costly offering but with pious virtues.

From the Emperor Julian, the Apostate’s Orations.  This is a Cynic appropriation of a famous verse-prayer by Solon, the Athenian sage and statesman.  Solon prayed for prosperity and reputation, and to be sweet (pleasing) to his friends.  Crates, makes a pointed contrast by praying instead for just enough food as the body naturally requires, enough “riches” to survive and live simply, and he seeks to be useful rather than pleasant to his friends, by helping to make them better (more virtuous) people, even if that sometimes requires harsh words or actions.  Virtue replaces wealth, throughout, as the chief good in human life, being likewise what the gods value.

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Cynicism

Poems about Diogenes the Cynic

Here are some lines of ancient Greek verse about Diogenes of Sinope, the founder of Cynic philosophy.  I’ve also included some ancient verse about his student Monimos of Syracuse.

The staff and cloak are mentioned as typical accoutrements, along with the knapsack.  What is the main thing Diogenes gets praised for here?  Teaching the doctrine of self-sufficiency (autarkeia), or self-reliance, which is paradoxically described as the “easiest path through life”.

He is now no more, the Sinopean,
The staff-bearer with the doubled cloak who lived in the open air,
But has gone off because he pressed his lips and teeth together
And held his breath; for he was Diogenes in very truth,
A son of Zeus and hound of heaven

Cercidas of Megalopolis, in Diogenes Laertius.  “Diogenes” means son of Zeus, and “Cynic” comes from the word for dog.  These verses describe some of the stereotypical accoutrements and behaviours of the Cynics.  Death by holding one’s breath was considered a form of suicide favoured by philosophers.

Even bronze yields to time, but your glory,
O Diogenes, will remain intact through all eternity,
Since you taught mortals the doctrine of self-sufficiency
And showed them the easiest path through life.

Engraved on bronze statues of Diogenes the Cynic erected in Corinth following his death, according to Diogenes Laertius.  These lines might be taken to refer to what was considered the essence of the Cynic philosophy, the legacy of Diogenes being what the ancients describe as a “short-cut to virtue” consisting of a life of voluntary poverty and self-imposed hardship for the purposes of philosophical training.

The following relates to Monimos of Syracuse:

There was a man named Monimos, Philo, a wise one,
But none too famous – who carried a knapsack?-
Not one but three.  Never did he use a saying
Like “Know thyself”, by heaven, or other of the quoted
Proverbs, no, he went much further, the dirty beggar,
And declared all human suppositions to be illusion.

From Menander’s comedy The Groom.  Monimos, a student of Diogenes the Cynic, seems to be mocked here for being greedy compared to other Cynics, and carrying three knapsacks of food.

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Excerpts Philosophy of CBT

Stoic Fatalism, Determinism, and Acceptance

This is a brief excerpt from my book, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, published by Routledge and available to order online from Amazon, and everywhere they sell books.

Whatever sorrow the fate of the Gods may here send us
Bear, whatever may strike you, with patience unmurmuring;
To relieve it, so far as you can, is permitted,
But reflect that not much misfortune has Fate given to the good. – The Golden Verses of Pythagoras

Paul Dubois was perhaps the first modern “rational” psychotherapist to explicitly argue that emotional problems could be made worse by certain, often unspoken, philosophical assumptions about freewill and determinism which prevail in modern society.

Patience towards unavoidable events, depending neither upon us nor upon others, is synonymous with fatalism; it is a virtue, and it is the only stand to take in face of the inevitable. […] The idea of necessity is enough for the philosopher. We are all in the same situation towards things as they are, and towards things that we cannot change. The advantage will always lie with him who, for some reason or other, knows how to resign himself tranquilly. (Dubois, 1909, pp. 240-241)

This notion is equally prominent in Stoic literature. In the Handbook, Epictetus boldly asserts that if we merely train ourselves in wishing things to happen as they do, instead of expecting them to happen as we wish, then our lives will go smoothly (Enchiridion, 8). In the Discourses, he actually defines the practice of philosophy in terms of such acceptance, when he writes, ‘Being educated [in Stoic philosophy] is precisely learning to will each thing just as it happens’ (Discourses, 1.12.15). In an extant fragment from his other teachings, he says that the man who refuses to accept his fortune is a “layman in the art of life” (Fragment 2).

The conceptual and metaphysical problem of freewill has been a central theoretical concern throughout the entire history of Western philosophy. However, Dubois, the Stoics, and others, have seen confusion over precisely this issue as a central psychotherapeutic concern. Dubois dedicates a whole chapter of his textbook on psychotherapy to the issue of determinism in which he asserts, ‘My convictions on this subject have been of such help to me in the practise of psychotherapy that I can not pass this question by in silence’ (Dubois, 1904, p. 47). However, in modern society we take certain metaphysical views regarding freewill for granted, and seldom examine whether they are well-founded, or even logically consistent.

There are some conclusions which we easily arrive at by using the most elementary logic, and which we dare not express. They seem to be in such flagrant contradiction to public opinion that we fear we should be stoned, morally speaking, and we prudently keep our light under a bushel. The problem of liberty is one of those noli me tangere [“do not touch me”] questions.

If you submit it to a single individual in a theoretical discussion, in the absence of all elementary passion, he will have no difficulty in following your syllogisms; he will himself furnish you with arguments in favour of determinism. But address yourself to the masses, or to the individual when he is under the sway of emotion caused by a revolting crime, and you will call forth clamours of indignation, – you will be put under the ban of public opinion. (Dubois, 1904, p. 47)

The philosophical debate concerning “freewill versus determinism” in modern academic philosophy is incredibly complex. Dubois only engages with it at a very superficial level. However, one aspect of the debate can perhaps be made explicit by means of a very crude syllogism of the kind Dubois had in mind.

Most people seem to assume that we generally act on the basis of freewill, which is constrained to varying degrees by obstacles in their environment. So a man is free from extrinsic restrictions or limitations, and therefore completely responsible for his actions, unless he is held at gunpoint, or brainwashed, etc. However, this popular way of looking at things seems to confuse two different concepts of “freedom”, that of freedom from the effects of preceding causal factors, and that of freedom to pursue future goals without obstruction. By contrast, the simple determinist position of Dubois can be outlined as follows,

  1. All physical activity of the brain is wholly determined by antecedent causal factors.
  2. All mental activity is wholly determined by physical activity in the brain.
  3. Therefore, all mental activity is wholly determined by antecedent causal factors.

There are many variations of this argument, exhibiting different degrees of philosophical complexity and sophistication. However, this simple “premise-conclusion” format should at least be sufficient to expose the basic controversy. As Dubois observes, if we accept the physiological basis of the mind, ‘all thought being necessarily bound to the physical or the chemical phenomena of which the brain is the seat’, we are ultimately forced to abandon the metaphysical theory of freewill (Dubois & Gallatin, 1908, p. 9).

Doing so does not logically entail apathy and inertia, as many people falsely assume. Indeed, a man may be causally determined to respond to the perception of universal determinism with a sense of renewed commitment to his ideals, and to vigorous action.

At the exact moment that a man puts forth any volition whatever his action is an effect. It could not either not be or be otherwise. Given the sensory motor state, or the state of the intellect of the subject, it is the product of his real mentality. […] But it is nowhere written that the individual is going to persist henceforward in a downward course, that he is fatally committed to evil. But the fault having been committed, it should now be the time for some educative influence to be brought to bear, to bring together in his soul all the favourable motor tendencies and intellectual incentives, to arouse pity and goodness, or found on reason the sentiment of moral duty. (Dubois, 1904, pp. 55-56)

To a large extent, the defence of freewill has been a central concern of medieval Christian ethics and traditionally depends upon making a sharp metaphysical division between the body and the mind, such that our will can be considered the unfettered activity of a soul which exists independently of the body, a “ghost in the machine”, as Gilbert Ryle famously put it (Ryle, 1949).

However, if we accept the argument for determinism at face value it has radical implications for our attitudes toward ourselves and other people. It forces us to see other people as the product of genetics and environment and therefore acting in a manner which they cannot be “blamed” for in the ordinary sense of the word, i.e., in an absolute, metaphysical sense. We are all, to a large extent, victims of circumstance, insofar as we do what we do with the brains and the upbringing that nature has given us. Dubois puts this quite eloquently,

I know of no idea more fertile in happy suggestion than that which consists in taking people as they are, and admitting at the time when one observes them that they are never otherwise than what they can be.

This idea alone leads us logically to true indulgence, to that which forgives, and, while shutting our eyes to the past, looks forward to the future. When one has succeeded in fixing this enlightening idea in one’s mind, one is no more irritated by the whims of an hysterical patient than by the meanness of a selfish person.

Without doubt one does not attain such healthy stoicism with very great ease, for it is not, we must understand, merely the toleration of the presence of evil, but a stoicism in the presence of the culprit. We react, first of all, under the influence of our sensibility; it is that which determines the first movement, it is that which makes our blood boil and calls forth a noble rage.

But one ought to calm one’s emotion and stop to reflect. This does not mean that we are to sink back into indifference, but, with a better knowledge of the mental mechanism of the will, we can get back to a state of calmness. We see the threads which pull the human puppets, and we can consider the only possible plan of useful action – that of cutting off the possibility of any renewal of wrong deeds, and of sheltering those who might suffer from them, and making the future more certain by the uplifting of the wrong-doer. (Dubois, 1904, p. 56)

In other words, contemplation of determinism, the idea that human actions are definitely caused by a complex network of multiple preceding factors, mitigates our anger toward other people, and leads us closed to a healthy sense of understanding and forgiveness. We are also more enlightened regarding our practical responses and more inclined to reform rather than punish wrongdoers. When Socrates argued in The Republic that the Sage wishes to do good even to his enemies, he meant that the Sage sought to educate and enlighten others, seeing that as their highest good. That harmonious attitude is the polar opposite of the one which seeks revenge through moralising punishment. It leads to a sense of generosity and equanimity, and resolves anger, resentment, and contempt.

The Paradox of Freewill versus Determinism

Like Dubois after them, the Stoics were determinists, who believed that all events in life, including our own actions, are predetermined to happen as they do. However, paradoxically, they were also passionately in favour of increased personal responsibility and belief in one’s freedom to act and make decisions in accord with reason. Hence, Epictetus constantly reminds his students that no matter what happens to them they still have the opportunity to make of life what they will.

Sickness is an impediment to the body, but not to the faculty of choice, unless that faculty itself wishes it to be one. Lameness is an impediment to one’s leg, but not to the faculty of choice. And say the same to yourself with regard to everything that befalls you; for you will find it to be an impediment to something else, but not to yourself. (Enchiridion, 9)

Epictetus himself was famously lame, reputedly after being brutally crippled by his master when enslaved, so these remarks must have carried an extra poignancy, given his obvious physical disability.

To many people this seems confusing and contradictory. How can the Stoics emphasise both freedom and determinism? However, as often proves the case in philosophy, it is not the answer which is confused but the question. The Stoics evidently believe that the concepts of freedom and determinism are compatible.

It is virtually certain that Epictetus’ concept of a free will, far from requiring the will’s freedom from fate (i.e., a completely open future or set of alternative possibilities or choices), presupposes people’s willingness to comply with their predestined allotment. The issue that concerns him is neither the will’s freedom from antecedent causation nor the attribution to persons of a completely open future and indeterminate power of choice. Rather, it is freedom from being constrained by (as distinct from going along with) external contingencies, and freedom from being constrained by the errors and passions consequential on believing that such contingencies must influence or inhibit one’s volition. (Long, 2002, p. 221)

Confusion is caused because of a well-known and long-standing ambiguity in the popular notion of “freewill”. Metaphysical “freedom” refers to the freedom of the soul to act independently of antecedent causal factors. However, by contrast, “freedom” in common parlance merely refers to the ability of something to perform its prescribed function without external impediment or obstruction. A wheel turns freely unless, for instance, it is buckled or stopped by a rock. People act freely unless, for instance, other people restrain them physically or mentally. ‘For he is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can restrain’ (Discourses, 1.12.8).

The great Stoic academic, Chrysippus explained the Stoic theory of freewill and determinism by means of his famous “cylinder analogy”. In this example, it is argued that if we roll a cylinder along the ground, the initial impetus to move is given by someone pushing it, but the direction in which the cylinder moves, in a straight line, is determined by its own shape. The push is an example of what Stoics call an “external cause” coming from without, whereas the shape of the cylinder is the “internal cause” of the direction it takes, its own constitution. External causes impinge upon the human mind through the senses, and through other effects upon the body. However, the constitution, or character, of our mind determines how we will respond, acting as an “internal cause” of our response.

The mind is therefore autonomous to the extent that it can determine the direction in which it acts on the basis of its own character, however, external events impinge upon it and trigger its responses. Our actions are like the movement of the cylinder, insofar as both are due to a combination of “internal” and “external” factors. The cylinder is free to move according to its own nature so long as no further external causes obstruct it.

Whatever happens to you has been waiting to happen since the beginning of time. The twining strands of fate wove both of them together: your own existence and the things that happen to you. (Meditations, 10.5)

In this sense of the word “freedom”, which we should remind ourselves happens to be the normal sense, there is no incompatibility whatsoever with the notion of determinism because there is no reference made to the preceding causes which make the wheel turn, or the person act, in the first place. The cylinder rolls freely, its movement determined by antecedent events.

The notion of being free from preceding causes, by comparison, is a much more unusual and problematic concept. As Skinner argues at length in Beyond Freedom & Dignity, as our scientific understanding advances with regard to human behaviour, the notion that we were somehow exempt from universal determinism is very much eroded (1971, p. 21). He adds, ‘Although people object when a scientific analysis traces their behaviour to external conditions and thus deprives them of credit and the chance to be admired, they seldom object when the same analysis absolves them of blame’ (Skinner, 1971, p. 75).

But what of the inner feeling of freewill? Whatever sensations or impressions we might feel of “effort”, the idea that our actions are free is simply a sign that we are ignorant of their causes.

We do not think enough about the yoke inside, the result of ideas so thoroughly adopted that they seem like our own. That is what Spinoza meant when he said, “Men think themselves free only because they get a clear view of their actions, they do not think of the motives that determined them.” (Dubois, 1909, p. 53)

My freedom toward the future is a different matter and down to my specific circumstances in each situation, i.e., whether I am obstructed by external events or not.

When people are told that things happen because they have been determined by the preceding chain of causes they usually respond, at first, by complaining that there’s no point trying to change anything in that case. The Stoics and other ancient philosophers knew this as the “lazy argument”, and considered an obvious fallacy. The theory of determinism does not hold, as this fallacy requires, that all events are completely determined only by external causes, i.e., that people are completely passive in relation to the world. Rather, it holds that events are co-determined by the interaction of internal and external causes. My actions are part of the causal network, and therefore have an effect upon the things which happen. Nevertheless, accepting those things which are genuinely beyond my control, with philosophical resignation, is a key rational therapeutic strategy, and employed extensively by Stoics in the face of adversity.

This is a brief excerpt from my book, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, published by Routledge and available to order online from Amazon, and everywhere they sell books.

Philosophy of CBT Cover 2nd Edition
Categories
Cynicism Stoicism

Menedemos: Cynic in Fancy Dress?

Statuette of man in Arcadian hat
Man in Arcadian Pointy-Hat

Menedemos was a pupil of Colotes of Lampsacos [a pupil  of Epicurus who also studied Cynicism in 3-4th century BC].

According to Hippobotos, he advanced to such a degree of imposture that he went around in the guise of a Fury [an ancient chthonic goddess of vengeance], saying that he had come from Hades to take note of sins that were committed, so as to be able to report them, on his return, to the deities below.

This was the manner of his dress: he wore a dark [grey or black] tunic reaching down to his feet, with a red [lit. Phoenician, i.e., Tyrian purple] belt tied around it, and an Arcadian hat on his head with the twelve signs of the zodiac embroidered on it, and tragic buskins, and he had an enormously long beard, and carried an ash-wood staff in his hand.

Diogenes Laertius
Categories
Stoicism

The Succession of Philosophical Schools

According to Diogenes Laertius’ The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, there were two major schools of ancient Greek philosophy, the Ionian and Italian (or Eleatic) schools, which divide into four distinct successions that survived down to the Hellenistic period.  The Ionian School was founded by Thales and Anaximander, and their succession led down to Socrates, at which point his followers, “Socratics”, divided into two sub-divisions: The Cynic-Stoic tradition founded by Antisthenes and the Academic tradition founded by Plato. Plato’s student Aristotle then split off to form his own tradition, creating three subdivisions of the Ionian succession.  The Italian school began with Pherecydes and Pythagoras and ended with Epicurus.

The Ionian School

  1. Anaximander (“pupil of Thales”)
  2. Anaximenes
  3. Anaxagoras
  4. Archelaus
  5. Socrates (“who introduced ethics or moral philosophy”)

[Diogenes doesn’t include Heraclitus in the Ionian succession.  Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes are usually described as part of the Milesian school.]

The Italian School

  1. Pythagoras (“pupil of Pherecydes”)
  2. Telauges (his son)
  3. Xenophanes
  4. Parmenides
  5. Zeno of Elea
  6. Leucippus
  7. Democritus (“who had many pupils”)
  8. Nausiphanes [and Naucydes] (“in particular”)
  9. Epicurus (Succession ends)

The Socratics

The Academic Succession

  1. Plato (Student of Socrates, “founder of the Old Academy”)
  2. Speusippus
  3. Xenocrates
  4. Polemo
  5. Crantor
  6. Crates
  7. Arcesilaus (“founder of the Middle Academy”, who introduced an emphasis on skepticism)
  8. Lacydes (“founder of the New Academy”)
  9. Carneades
  10. Clitomachus (Succession ends)

The Cynic-Stoic Succession

  1. Antisthenes (student of Socrates)
  2. Diogenes the Cynic (founder of Cynicism)
  3. Crates of Thebes
  4. Zeno of Citium (founder of the Stoa)
  5. Cleanthes
  6. Chrysippus (Succession ends)

The Peripatetic Succession

  1. Aristotle (student of Plato)
  2. Theophrastus (Succession ends)

Excerpt from Diogenes Laertius

But philosophy, the pursuit of wisdom, has had a twofold origin; it started with Anaximander on the one hand, with Pythagoras on the other. The former was a pupil of Thales, Pythagoras was taught by Pherecydes. The one school was called Ionian, because Thales, a Milesian and therefore an Ionian, instructed Anaximander; the other school was called Italian from Pythagoras, who worked for the most part in Italy.  And the one school, that of Ionia, terminates with Clitomachus and Chrysippus and Theophrastus, that of Italy with Epicurus. The succession passes from Thales through Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, to Socrates, who introduced ethics or moral philosophy; from Socrates to his pupils the Socratics, and especially to Plato, the founder of the Old Academy; from Plato, through Speusippus and Xenocrates, the succession passes to Polemo, Crantor, and Crates, Arcesilaus, founder of the Middle Academy, Lacydes, founder of the New Academy, Carneades, and Clitomachus. This line brings us to Clitomachus.

There is another which ends with Chrysippus, that is to say by passing from Socrates to Antisthenes, then to Diogenes the Cynic, Crates of Thebes, Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus. And yet again another ends with Theophrastus; thus from Plato it passes to Aristotle, and from Aristotle to Theophrastus. In this manner the school of Ionia comes to an end.

In the Italian school the order of succession is as follows: first Pherecydes, next Pythagoras, next his son Telauges, then Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Leucippus, Democritus, who had many pupils, in particular Nausiphanes [and Naucydes], who were teachers of Epicurus. (Diogenes Laertius)

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Stoicism

Some Comments on Stoicism & Cynicism

Some Comments on Stoicism & Cynicism

Diogenes-Laertius_thumb.jpgDiogenes Laertius says in the prologue of his Lives of Eminent Philosophers that there were two main philosophical lineages: the Ionian, starting with Anaximander, and the Italian, starting with Pythagoras.  He then adds:

There is another which ends with Chrysippus, that is to say by passing from Socrates to Antisthenes, then to Diogenes the Cynic, Crates of Thebes, Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus.

This seems to mean that he sees Stoicism as a development of Cynicism, and in some sense derived from Socrates himself; or he may mean that Stoicism can be traced back beyond Socrates to Anaximander and the Ionian tradition.  He actually seems to describe the Ionian tradition as splitting into three roughly parallel lineages, founded by Plato, Antisthenes and Aristotle respectively.  These correspond to the major Hellenistic schools of the Academy, the Cynic-Stoic tradition, and Aristotelianism, with the addition of the Epicurean school, which he claims follows the Italian succession.

However, preceding his comments about the Cynic-Stoic succession, he explains that although Socrates stood in the Ionian tradition, he “introduced ethics or moral philosophy” , which may suggest that the lineage Socrates-Cynicism-Stoicism originates in Socrates’ novel conception of moral philosophy.   It may be worth noting that Diogenes says in his chapter on Socrates that “he discussed moral questions in the workshops and the market-place, being convinced that the study of nature is no concern of ours; and that he claimed that his inquiries embraced ‘Whatso’er is good or evil in an house'”, quoting Homer.  This appears to mean that Socrates was particularly known for his concern with moral questions that, rather than being purely abstract, dealt with our daily problems of living.  Moreover, Diogenes adds:

In my opinion Socrates discoursed on physics as well as on ethics, since he holds some conversations about providence, even according to Xenophon, who, however, declares that he only discussed ethics. But Plato, after mentioning Anaxagoras and certain other physicists in the Apology, treats for his own part themes which Socrates disowned, although he puts everything into the mouth of Socrates.

This ambivalence about questions of abstract physics can certainly be found in the Stoics as well, despite the fact that their philosophical curriculum was famously divided into: Physics, Ethics and Logic.  Later, in his chapter on Antisthenes, Diogenes goes on to mention Zeno and the Stoics:

It would seem that the most manly section of the Stoic School owed its origin to him. Hence Athenaeus the epigrammatist writes thus of them:

“Ye experts in Stoic story, ye who commit to sacred pages most excellent doctrines–that virtue alone is the good of the soul: for virtue alone saves man’s life and cities.  But that Muse that is one of the daughters of Memory approves the pampering of the flesh, which other men have chosen for their aim.”

Antisthenes gave the impulse to the indifference of Diogenes, the continence of Crates, and the patient endurance of Zeno, himself laying the foundations of their state.

He concludes this chapter by saying “we will now append an account of the Cynics and Stoics who derive from Antisthenes”.  Subsequently, in the last of his chapters on Cynicism (Menedemus) he comments:

They hold further that “Life according to Virtue” is the End to be sought, as Antisthenes says in his Heracles: exactly like the Stoics. For indeed there is a certain close relationship between the two schools. Hence it has been said that Cynicism is a short cut to virtue; and after the same pattern did Zeno of Citium live his life.

However, in De Finibus, Cicero portrays the Stoic Cato as saying:

Some Stoics say that the Cynics’ philosophy and way of life is suitable for the wise person, should circumstances arise conducive to its practice.  But others rule this out altogether.

With this in mind, it’s noticeable that whereas Epictetus very frequently refers to Diogenes the Cynic as an exemplar or role-model for his students, Seneca very seldom refers to Cynicism.  Indeed, at one point Seneca lists the philosophers he most admired, all of whom were Stoics, apart from Socrates and Plato – but neither Diogenes nor any other Cynic was included by him.

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Stoicism

Marcus Aurelius on Overcoming Anger and Developing Empathy

Men have come into being for one another; so either educate them or put up with them. (Meditations, 8.59)

Here are my attempts to (partially) retranslate, from ancient Greek into more contemporary English, some key passages from The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius dealing with Stoic strategies for overcoming anger and cultivating empathy.  Marcus wrote two elaborate lists of Stoic formulas intended as remedies for interpersonal conflict, the first is in a more polished style, the second presents a slightly more technical philosophical response to the same sort of problems.

The Meditations, Book 11 §18

[When offended by other people’s actions:]

  1. Remember the close bond between yourself and the rest of mankind and that we came into the world for the sake of one another; and taking another point of view, that I have come into it [as Emperor] to be set over men, as a ram over a flock or a bull over a herd.  Start at the beginning from this premise: If not atoms, then an all-controlling Nature.  If the latter, then the lower [animals] are for the sake of the higher and the higher [i.e., human beings] for one another.
  2. Think of the characters of those who offend you at the table, in their beds, and so on. In particular, remember the effect their negative way of thinking has on them, and the misplaced confidence it gives them in their actions.
  3. If what they’re doing is right, you’ve no reason to complain; and if it’s not right, then it must have been involuntary and unintentional. Because just as “no-one ever deliberately denies the truth,” according to Socrates, so nobody ever intentionally treats another person badly. That’s why these negative people are themselves insulted if anyone accuses them of injustice, ingratitude, meanness, or any other sort of offence against their neighbours -they just don’t realise they’re doing wrong.
  4. You yourself, are no different from them, and upset people in various ways. You might avoid making some mistakes, but the thought and inclination is still there, even if cowardice or egotism or some other negative motive has held you back you from copying their mistakes.
  5. Remember, you’ve got no guarantee they’re doing the wrong thing anyway, people’s motives aren’t always what they seem. There’s usually a lot to learn before any sure-footed moral judgements can be made about other people’s actions.
  6. Tell yourself, when you feel upset and fed up, that human life is transient and only lasts a moment; it won’t be long before we’ll all have been laid to rest.
  7. Get rid of this, make a decision to quit thinking of things as insulting, and your anger immediately disappears. How do you get rid of these thoughts? By realising that you’ve not really been harmed by their actions. Moreover, unless genuine harm to your soul is all that worries you, you’ll wind up being guilty of all sorts of offences against other people yourself.
  8. Anger and frustration hurt us more than the things we’re annoyed about hurt us.
  9. Kindness is an irresistible force, so long as it’s genuine and without any fake smiles or two-facedness. Even the most stubborn bad attitude is nothing, if you just keep being nice to the person concerned. Politely comment on his behaviour when you get the chance and, just when he’s about to have another go at you, gently make him self-conscious by saying “No, my son; we’re not meant for this. I’ll not be hurt; you’re just hurting yourself.” Subtly draw his attention to this general fact; even bees and other animals that live in groups don’t act like he does. Do it without any hint of sarcasm or nit-picking, though; do it with real affection and with your heart free from resentment. Don’t talk to him harshly like a school teacher or try to impress bystanders but, even though other people may be around, talk as if you’re alone together in private.

Keep these nine pieces of advice in mind, like nine gifts from the Muses; and while there’s still life in you, begin at last to be a man. While guarding yourself against being angry with others, though, be just as careful to avoid the opposite extreme, of toadying. One’s just as bad as the other, and both cause problems. With bouts of rage, always remind yourself that losing your temper is no sign of manhood. On the contrary, there’s more strength, as well as more natural humanity, in someone capable of remaining calm and gentle. He proves he’s got strength and nerve and guts, unlike his angry, complaining friend. Anger’s just as much a sign of weakness as bubbling with tears; in both cases we’re giving in to suffering. Finally, a tenth idea, this time from the very leader of the Muses, Apollo himself. To expect bad men never to do bad things is just madness; it’s asking the impossible. And to let them abuse other people, and expect them to leave you alone, that is arrogance.

The Meditations, Book 9 § 42

When you are offended by anyone’s shameless lack of conscience, put this question at once to yourself: “Can it therefore be possible that men without conscience do not exist in the world?”  No, it is not possible.  Therefore do not ask for the impossible.  For the individual in question is just one of the conscienceless people that necessarily exist in the world.  Have the same reflection ready-to-hand for the rogue, the deceiver, or any other wrongdoer whatsoever.  For the recollection that this sort of man cannot but exist will bring kindlier feelings towards individuals of this sort.  It’s also very useful to immediately think this to yourself: “What virtue has Nature given humanity as a counter-measure to the wrong-doing in question?”  For as an antidote against the unfeeling man she has given gentleness, and against another person some other resource.

In any case, it is in your power to teach the man that has gone astray the error of his ways.  For everyone that errs misses his true mark and has gone astray.  But what harm have you suffered?  You will find that not one of the persons against whom you are exasperated has done anything capable of making your mind worse; but it is there in your mind that what is evil for you and harmful have their whole existence.

What is harmful or strange about the uneducated man acting like an uneducated man?  Look and see whether you aren’t more to blame yourself for not expecting that he would act wrongly in this way.  For your own faculty of reason too could have given you means for concluding that this would most likely be the case.  Nevertheless all this is forgotten, and you are surprised at his wrongdoing.

But above all, when you find fault with a man for untrustworthiness and ingratitude, turn your thoughts to yourself.  For the fault is evidently your own, whether you trusted that a man with such a character would be trustworthy, or if in granting a kindness you did not bestow it absolutely and so that from the very act of doing it you immediately had the reward in full.

For when you had performed a kindness, what more do you want?  Is it not enough that you have done something in accord with your nature?  Do you seek compensation for it?  As though the eye should claim a payment for seeing, or the feet for walking!  For just as these latter were made for their special work, and by carrying this out according to their individual constitution they come fully into their own, so also man, formed as he is by nature for benefiting others, when he has acted as benefactor or as collaborator in any other way for the common welfare, has done what he was constituted for, and has what is his.