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Epicureanism

Epictetus: Stoicism versus Epicureanism

EpicurusNB: This is a draft, I’m still adding the final sections.

In the surviving Discourses, Epictetus is shown discussing the rival philosophical school of Epicureanism at considerable length with his Stoic students.  Typically his comments are scathingly critical of Epicureanism.  He even appears to criticize some of his students for failing to attain Stoic virtue by accusing them of being mere “Epicureans”.  Diogenes Laertius, one of our few sources for Epicurean doctrines, begins his chapter on Epicurus in The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers with a list of criticisms and allegations made against him by the Stoics.  He adds: “Epictetus calls him preacher of effeminacy and showers abuse on him”, which is definitely in accord with the tone of criticism we find in the surviving Discourses.

Some of Epictetus’ comments are scattered, and of those some are more direct than others.  However, there are also three Discourses in which he more explicitly and directly critiques the philosophy of Epicurus.  

  1. In answer to Epicurus (1.23)
  2. Against Epicureans and Academics (2.20)
  3. A conversation with the Imperial Bailiff of the Free Cities, who was an Epicurean (3.7)

This is probably fairly consistent with Stoic teachings in general, which appear to have become increasingly focused on the criticism of Epicureanism from at least the time of Chrysippus onward.  Diogenes Laertius tells us that, among his numerous books, Chrysippus wrote two entitled Proofs that Pleasure is not the End-in-chief of Action and Proofs that Pleasure is not a Good, which definitely sound like they may have contained systematic critiques of the Epicurean position.

Often criticisms of Epicurean philosophy merge with more general criticisms made against those who treat pleasure as the goal of life.  In the time of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, this probably began with attacks against the Cyrenaic school of philosophy, and later expanded to encompass the teachings of Epicurus.  However, it also extends more generally to non-philosophers who treat pleasure as if it were the most important thing in life.  Some proponents of Epicureanism will object that this is a caricature of his philosophical teachings.  However, the Epicurean teachings were notoriously ambiguous, or even contradictory, and Epicurus and his followers do seem at times to have professed doctrines that sound like those being attacked by the Stoics, including the sort of hedonism Epictetus is so keen to dispute for the sake of his students.

Epictetus’ key criticisms of Epicurus can be summed up as follows:

  1. Like the Academic Skeptics, Epicurus frequently contradicts himself by taking for granted in practice assumptions that he claims to reject in his philosophical doctrines.
  2. If he rejects the concept of fellowship between mankind, or a moral duty to others, then what’s motive for writing so many books and teaching his philosophy to others?
  3. If he really wanted to obtain “security” for his own tranquillity from other men then, paradoxically, he’d actually be better to teach them Stoicism rather than Epicureanism, because that would better serve his own self-interest.

Typically he employs a method that’s modelled on Socratic questioning, seeking to expose internal contradictions in his opponents’ views, especially between their words and actions. Hence, this isn’t an abstract or nit-picking debate. Epictetus is very much focused on the day-to-day practical implications of following one philosophy over another. Likewise, it’s sometimes said that he’s misinterpreting the Epicureans or being unfair to them. However, it’s likely that he was more familiar with Epicurean doctrines, and their practical way of life, than we are today. He probably had many Epicureans visit his school. Indeed, in one of the Discourses described below, we can actually see the record of a Socratic exchange between Epictetus and an Epicurean philosopher, which apparently took place in public before his students.

In answer to Epicurus

In this Discourse (1.23), Epictetus begins by claiming that Epicurus has “set our good in the husk which we wear”, the physical body, and that by doing so he’s led into contradiction when he also tries to profess the view that humans are by nature social beings.  We’re told Epicurus taught that “we should neither admire nor accept anything that is detached from the nature of the good”, something the Stoics would emphatically agree with.  However, we’re also told that Epicurus rejected the view that affection for our own children is a natural instinct, which the Stoics argue forms the basis of our social nature, and the virtue of justice.  For Epicureans, although friendship is important, it’s typically portrayed as being of only instrumental value, i.e., a means to the end of preserving one’s own mind in pleasant tranquillity.  Sometimes love or friendship may cause more turmoil than calm, and in these cases Epicureans seem to shun relationships.  For that reason, incidentally, Seneca also accuses Epicureanism of encouraging superficial or “fair-weather” friendships.

Epicurus actually taught that the wise man will not raise a family and that his followers should emulate this way of life, which he apparently followed himself in practice.  He apparently argued that by marrying and having children, one makes oneself particularly vulnerable to disturbance and emotional suffering on their behalf, so it is better to avoid this if you want to live a life of tranquillity.  Compare this to Socrates, the Stoics’ supreme role-model, who reputedly told his friends that he remained married to his notoriously shrewish wife, Xanthippe because she offered him the opportunity to strengthen his character through patience and self-discipline in the face of provocation.  Epictetus ridicules the obvious inconsistency of Epicurus in this regard because he was understood to be very fond of his favourite house-slave, nicknamed “Mouse” and concerned for his welfare.  If he really believed that we should avoid marrying and having children to minimise potential for emotional disturbance, then to be truly consistent Epicurus should have also avoided becoming emotionally attached to his friends and slaves.  Epictetus says, strikingly, here that “once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it or to care for it.”  He’s talking about the normal state of affairs of course, and I’m sure he’d admit that there are some exceptions to this natural inclination.

He goes on to say that Epicurus, for the same reasons that he gives against marrying and having children, also advises his followers not to engage in politics.  By this he means generally being involved in public life, the affairs of the city, for the sake of one’s community, and not just what we mean by professional politics today.  Epicurus, of course, withdrew to a private garden outside the city walls of Athens where he enjoyed the company of a small circle of friends, who discussed philosophy among themselves in seclusion.  One of the mottoes of the Epicurean garden, according to Plutarch, was actually “live in obscurity” (lathe biōsas).  We might say: “keep your head down and stay out of trouble.”  By contrast, Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, paced up and down the public colonnade known as the Stoa Poekile, on the edge of the Athenian marketplace.  He probably did this, partly, in emulation of Socrates who also taught philosophy in the agora.  Members of the public, philosophers of other schools, and politicians, could approach them there and engage them in debate over the nature of philosophical questions, particularly ethical questions of a practical nature.  Epictetus appears to imply that Epicurus’ advice was rather than to marry and have children or to engage in public life, as the Stoics advised their students, one should “live among men as though you were a fly among flies”, meaning in a detached manner, lacking any sense of natural affection or affiliation toward other people.

Epictetus attacks Epicurus quite ferociously for hypocrisy in this regard, partly because he ignores the fact that affection for own children is completely natural, and therefore the basis of social ethics, according to Stoicism.  Even domestic animals like sheep, or wild animals like wolves, do not feel indifference to their own offspring.  (The Stoics, incidentally, classified people as having lost their essential humanity and degenerating to the level of either domestic or wild animals if they’d succumbed to the vices of hedonism or aggression, respectively.)  In ancient Greece, as in the tale of Oedipus, unwanted or sickly infants were sometimes left outdoors by their parents to die of exposure.  So Epictetus concludes his Socratic charge of contradiction and hypocrisy, against Epicurus, as follows:

Come now, who follows your advice when he sees his child fallen on the ground and crying?  Why, in my opinion, your mother and your father, even if they had divined that you were going to say such things, would not have left you to die of exposure!

Against Epicureans and Academics

In this Discourse (2.20), Epictetus begins by reminding his students of several well-established criticisms made against Academic Skepticism.  His main objection is that the Skeptics contradict themselves by forwarding arguments that take for granted some of the assumptions they’re trying to undermine.  He soon shifts his focus onto Epicurus, though, whom he accuses of essentially the same philosophical error.  

His first target is the claim, which he attributes to the Epicurean school, that there is no “natural fellowship” among mankind.  Epictetus claims that Epicurus  necessarily contradicts himself by making use of precisely that assumption in practice.  Some modern proponents of Epicureanism seem to question whether this was indeed part of the ancient creed.  However, ancient commentators on Epicureanism generally take it for granted that this was one of their best-known doctrines.  Epictetus actually quotes Epicurus as saying:

Be not deceived, men, nor led astray, nor mistaken; there is no natural fellowship with one another among rational beings; believe me.  Those who say the contrary are deceiving you and leading you astray with false reasons.

“Why do you care then?”, asks Epictetus.  Why do you teach?  Why did you labour day and night to write so many books of philosophy for others to read?  If we are deceived in this way, how does it harm your ability to enjoy peace of mind, Epicurus?  There seems to be a conflict here between the values being taught and the very act of teaching them to others.  In fact, Epicurus would attain more “security” for his pleasant way of life from other men, if he allows them to be “deceived”, as he puts it.  The goal of Epicureanism is supposed to be to preserve one’s lasting pleasure, or peace of mind, at all costs.  Epictetus is really rolling two criticisms into one here.  Epicurus’ actions seem hypocritical.  However, paradoxically, it also seems like anyone sincerely embracing Epicureanism would be better off to teach Stoicism to others, and the doctrine of natural affection toward mankind, because that would ultimately be more in their self-interest.

Why do you care, then?  Allow us to be deceived.  Will you far any the worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that we do have a natural fellowship with one another, and that we ought by all means to guard it?  Nay, your position will be much better and safer.  […] What do you care how the rest of mankind will think about these matters, or whether their ideas be sound or not?  For what have you to do with us?  Come, do you interest yourself in sheep because they allow themselves to be shorn by us, and milked, and finally to be butchered and cut up?  Would it not be desirable if men could be charmed and bewitched into slumber by the Stoics and wlos themselves to be shorn and milked by you and your kind?  Is not this something that you ought to have said to your fellow Epicureans only and to have concealed your views from outsiders, taking special pains to persuade them, of all people, that we are by nature born with a sense of fellowship, and that self-control is a good thing, so that everything may be kept for you?

The Stoics believed that all men deserve our consideration, as brothers, and we should view ourselves as all citizens of a single state, consisting of the whole cosmos.  Epicurus at times appears to completely reject any fellowship among mankind or mutual obligation to benefit others.  However, even if he qualifies that by arguing that fellowship should be maintained selectively, for pragmatic reasons, it seems to cause further difficulties.

Or ought we to maintain this fellowship with some, but not others?  With whom, then, ought we to maintain it?  With those who reciprocate by maintaining it with us, or with those who are transgressors of it?  And who are greater transgressors of it than you Epicureans who have set up such doctrines?

In much the same way that the Skeptics try to defy nature by denying the reliability of our eyes and ears, Epicurus defies nature by denying our natural affections, and drive to benefit other humans.

A conversation with the Imperial Bailiff of the Free Cities, who was an Epicurean

In this Discourse (3.7), an actual conversation between Epictetus and a follower of Epicurus is reported. That’s important to note because due to the notorious ambiguity of Epicurean teachings, people sometimes want to question whether Epictetus really understood Epicureanism.  It’s likely, however, that he had access to more Epicurean teachings than we do today.  Scholars believe Epictetus possessed rare copies of early Greek Stoic texts, which he read to students and was discussing with them in the surviving Discourses.  These may have been the books of Zeno, and more likely some of those by Chrysippus.  These quite probably contained references to early Epicurean teachings.  However, Epictetus would also have known many late Roman Epicureans personally.  As this Discourse proves, Epicureans visited him and apparently discussed philosophy in his school, in the presence of students like Arrian, who recorded this conversation.  So it’s unfairly dismissive to merely place in question his familiarity with the philosophy.  Epictetus probably knew a great deal more about the teachings and way of life endorsed by Epicureans than we ever will.

We’re told from the outset that the Imperial Bailiff or “Corrector”, a high-ranking government official, “who was an Epicurean”, came to visit Epictetus.  Epictetus welcomed the Epicurean by presenting himself as a relative laymen with regard to the teachings of Epicurus, in the presence of an expert, and seeking to learn more by questioning him.  That’s striking because it obviously resembles “Socratic irony”, the way Socrates would act as if he were ignorant, rather than play the part of a guru himself, and instead question his visitors in depth about their philosophical and ethical beliefs.  Epicurus himself did the opposite of Socrates and happily claimed to be an enlightened sage, which arguably led his followers to treat him as a guru figure.  (They celebrated his birthday every year, kept pictures of him, and memorised his teachings verbatim, etc.)  By contrast, the Stoics believed that the wise man is “as rare as the Ethiopian phoenix”, a mythical bird supposedly born every five hundred years.  Neither Zeno nor any of the other founders of the Stoa claimed to be wise themselves.  Instead they seem to have classed themselves as fools, who were merely helping other fools to approach wisdom.  Seneca described himself as like a patient in one bed describing how his therapy is going to the patient in the bed beside him.  That attitude toward experts, or wise men, was a major practical difference between the Stoic and Epicurean schools, which shaped their respective discourses about philosophy.  Epictetus refers to himself here as a “layman” in philosophy, whereas Epicurus called himself a sage.  By contrast, although we may read an account of him explicitly denying that he is wise, after his death it appears that Epictetus may have been considered sage-like by his followers.

Once again, Epictetus then engages in what’s obviously a Socratic-style questioning, this time of his Epicurean guest.  He proceeds to ask him about his assumptions concerning the good, and then to expose apparent contradictions in his position.  He leads the Epicurean into a position where he appears to admit that pleasure must have some object, and for it to be good, its object must also be good.  The goodness of pleasure depends upon the goodness of the thing we take pleasure in.  For example, to take pleasure in atrocities would be bad.  They agree the highest good must be the moral purpose (prohairesis) of the soul, i.e., the seat of wisdom and virtue, which most people agree is what we find most praiseworthy in man.  However, Epictetus points out that this stands in direct contradiction to the Epicurean doctrine, which he describes as saying that: “pleasure of soul is pleasure in the things of the body” because “then they become matters of prime importance, and the true nature of the good.”

Epictetus also mentions another well-established criticism of Epicureanism, one also discussed by Cicero and others.  Epicurus, he says, does not condemn theft as wicked but says that it only becomes so because of the pain, or displeasure, caused by actually being caught, or worry about being caught.  It’s the pleasure that comes from avoidance of pain that’s the supreme goal of life, and avoiding theft and other vicious acts is merely a means to this end.  So Epictetus poses the obvious question: what if “the stealing be done secretly, safely, without anybody’s knowledge”?  There are many instances where we have the opportunity to act unethically without any risk whatsoever of detection.  Epictetus mentions also that if he happens to have “influential friends in Rome”, powerful friends, then an Epicurean may have very little motive to behave himself, being placed above fear of reprisals by his social status and connections in society.  If he sincerely believes that pleasure is his own highest good, for the sake of which he would be willing to sacrifice everything else, then there are bound to be many situations where this can be pursued without the fear of being caught that Epicurus claims should be sufficient to keep us from acting antisocially.

Epictetus goes on to mention another familiar response to the Epicureans: that they aspire to act virtuously but doing so is in conflict with the problematic ethical doctrines that they claim to follow.  He jokes that whereas the Stoics aspire to noble doctrines, although they sometimes fall short of them and lapse into base actions, the Epicureans aspire to base doctrines even when they engage in noble deeds.  He’s basically saying to his Epicurean guest: “You’re better than this.”  Your actions are good, but your philosophy isn’t fit for purpose because if you followed it consistently you should potentially be doing things that go against your own moral conscience.  There’s a contradiction between your philosophy and your way of life.

He then proceeds to discuss yet another familiar criticism of Epicureanism by posing the question very bluntly: “In the name of God, I ask you, can you imagine an Epicurean state?”  Epicureanism often appeals to individuals, it’s self-interested in a particular way, but it’s far less appealing to imagine being surrounded by people adopting the same values, e.g., that your life and wellbeing would only be of value to them as long as it was consistent with their goal of preserving their own lasting pleasure and peace of mind.  Epictetus says the Epicureans say: “people ought not to marry”, nor have children, nor “perform the duties of a citizen”, i.e., participate in society.  If everyone embraced this philosophy, Epictetus says, society would simply collapse.  There could be no genuinely Epicurean state.  “Your doctrines are bad, subversive of the state, destructive to the family…  Drop these doctrines, man!”  We should look for philosophical doctrines that are consistent with our way of life, and help us to flourish and become good citizens.  That’s what we would want from other people around us.

The persuasive power of vice is so strong already – it’s the biggest challenge we face in life.  Why then, says Epictetus, embrace philosophical doctrines that potentially make this temptations seem even more powerful by judging our supreme good to reside in pleasure?  Pleasure, he says, should be subordinate to virtue, and not the other way around.  The Epicurean bailiff apparently claims he has power over other man, and influence at the Emperor’s court.  However, Epictetus concludes by saying this is not true leadership but that comes from the authority of someone like Socrates, whose wisdom and virtue make men want to emulate him as a role-model.

Scattered remarks by Epictetus

Elsewhere in the surviving DiscoursesEpictetus uses Epicureanism as a kind of insult against some of his students:

Do you not realize the kind of men they are whose language you have just uttered?  That they are Epicureans and blackguards?  And yet, while doing their deeds and holding their opinions, you recite to us the words of Zeno and Socrates? (3.24)

Elsewhere he makes a similar remark:

Why did you call yourself a Stoic?  Observe yourselves thus in your actions and you will find out to what sect of the philosophers you belong.  You will find that most of you are Epicureans, some few Peripatetics, but these without any backbone; fore wherein do you in fact show that you consider virtue equal to all things else, or even superior?  But as for a Stoic, show me one if you can!  (2.19)

In one of the surviving fragments (14), he seems to be saying that in contrast to the Epicureans, the Stoics hold that “pleasure is not something natural, but a sequel of things that are natural, as justice, self-control, and freedom.”  Epictetus asks why the soul doesn’t take pleasure in its own goods  but rather in the inferior goods of the body.  He says, though, that nature has given us a sense of shame, which causes us to blush at vice, and this prevents him from “laying down pleasure as the good and end of life.”

But if I put what is mine in one scale, and what is honourable in the other, then the statement of Epicurus assumes strength, in which he declares that “the honourable is either nothing at all, or at best only what people hold in esteem.” (2.22)

He claims in another Discourse (2.23) that Epicurus has said that the flesh is the  most excellent part of man.  Epictetus claims that when Epicurus was dying and wrote “We are spending what is our last and at the same time a happy day?”, and when he wrote so many books to benefit his followers, it was not his flesh that prompted him to do so but his moral purpose (prohairesis).  We would have to act like we were blind to ignore the presence of a higher faculty within us than that of physical sensation.

If Epicurus should come and say that the good ought to be in the flesh, again the explanation becomes lengthy, and you must be told what is the principal faculty within us, and what our substantial, and what our essential, nature is.  Since it is not probable that the good of a snail lies in its flesh?  But take our own case, Epicurus: what more masterful faculty do you yourself possess?  What is that thing within you which takes counsel, which examines into all things severally, which after examining the flesh itself, decides that it is the principal matter?  And why do you light a lamp and toil in our behalf, and write such quantities of books?  Is it that we may not fail to know the truth?  Who are we?  And what are we to you?  And so the argument becomes lengthy.  (1.21)

Categories
Stoicism

Stoicism Defends Itself (Draft)

[This is just a first draft so don’t worry too much if there are some typos or bits you don’t agree with — I’ll probably just change it later!]Brace Yourselves Meme

When people first begin studying Stoicism it’s inevitably not long before they encounter debate involving various criticisms of the philosophy.  All of these criticisms are, in a sense, legitimate.  Of course, it’s natural and healthy for us to engage in these sort of philosophical discussions, especially if we can shed some light on things for ourselves or others.  However, the majority of these criticisms – at least the ones I’ve heard over the past ten or fifteen years – tend to be based upon simple misconceptions about Stoicism, which can be answered fairly easily if we take the time to do so.  I’ve therefore chosen to try to summarise the main arguments in one article and to provide an overview of them and the way I’d normally tend to reply.  I don’t really have space here to go into all of these matters in a great deal of depth – so some people are bound to find my replies insufficient as they stand – but I think the brief comments below may provide a good indication of some ways to answer the criticisms I’m talking about and I’m sure others can develop them further.

In the Beginning was the Word

The most common source of misconceptions about Stoicism is simply the word itself.  “Stoicism” is a homonym: it sounds identical, and is spelt the same, as another word, which nevertheless means something fundamentally quite different.  There are two different things called by this name, in other words.  The difference is usually indicated by capitalisation.

  1. The word “Stoicism” with a capital “S” refers to an ancient Greek school of philosophy, defined by its central ethical tenet: that “virtue” (or excellence of character) is the only true good.
  2. The word “stoicism” with a small “s” is a modern expression, referring to a personality trait, which involves calmness in the face of adversity but is also often taken to imply a lack of emotion in general.

Indeed, it’s not a coincidence that both things are called by the same name.  The personality trait is named “stoicism” because of the ancient school of philosophy.  However, the relationship between these concepts is tenuous and quite problematic.  

The ancient philosophical school of Stoicism does not, in fact, advocate being “stoic”, in the sense of being unemotional, as we shall see.  It’s also misleading because people talk about having a naturally “stoic” temperament whereas “Stoicism” consists of a philosophical world-view and set of values.  Someone may have a “stoic” personality but hold completely different beliefs from someone who is “Stoic” in the philosophical sense of the word.  In particular, people today often describe someone as “stoic” who believes that something genuinely bad has happened to them, perhaps bankruptcy or divorce, but keeps a “stiff upper-lip” despite their upset.  That person would not be a “Stoic” in the philosophical sense, though, because, as we’ll see, although he may rationally “prefer” not to be bankrupt or divorced, a Stoic philosopher would not judge these things to be intrinsically bad to begin with.

Philosophy, what Philosophy?

By far the most popular and widely-read book on Stoicism is The Meditations of the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius.  It’s a wonderful book and represents Marcus’ attempts to train himself in Stoic practices, while recording his maxims and reflections in the form of a contemplative journal.  However, it’s therefore not a systematic treatise on Stoic philosophy.  Because Marcus was writing for himself, in a kind of aphoristic style, he did not generally take time to make his philosophical assumptions explicit.  Nevertheless, Stoicism was famous in the ancient world for its highly systematic nature.  Scholars who are familiar with the doctrines and arguments of Stoic philosophy, and its technical terminology, easily spot that Marcus is working within that system.  However, for most readers this is simply not apparent and so I’ve heard intelligent people say that Marcus was just writing down his “random musings” and nothing more.  For that reason, many individuals, having read only The Meditations and not any other Stoic texts or modern commentaries, naturally tend to assume that Stoicism is a loosely-defined set of ideas.  The opposite is the case, though.  

Stoicism is a tightly-integrated, formal, philosophical system.  It was founded in 301 BC in Athens by Zeno of Citium and Marcus, who happens to be pretty much the last famous Stoic we find in history, died in 180 AD.  So the Stoic school of philosophy survived for almost 500 years, half a millennium, as a living, practical and theoretical tradition.  Thousands of books were apparently written on Stoicism in the ancient world, although less than 1% of that literature survives today.  Zeno himself was known for the “laconic” brevity of both his sayings and arguments.  However, Chrysippus, the third head (“scholarch”) of the Stoic school, engaged in much more elaborate philosophical arguments than Zeno and supposedly wrote over 700 books (although perhaps short books, more like essays).  I suspect that he probably felt that it was necessary to elaborate upon the doctrines of the school in this way in order to defend them against equally elaborate criticisms of Stoicism, which were taught and published by philosophers aligned with other schools of philosophy, particularly the Skeptics of the Platonic Academy.  In any case, Stoicism was always renowned as a highly sophisticated and coherent system of philosophy, with a complex technical vocabulary and an extensive armamentarium of practical psychological strategies at its disposal.  Criticisms often fail to take account of that by interpreting passages in isolation, without reference to the rest of the philosophical framework on which individual ideas or practices depend.

Why Just Pick on the Stoics?

Another common pattern that emerges when we look at criticisms of Stoicism is that they’re often, on closer inspection, highly skeptical arguments, of a very broad nature.  They would would apply much more generally than their author is letting on.  For example, a speaker at our 2015 conference on Stoicism forwarded the criticism that Stoic practices should not be taught in schools because they could be exploited to make children take on excessive responsibility for their emotional distress, and thereby disguise the role of the environment and socio-political factors.  However, it seems to me that this argument does not specifically apply to Stoicism but to more or less any form of resilience-building or psychological self-improvement whatsoever.  It’s much less tempting accept such an argument when we realise its scope extends so widely.  

Likewise, as we’ll see below, Stoicism is also often criticised because its ethical doctrines can’t be conclusively proven with either philosophical or empirical arguments.  However, that’s also true of ethics in general, including ethical doctrines based on Christian, Buddhist, Marxist, humanist, and all other religions and philosophies.  Of course, just noticing this problem with the criticism isn’t sufficient to answer the criticism.  However, for many people, it does weaken its appeal somewhat.  It’s also often the case that criticisms of Stoicism are so general in scope that they would undermine beliefs that the speaker is already committed to holding themselves, leaving them in a position of self-contradiction, although this may not be apparent at first glance.  

Many of the criticisms of Stoicism that I’ve heard try to argue that it can’t be healthy or effective psychologically, on the basis of some objection to the cognitive theory of emotions.  However, cognitive-behavioural therapy is based on a very similar model of emotion and employs similar strategies.  CBT has proven its effectiveness in many hundreds of highly-sophisticated clinical trials.  The fact that it’s safe and beneficial, overall for a range of conditions, is pretty much beyond reasonable doubt now.  Yet sometimes criticisms of Stoicism ignore this overlap and, in certain cases, if we took them seriously they should lead us to discount something that we know works, from empirical evidence, which would be an absurd conclusion.  Questions about the effectiveness of Stoic strategies as a therapy for the emotions can only be settled by consulting relevant scientific evidence because it’s an empirical question, not a purely philosophical one.  Armchair discussions about the effectiveness of therapies should set our alarm bells ringing.  This kind of idle speculation is surprisingly common, though.  It’s more obvious that these arguments are vacuous if we consider how they would fare in relation to cognitive-behavioural therapy rather than just Stoic therapy.

The Unproven Ethics of Stoicism

As mentioned above, one of the most common criticisms of Stoicism is that its ethical doctrines cannot be philosophically proven.  Although the ancient Stoics believed that they could provide rigorous proofs of their main conclusions, and defend them against radical ethical skepticism, we’re told they were mistaken.  Now, funnily enough, there’s undoubtedly some validity to this criticism.  However, it has to be understood in the following context: no philosophical or non-philosophical system of ethics has ever provided a conclusive proof of its doctrines.  So this extremely-skeptical criticism would apply not just to Stoicism but to ethics in general, and often to ethical assumptions held by the person making the criticism.  Even if the ethics of Stoicism can’t be proven conclusively, many people obviously feel that it can be shown to be consistent with their own deepest ethical convictions, on reflection, and to lead to a coherent ethical world-view.  That’s often enough for them and is arguably all that we can ask for in terms of a philosophical justification for ethics.  

It’s sometimes also claimed that Stoic Ethics depends on the assumption that a provident God exists and that without this premise, which many modern readers reject, its ethical system loses its foundation.  However, as we’ll see below, the Stoics were pantheists who believed in a “philosophers’’ god”, radically different from the Zeus of Greek mythology or the Judeo-Christian Jehovah.  The Stoics were also materialists of a sort and their God is synonymous with Nature as a whole.   Many people who reject the idea of the Christian God or the supernatural beings described in Greek mythology (assuming we take it literally) would be more willing to accept the notion that Nature as a whole can be viewed as an active process, from which certain values might somehow be derived.  The main issue at stake is whether Nature can be viewed in teleological terms, as having some kind of ideal or goal, in reference to  which other values could be established.  Although that’s a view that many people reject in theory, it’s worth noting that most people in their daily lives act as if they were committed to the assumption that things naturally have an optimum or ideal state.  For example, we would find it very difficult to suspend any thinking that employs the concept of something (ourselves and other people included) being “helped” or “harmed” by events.  However, that way of talking, thinking, and acting arguably betrays the fact that we’re already committed to a world-view in which there’s a desirable state that things “should” be allowed to be in.  Of course, the Stoics would argue that we’re all wrong to think that physical injury, financial loss, and attacks on our reputation are genuinely “harmful” but I believe that’s an easier step to take than trying to argue against the extreme form of skepticism that denies the possibility of any meaningful goal in nature whatsoever.  To put it another way: although this type of ethical skepticism might seem difficult to counter, I don’t think many people are really able to view the world that way in practice anyway.  For the Stoics, Nature’s goal for man is “virtue”, for him to excel and flourish in his use of practical reason.  So very simply: virtue helps him and vice harms him: everything else is “indifferent” in this regard.

Moreover, the Stoics actually seldom appeal to theological premises, about the existence or nature of God, in order to justify their ethical conclusions anyway.  They forward many other lines of argument to support their central claim that the supreme goal of life is virtue, or excellence of character.  (Not just because Zeus wills it.)  For instance, to take just one example, they argue that to judge something “good” is to desire it, and that it makes no sense to desire something that is not under our control, therefore the good must reside in some quality of our own voluntary actions, and good actions are what we mean by virtue.  (To be fair this proto-Kantian argument – “should entails can” – isn’t very explicit but I believe the Stoics allude to it and it’s easy to see how it would be consistent with their surviving remarks.)  They also argue that on reflection we tend to praise and admire other people not for their possessions but for the character of their voluntary actions, for “virtues” or good qualities such as wisdom, justice, courage, and self-discipline, and it would be inconsistent or hypocritical of us not to value and desire the same thing (virtue) for ourselves.  Whatever we make of these and other Stoic Ethical arguments, it’s simply not true that, in any obvious sense, they require us to agree with archaic metaphysical or theological assumptions.  I believe we could make the same sort of arguments today, from the perspective of modern scientific atheism or agnosticism, and defend them with additional arguments drawn from that world-view, without contradicting Stoicism’s central doctrines.  

Stoics Have Feelings Too

Many people mistakenly assume that Stoics seek to “repress”, “suppress”, or “eliminate” all of their emotions.  Sometimes this is described as the assumption that Stoics are like the character Mr. Spock from Star Trek, or that they are unemotional like a “cold fish”.  To be fair, even some highly-regarded academic scholars have, in the past, argued that Stoicism teaches the “extirpation” (uprooting and elimination) of all emotions.  However, I think few experts on Stoicism today would accept that interpretation.  First of all, it’s difficult to imagine why Stoicism would have been so successful in appealing to so many different people, for so many hundreds of years, if what it taught us was that we should eliminate all of our feelings, even the pleasant and seemingly healthy ones.  Also, much of our emotional life is not entirely “up to us”, and battling “stoically” against our automatic emotional reactions is bound to seem totally contrary to the well-known Stoic teaching that we should focus on changing things we control while accepting that some things are not within our power.

Moreover, it should probably be explained that the Stoics don’t even use a word that could be translated, unequivocally, by the English word “emotion”.  They talk mainly about “passions” (pathê), a technical term that has a very specific meaning in their philosophical system.  Passions were defined as both desires and emotions, which are “irrational”, “excessive”, and “unnatural” (in the sense of being unhealthy).  These “passions” are also intended to be voluntary: we implicitly choose to indulge in them and perpetuate them.  So the Stoics primarily advise us to stop going along with them.  It’s also important to explain that for Stoics there is no real division between reason and the passions, or emotions.  It was Plato’s doctrine that reason and the emotions are two fundamentally separate parts or faculties of the mind, and the Stoics criticised and totally rejected that assumption.  The emotion of fear, for example, consists of certain anxious feelings, but it also necessarily entails the judgement that something bad or harmful is about to happen, otherwise it just wouldn’t be fear.  

When people talk about “repressing” or “suppressing” emotions – two terms which, incidentally, mean very different things – they usually have a vague idea in mind, of forcefully eliminating the feelings or sensations, without changing the beliefs associated with them.  So someone who suppresses fear would perhaps be trying to relax their muscles, slow their breathing, act outwardly courageous, and block the feelings of anxiety from their mind, while still believing that something bad is about to happen.  Someone who does not believe that something bad is about to happen, probably won’t have any need to suppress their feelings in this way, though.  It doesn’t really make sense to talk about repressing or suppressing anxious feelings when the fearful belief has gone, and (under normal circumstances) anxiety abates naturally as a result.  That’s what the Stoics meant, though: changing the belief rather than merely suppressing the feelings.  They also don’t mean simply forcing the belief to change but rather they argued that the beliefs underlying unhealthy passions are false, and that we should change them by thinking things through philosophically until we actually realise that they are mistaken.  For instance, the Stoics don’t tell us to try to suppress our anxiety about death.  Rather they argue, on the basis of their philosophy, that death is not intrinsically bad, or evil.  (For example, some people may choose euthanasia, in extreme circumstances such as severe illness, which suggests that death is not perceived by them as worse than the prospect of an unpleasant future life.)  

Moreover, the Stoics explicitly stated that their philosophy contained a systematic model, which distinguishes between three categories of passion (or desires and emotions):

  1. “Passions” (pathê), which are irrational, excessive, unhealthy, and voluntarily perpetuated by us
  2. “Proto-passions” (propatheiai), which are the involuntary or reflex-like precursors of full-blown passions (desires and emotions), and the Stoics name examples such as shaking, sweating, being startled, stammering, blushing, etc.
  3. “Good passions” (eupatheiai), which are rational, moderate, healthy, and voluntary passions, which “supervene” upon wisdom and virtue, because they are the consequences of holding true beliefs about what is good, bad, and indifferent in our lives

The “good passions”, experienced by the Stoic Sage, or the “wise and good” person, are things like joy (happiness) about our own good qualities (virtues) or those of others, desire for ourselves and others to flourish and become better people, fate permitting, and a healthy concern about the possibility of falling into foolishness or vicious attitudes and behaviour.  That’s right, the Stoic ideal consists of feeling abundant joy!  It also consists of a kindly and benevolent attitude, which the Stoics describe as being like a gentle friendship felt toward our own selves, and the rest of mankind.  Indeed, Stoic Ethics is based on the idea that humans naturally tend to experience an instinct called “natural affection” (philostorgia) for our own offspring, and family.  The wise man gradually extends this into brotherly-love for all mankind, a kind of philanthropic attitude, linked to what we call Stoic “cosmopolitanism”, seeing all human beings as fundamentally brothers and sisters, and part of the same global community.  Marcus Aurelius described this very succinctly, in a way that obviously contradicts the “cold fish” misconception about Stoicism, when he said that the Stoic ideal is to be “free from the [irrational, unhealthy] passions, and yet full of love.”

Zeus, the Philosophers’ “God”

The ancient Stoics, particularly Epictetus, frequently refer to the Greek god Zeus in very religiously-devout-sounding language.  (Sometimes they refer to him under other names, such as “God” or “Jupiter”, or to other Greek or Roman deities.)  This leads many modern readers to assume that the ancient Stoics require us to “believe in God” in order to share in their philosophy, and if they happen to be atheists or agnostics, as many people are today, that can be somewhat off-putting.  However, the Stoics were renowned for basing their philosophy on concepts that radically revised the values and assumptions prevalent in their society.  They followed their predecessors the Cynics, and other philosophers, in doing this, and it is known as philosophical paradox, which literally means not just something puzzling but specifically something “contrary to (popular) opinion”.  The prevalent opinion about the gods, the opinion held by of the majority of ancient Greeks, was that they were literally the sort of characters described in the myths: supernatural beings, with human-like personalities and emotions, etc.  However, the Stoics held a completely different view, which so challenged popular theology that throughout history they – and philosophers like them, such as Spinoza – were frequently accused of being atheists by Christians and other theists.

The Stoics were pantheists of sorts (or “panentheists”) who believed that the whole of Nature is divine, and so they referred to the whole of Nature as “Zeus”.  They were also materialists of sorts (or “corporealists”) who utterly rejected the notion of any metaphysical realm beyond the physical universe, such as Plato’s theory of forms.  They are believed to have largely assimilated the philosophy of Nature taught by the famously paradoxical and cryptic pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus.  In typically equivocal style, Heraclitus taught that Nature is “both willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus”.  I would say that if we asked Heraclitus whether “Nature” was the same thing as “Zeus” or “God”, he would reply: “yes and no”.  Moreover, I think that his successors the Stoics, if pressed on this question, would also give the same reply.  The Stoics were renowned in the ancient world for their attempts to reinterpret Greek myths allegorically, usually as metaphors for natural elements and processes.  For example, for the Stoics, Zeus is not literally a supernatural being, resembling a bearded man who hurls bolts of lightning from atop Mount Olympus.  Rather the myth of “Zeus” is a metaphor for the natural “fire”, the force or energy, that animates the whole of the physical universe, or it is Nature viewed as an active process.  

In his Republic, probably the founding text or original manifesto of Stoicism, Zeno reputedly described “as if in a dream”, a utopian vision of the ideal philosophical society.  In it there would be no shrines or temples.  The Pharsalia, a much later epic poem written by Seneca’s nephew, the Stoic Lucan, contains a scene in which the great Stoic hero of the Roman Republic, Cato of Utica, is advised by one of his officers to consult the priests in a temple to Zeus, and seek their prophesy about the outcome of an impending battle with the legions of the tyrant Julius Caesar.  However, Cato says no.  He basically says that Stoics don’t really believe in temples, or prophecies, of this kind.  Zeus is Nature, therefore he is present everywhere, and there are not really any special buildings in which he lives, and no special individuals (priests or prophets) through whom he speaks.  Nature runs through everything including the human mind, and so Cato looks deep within his own soul to commune with the divine by contacting his own deepest convictions and instincts and there he finds the doctrine of Stoicism that says whatever fate befalls us, all that truly matters is that we handle it virtuously, with wisdom and integrity.  He doesn’t need a priest to tell him that.  So we’re told he turned his back on the temple and walked away without even bothering to go inside.  The Stoic “Zeus” is Nature, and Nature has no use for temples or churches, scriptures and rituals, or priests and prophets.  Epictetus tells us that although Stoics might pray, they did not pray as the majority did.  They didn’t petition the gods for favours.  They didn’t pray for Zeus to bring rain for crops, or victory in battle, but rather they prayed for only one thing: to find wisdom within themselves and thereby to flourish as human beings.

This concept of a “sort-of” God – both willing and unwilling to be dubbed “Zeus” – is sometimes called the “philosophers’ God” and it’s so radically different from what most people mean by “God” that many agnostics or atheists may actually find it entirely acceptable – or at least, more acceptable – to their world-view.  Indeed, pantheism in general has often been viewed as a spiritual view which comes across as much more palatable than religions such as Christianity or Islam do to modern, scientifically and skeptically-inclined, individuals.  The physicist Albert Einstein, for example, said that he could not believe in the God of Christianity or Judaism but that he preferred to believe in the God that Spinoza described as “Deus sive Natura”, which basically means “God” as a synonym for the unfolding process of Nature as a whole.  This pantheistic God advocated by Einstein and Spinoza is therefore very similar to the Zeus of the Stoics.

Stoics Prefer Things; Cynics Don’t

Another common group of criticisms about Stoicism have to do with the claim that it treats all external things as totally indifferent, and that Stoics have no desire to change anything whatsoever in the world.  This takes various forms but it’s often allied with the claim that Stoics passively accept bad personal, political, or social situations, which most people would think we have an obligation to try to change.  The first thing to say in response to this is that as a matter of historical fact, the Stoic school was always particularly renowned for advocating political involvement among its followers.  For example, Zeno had King Antigonus of Macedonia, the most powerful military and political leader in the region, as a student and presumably discussed ethical doctrines with him that would have implications for the way he ruled.  Antigonus pleaded with Zeno to travel to his court and become his advisor but by that time he was an elderly man and somewhat too frail for the upheaval this would involve so he sent one of his finest students, Persaeus, instead, and we learn that he was put in charge of the city of Corinth and later died in battle commanding the garrison during its defence against Antigonus’ enemies.  

Likewise, the great Stoic hero Cato of Utica was famous for his political stubbornness and unflinching opposition to the rise of the tyrant Julius Caesar.  Seneca’ nephew, Lucan’s epic poem, Pharsalia, describes Cato’s involvement in the Roman Civil War in heroic terms, particularly the scene where he finally takes command of the shattered remnants of the Republican army and marches them through the deserts of North Africa to make their last stand against Caesar’s legions at the fortified city of Utica.  Cato was not a doormat, in other words.  He was held up throughout Roman society as an exemplar of the Stoic virtues of courage and self-discipline, in the face of extreme adversity.  We might also point to (today) the most famous Stoic, Marcus Aurelius, who also led a broken Roman army, weakened by plague, in a desperate but successful attempt to drive back invading barbarians hordes.  We’re told Marcus took emergency measures, which shocked the populace, such as conscripting gladiators into the army, and selling off many of his own treasures from the imperial palace to help fund the war effort.  Stoicism clearly did not lead him to sit back and twiddle his thumbs in passive resignation while the Marcomanni hordes overran and looted Roman cities.  If he’d lost that campaign and Rome had fallen, the world as we know it today would not exist.  He took to the battlefield and we’re told the legions under his command especially loved and revered him – the soldiers reputedly wept when his death was announced.  These were, therefore, all clearly men of action – exceptionally so.

So how is it possible for so many people to get the opposite idea: that Stoicism teaches us to be overly-passive or submissive?  This misconception basically stems from a tendency to confuse it with its precursor, the philosophy of Cynicism.  Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was originally a student of the famous Cynic philosopher Crates of Thebes.  For many years, therefore, Zeno was a Cynic but he founded the Stoic school, after training in philosophy for about twenty years, because he became dissatisfied with Cynicism and the other Socratic schools in Athens.  The Cynics believed that virtue is the only true good, vice is the only true evil, and that everything else is totally indifferent with regard to the goal of life.  Zeno and his Stoic students accepted this view but they also felt it was necessary to make a fundamental change to it.  So Zeno introduced an innovative concept which became known as the central and most characteristic teaching of the Stoic school: the doctrine of “preferred indifferents”.  This teaching says very simply that although the Cynics were right that only virtue can be considered “good” (and vice “bad”) in the strictest sense of the word, it is nevertheless necessary for the wise man to distinguish between external things that he “prefers” to get or to avoid.  

The Stoics provide very clear lists of these things.  For example, physical health, wealth, and good social standing, are “preferred”, and their opposites are “dispreferred” – it’s perfectly rational for the Stoic to prefer not to become ill, impoverished, or to be condemned or exiled.  When the Stoics describe these things as “indifferent” they mean that they’re of no relevance when it comes to the good life.  Socrates may have been starting to age, relatively poor, and condemned to death by unjust accusers and the Athenian court but he nevertheless lived a good life, an exceptionally better life in fact than the majority of other people, because he dealt with such adversity wisely and with courage.  The Stoics would say that his poverty did not actually make his life any worse but rather, if anything, it actually gave him more opportunity to exercise his virtues and strength of character, and to flourish as a wise and good man.  Despite this particular sense in which they lack value, though, some externals are considered to be naturally preferable over others and wisdom consists in choosing prudently between them, without compromising our virtues.  Chrysippus reputedly summed this up by saying, to paraphrase him somewhat, that to the Stoic Sage it’s ultimately indifferent whether or not he’s able to have a bath, because it won’t make him any more or less enlightened, but that given the opportunity, he would certainly prefer to be able to wash when he’s dirty.  

It’s perfectly natural and rational therefore for Stoics to continue to seek certain “preferred” things in life, and it would be foolish for them not to do so.  This perhaps involves an element of speculation on my part but, personally, I suspect that in the Republic, when Zeno described the ideal Stoic society, what he said was that this is the ultimate external goal of the wise man, the highest preferred indifferent, which he would presumably have to pursue with the Stoic “reserve clause” in mind.  In other words, the wise man only rates his wellbeing in terms of attaining wisdom and virtue but his practical actions aim toward improving the world and the lives of other people, by spreading wisdom and virtue among them.  Zeno himself did this, for example, by lecturing in public, at the Stoa Poekile, where anyone could come and hear him speak, and by writing books intended to help others improve, even after his death.  Antigonus, Cato, and Marcus, would not have wrestled with the world of politics, or risked their lives on the field of battle, and Zeno and the other Stoic scholarchs would not have dedicated their lives to teaching and writing books if they did not believe that it was worthwhile trying to change the world in a way that seemed definitely “preferable” to them, and it would be better for them even to try and fail in doing so than never to have tried at all.  

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Stoic Week

Notes from Stoicon Talk and Workshop

Notes from Talk in Morning

  1. What I’m actually supposed to be talking about is “Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and Stoicism” – So first of all: they’re two different things.  I said this last year: Weirdly, one of the most common criticisms people seem to make is that modern Stoics say they’re the same thing but I’ve never actually met anyone who does say that: so it’s a straw man.
  2. The clue’s in the name anyway: Stoic philosophy is a philosophy; cognitive-behavioural therapy is a therapy.
  3. My first book on Stoicism – The Philosophy of CBT – was all about the relationship between Stoicism and CBT.  In it, I said that philosophy is bigger and deeper than just therapy.  However, Stoic philosophy contains many therapeutic concepts and techniques.  (I listed lots of them in that book, which I’ll be giving an overview of in my workshop.)  All the schools of Hellenistic philosophy incorporated therapeutic elements, but Stoicism more so than the others.
  4. In modern times, Aaron T. Beck and Albert Ellis the two main founders of CBT both claimed that their therapy had its philosophical origins in ancient Stoic philosophy.  
  5. Ellis in particular drew very heavily on Stoic concepts and techniques.  Sometimes mentioning the Stoic heritage, sometimes not.  Ellis was originally a psychoanalyst who became disillusioned with Freud and decided in the 1950s to develop a more rational or philosophical approach to therapy.  He’d read Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus years earlier and saw them as an obvious inspiration.
  6. (Incidentally, in the first half of the twentieth century, decades earlier, there was a rival to psychoanalysis called rational persuasion therapy, which was even more explicitly influenced by Stoicism, and it was a major precursor to Ellis, and subsequent CBT, although it’s largely forgotten now.)
  7. Anyway, many other psychotherapy authors, especially the CBT ones, have arrived at similar ideas, perhaps independently of the Stoics.   (Once you accept that cognitions are the key to emotions, you’re likely to invent similar therapy strategies for dealing with those cognitions.)
  8. I think the best example of this is what Beck called cognitive distancing, sometimes called “verbal defusion” by behaviourists.  So I want to say a little about that…  Cognitive distancing the ability to view one’s own thoughts in a somewhat detached manner, as transient mental events.  It’s the difference between “This guy’s an idiot!” and “I notice I’m having the thought right now that this guy is an idiot!”  It’s the opposite of being absorbed in thoughts or swept along by them, like happens in worry or rumination.  We suspend worry and rumination when we meditate and view our own thoughts more objectively.  Separating the map from the terrain, or separating thoughts from reality, as opposed to fusing them together.
  9. Beck’s original idea (1976) was that when people put their thoughts into words and write them down on paper or on a blackboard that can help them gain distance and view them as events, and he talks about several other ways of achieving this sense of detachment, although surprisingly he didn’t originally mention meditation.  (For instance, I might say “Donald is having the thought that…”, draw it inside a speech bubble, view it as a mere hypothesis as if I were a scientist who might test it out, and so on…)
  10. It wasn’t long before clients and therapists who were into Buddhism or yoga, etc., said: “Hang on a minute: this is basically what happens during meditation.”
  11. This has become the focus since the mid-1990s of what’s called the third-wave of CBT: behaviour therapy (first wave), cognitive therapy (second wave), and now mindfulness and acceptance-based therapy (third wave).
  12. However, ironically, this was the part of Stoicism most neglected by Beck and Ellis.  And later CBT authors don’t turn to Stoicism but to Buddhism for their inspiration with regard to mindfulness and distancing.  They could have found it in Stoicism, though.  (Pierre Hadot called it Stoic prosoche, attention to oneself, to your thoughts and value-judgements, in particular.)  
  13. Epictetus taught his students: When you experience a troubling thought (impression), you should train yourself to say to it: “You are just an impression and not at all the thing you claim to represent.”  That’s unmistakable: it’s a cognitive distancing strategy.  There are many similar strategies in Epictetus and in the other Stoic literature.  In about half a dozen places, Epictetus refers to being “swept along” or “carried away” by thoughts (he uses the same Greek expression each time), and he tells his students to be mindful of this, and to step back rather than going along with these runaway thoughts.  That’s cognitive distancing again.
  14. Albert Ellis actually taught most of his clients a famous quotation from Epictetus: “It’s not things that upset us but our judgements about things.”  For many CBTers that forms part of what’s called the “socialisation” phase of treatment: where clients are taught their role in the process of therapy.  It’s not a method of disputing thoughts, questioning their evidence, but something that precedes that.  It’s also a cognitive distancing strategy.
  15. To be clear: we don’t mean “distancing” as in getting really far away from thoughts but rather we mean separating our thoughts from events, and viewing them more objectively.  That’s the kind of detachment we sometimes have when contemplating another person’s beliefs: when we say “it’s just his opinion.”  It’s the difference between looking at the world through rose-tinted spectacles and taking the spectacles off and looking at them: looking at our thoughts, or our value-judgements, rather than looking at events through them.
  16. The Stoics also refer to this as withholding “assent” from our automatic flow of impressions: not just going along with them, and not struggling against them either, but pausing to consider them in a more detached and contemplative way. 
  17. Now, cognitive distancing is a subtle concept.  It’s tricky to define and it takes a while for some people to get the idea.  That’s why we use a technical term, there’s no word for it in ordinary language.  Most cognitive therapists would be familiar with this idea but classicists and philosophers wouldn’t normally be, so it’s been somewhat neglected in modern commentaries on Stoicism.  (People kind of missed it.)
  18. Earlier I mentioned “mindfulness”…  I would say “mindfulness” is a slightly broader concept that consists of roughly three things: cognitive distance, focus on the here and now, and a degree of self-awareness.  These are all themes that run throughout all the Stoic literature: (1) we should view our impressions objectively, (2) we should focus on the present moment, (3) we should continually pay attention to our ruling faculty, the seat of all our value-judgements and source of the passions.  We should not allow ourselves to be swept along by troublesome impressions into worry, into irrational, unhealthy, and excessive trains of thought, rumination about fears and desires.
  19. “Mindfulness”, incidentally, is, in a sense, a modern concept: it’s actually a bit of a buzzword.  The English word wasn’t in widespread use until the 1960s.  Scholars are undecided to what extent it actually corresponds with concepts found in the earliest Buddhist scriptures.  Although “mindfulness” has become associated with Buddhism, in some ways, what we’ve come to mean by that word may actually have as much, or more in common, with what the ancient Stoics were talking about.
  20. So for me, IMHO, Stoicism is very much a mindfulness-based philosophy of life, and it contains many mindfulness-based psychological techniques: it contains a mindfulness-based therapy of the passions.  
  21. Stoicism is essentially an ethical world-view that says virtue – or excellence of character – is the only true good.  We should love and cherish virtue.  That implies that we should continually be paying attention to our own character and actions, the seat of virtue.  (If you want any good, look inside yourself: said Epictetus.)
  22. However, only our voluntary judgements and actions can be virtuous, so Epictetus advised his students to continually maintain a careful distinction between their own actions and everything else, everything external to their volition or involuntary.
  23. It seems to me that’s the most important practical component of Stoicism.  That’s why it’s spelled out in the opening paragraphs of Epictetus’ Stoic Handbook.  We have two types of thought: thoughts that we think on purpose and thoughts that just pop into our minds automatically.  (Like when you try not to think about donkeys.)  Psychologists call those “automatic” versus “strategic” thinking processes.  And this distinction has become central to third-wave or mindfulness-based CBT.
  24. It seems to me that separating those two things – what’s under our control about our thinking and what isn’t – requires a kind of cognitive distancing.  I think that’s what’s most distinctive, though, about what I’d call “Stoic mindfulness”.  That dichotomy of control – which I sometimes like call the “Stoic fork” – that’s what’s most Stoic, about Stoic mindfulness.  
  25. It’s no coincidence that it constitutes the very beginning of Epictetus’ Handbook, because it’s the psychological foundation of Epictetus’ Handbook.  Some things are “up to us” and others are not.  In a word, our own actions (or rather our decisions, our ruling faculty’s judgements) are up to us and everything else is indifferent, at least with regard to our attaining eudaimonia, or fulfilment, the goal of life.
  26. So anyway, I’d like to leave you with this quote from Marcus Aurelius, as that’s our theme: “Always bear in mind what Heraclitus said: […] ‘we must not act and speak like men asleep.’” (Meditations, 4.46)

Workshop on Stoicism and Mental Imagery

Part I

Overview of Stoic psychological strategies…

  1. Premeditation of Adversity (cf. “Negative Visualisation”).
  2. View from Above / Cosmology (Olympian versus Cosmic)
  3. Contemplation of Death (and transience of material things)
  4. Contemplation of the Sage (Model, Observer)
  5. Contemplation of Gods and Heroes (Zeus, Hercules, Socrates, Diogenes, etc.)
  6. Contemplating the Virtues of Others (Marcus Book 1, Zeno on Antisthenes)
  7. Memorisation of Maxims (Paraphrasing) – Fist clenching
  8. Writing a Journal to Oneself (The Meditations)
  9. Writing Letters for Others (Seneca’s Letters and Consolations, possibly unsent)
  10. Socratic Philosophical Discourse (Epictetus’ Discourses, Seneca’s Dialogues)
  11. Contemplation of the Present Moment
  12. Morning Meditation, cosmos, anticipate adversity (Marcus, Epictetus)
  13. Evening Meditation/Review (Pythagoras, Seneca, Epictetus)
  14. Distancing (“You are just an impression…”)
  15. Postponement of Response, until Passions have naturally abated (Seneca on Anger, Epictetus)
  16. Distinguishing what is “up to us” from what is not.
  17. Voluntary hardship (camp bed, philosopher’s cloak, vegetarian diet, endurance of heat and cold, physical exercise)
  18. Attention to Faculty of Judgement (Stoic Mindfulness)
  19. Action with the Reserve Clause
  20. Amor Fati (Stoic Acceptance)
  21. The Goal of Life as Virtue (Unity of Purpose)
  22. Contemplation of Metaphors (Life as Festival, Life as Ballgame)
  23. Self-Monitoring (Epictetus, count times you become angry)
  24. Contemplating the Unity of the Cosmos (men as limbs)
  25. The Circles of Hierocles (calling friends “brother”)
  26. Natural Philosophy (scientific mindset) / “Objective Representation” (Phantasia Kataleptike)
  27. Plus others (we haven’t spotted, or that I’ve forgotten)

Part II: View from Above Script

“Plato has a fine saying, that he who would discourse of man should survey, as from some high watchtower, the things of earth.” – Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations

Take a moment to settle into your posture and make yourself comfortable… Close your eyes and relax… [Pause.] Be aware of your breathing… Notice the rhythm and pattern of the breath… Do nothing for while, just be content to contemplate your breathing more deeply… [Pause.] Now, begin by paying attention to the whole of your body as one… From the top of your head, all the way down into your fingers and down into your toes… Be aware of your body as one… every nerve, muscle and fibre… Don’t try to change anything. Don’t try to stop anything from changing… Some things can change just by being observed…

Just be content to notice whatever you notice, and feel whatever you feel… Be a passive, detached observer… As you continue to relax, turn your attention deeper within, and become more aware of your body… until you can almost imagine how you look right now… Begin to picture yourself as if seen from the outside… Now just imagine that you are taking a step back and looking at yourself. It really doesn’t matter how vividly you can picture yourself, it’s just the intention, just idea that matters. Imagine your body posture… your facial expression… the colour and style of your clothing…

Now keep looking at the image of yourself resting there, and imagine your own feet are gently leaving the ground. You begin floating serenely upwards, slowly and continuously, rising upwards. All the while your gaze keeps returning to your own body, now seated there below you as you rise above it. Keep looking down toward your body as you float higher and higher…. The roof and ceiling disappear, allowing you to float freely upward. Gazing down you see yourself seated comfortably below in the building, looking contented and contemplative. You see all the rooms, and any other people around.

As you continue to float gently higher and higher, your perspective widens more and more until you see the whole surrounding area. You see all the buildings nearby from above. You see the people in buildings and in the streets and roads. You observe people far below working, or walking along the pavement, people cycling or driving their cars, and those travelling on buses and trains. You begin to contemplate the whole network of human lives and how people everywhere are interacting with each other, influencing each other, encountering each other in different ways…

Floating higher, people become as small as ants below. Rising up into the clouds, you see the whole of the surrounding region beneath you. You see both towns and countryside, and gradually the coastline comes into view as your perspective becomes more and more expansive… You float gently up above the clouds, above the weather, and through the upper atmosphere of the planet Earth… So high that you eventually rise beyond the sphere of the planet itself, and into outer space… You look toward planet Earth and see it suspended in space before you, silently turning… resplendent in all its majesty and beauty…

You see the whole of your home planet… the blue of the great oceans… and the brown and green of the continental land masses… You see the white of the polar ice caps, north and south… You see the grey wisps of cloud that pass silently across the surface of the Earth… Though you can no longer see yourself from so far above, you know and feel that you are down there on Earth below, and that your life is important, and what you make of your life is important. Your change in perspective changes your view of things, your values and priorities…

You contemplate all the countless living beings upon the Earth. The population of the planet is over six billion people… You realise that your life is one among many, one person among the total population of the Earth… You think of the rich diversity of human life on Earth. The many languages spoken by people of different races, in different countries… people of all different ages… newborn infants, elderly people, people in the prime of life… You think of the enormous variety of human experiences… some people right now are unhappy, some people are happy… and you realise how richly varied the tapestry of human life before you seems.

And yet as you gaze upon the planet Earth you are also aware of its position within the rest of the universe… a tiny speck of stardust, adrift in the immeasurable vastness of cosmic space… This world of ours is merely a single planet, a tiny grain of sand by comparison with the endless tracts of cosmic space… a tiny rock in space, revolving around our Sun… the Sun itself just one of countless billions of stars which punctuate the velvet blackness of our galaxy…

You think about the present moment on Earth and see it within the broader context of your life as a whole. You think of your lifespan as a whole, in its totality… You think of your own life as one moment in the enormous lifespan of mankind… Hundreds of generations have lived and died before you… many more will live and die in the future, long after you yourself are gone… Civilisations too have a lifespan; you think of the many great cities which have arisen and been destroyed throughout the ages… and your own civilisation as one in a series… perhaps in the future to be followed by new cities, peoples, languages, cultures, and ways of life…

You think of the lifespan of humanity itself… Just one of countless billions of species living upon the planet… Mankind arose as a race roughly two hundred thousand years ago… animal life itself first appeared on Earth over four billion years ago… Contemplate time as follows… Realise that if the history of life on Earth filled an encyclopaedia a thousand pages long… the life of the entire human race could be represented by a single sentence somewhere in that book… just one sentence…

And yet you think of the lifespan of the planet itself… Countless billions of years old… the life of the planet Earth too has a beginning, middle, and end… Formed from the debris of an exploding star, unimaginably long ago… one day in the distant future its destiny is to be swallowed up and consumed by the fires of our own Sun… You think of the great lifespan of the universe itself… the almost incomprehensible vastness of universal time… starting with a cosmic explosion, a big bang they say, immeasurable ages ago in the past… Perhaps one day, at the end of time, this whole universe will implode upon itself and disappear once again… Who can imagine what, if anything, might follow, at the end of time, in the wake of our own universe’s demise…

Contemplating the vast lifespan of the universe, remember that the present moment is but the briefest of instants… the mere blink of an eye… the turn of a screw… a fleeting second in the mighty river of cosmic time… Yet the “here and now” is important… standing as the centre point of all human experience… Here and now you find yourself at the centre of living time… Though your body may be small in the grand scheme of things, your imagination, the human imagination, is as big as the universe… bigger than the universe… enveloping everything that can be conceived… From the cosmic point of view, your body seems small, but your imagination seems utterly vast…

You contemplate all things, past, present and future… You see your life within the bigger picture… the total context of cosmic time and space… The totality is absolute reality… You see yourself as an integral part of something much bigger, something truly vast, the “All” itself… Just as the cells of your own body work together to form a greater unity, a living being, so your body as a whole is like a single cell in the organism of the universe… Along with every atom in the universe you necessarily contribute your role to the unfolding of its grand design…

As your consciousness expands, and your mind stretches out to reach and touch the vastness of eternity… Things change greatly in perspective… and shifts occur in their relative importance… Trivial things seem trivial to you… Indifferent things seem indifferent… The significance of your own attitude toward life becomes more apparent… you realise that life is what you make of it… You learn to put things in perspective, and focus on your true values and priorities in life… One stage at a time, you develop the serenity to accept the things you cannot change, the courage to change the things you can, and the wisdom to know the difference… You follow nature… your own true nature as a rational, truth-seeking human being… and the one great nature of the universe as a whole…

Now in a moment you are beginning to sink back down to Earth, toward your place in the here and now… Part of you can remain aware of the view from above, and always return to and remember that sense of serenity and perspective.

Now you begin your descent back down to Earth, to face the future with renewed strength and serenity… You sink back down through the sky… down… down… down… toward the local area… down… down… down… into this building… down… down… down… You sink back gently into your body… all the way now… as your feet slowly come to rest upon the floor once again…

Now think about the room around you… Think about action… movement… think about looking around and getting your orientation… raising your head a little… Begin to breathe a little bit more deeply… a little bit more energetically… let your body feel more alive and ready for action… breathe energy and vitality into your body… breathe a little deeper and deeper again… until you’re ready to take a deep breath, open your eyes, and emerge from meditation… taking your mindfulness and self-awareness forward into life… beginning now… take a deep breath… and open your eyes now… when you’re ready… entering the here and now with deep calm and serenity…

Categories
Stoicism

Seneca and the Stoic Hercules

Seneca wrote two plays about the Stoic hero, Hercules.  It’s sometimes claimed that his plays seem totally divorced from his philosophy and portray violent scenarios, with little philosophical content.  However, these two plays, set just before the twelve labours began, and just after he completed the final one, both contain clearly philosophical remarks and focus on well-known Stoic themes.  We find obvious references in both plays to the notion that the external consequences of actions are morally indifferent, only our intentions can make us virtuous or vicious.  We also find a number of other philosophical remarks, quoted below.

The Madness of Hercules (Hercules Furens)

Hercules is driven temporarily insane by the goddess Hera (Juno) and kills his wife and children, an awful tragedy he must somehow learn to live with.  A major Stoic theme in this play is therefore the notion that we cannot be blamed for the unintended consequences of our actions, only our intentions are morally relevant.  We learn from Hercules that even the most tragic act must be forgiven if it’s been done by mistake.  Hercules consulted the Oracle of Delphi to discover how he could atone for this atrocity and this led to him undertaking the famous twelve labours, spanning the next twelve years of his life.

Chorus: Known to but few is untroubled calm, and they, mindful of time’s swift flight, hold fast the days that never will return.  While the fates permit, live happily; life speeds on with hurried step, and with winged days the wheel of the headlong year is turned. [159]

Megara: What the wretched overmuch desire, they easily believe. [313]

Megara: Who can be forced has not learned how to die. [426]

Amphitryon: … things ’twas hard to bear ’tis pleasant to recall. [654]

Amphityron: What man anywhere hath laid on error the name of guilt? [1237]

Hercules on Oeta (Hercules Oetaeus)

This is the story of Hercules’ death.  Having completed the twelve labours, and overthrown King Eurytus, he seeks to take the slave girl Iole as his wife.  However, his existing wife, Deianira, becomes jealous and tricks him into wearing a cloak imbued with what she mistakenly believes is a love potion.  It turns out she was herself tricked, and the potion contains the Hydra’s blood, which poisons Hercules and kills him.  Again, this story touches on the Stoic theme that the consequences of our actions are morally indifferent, and that our intentions alone determine our moral character.  In this instance, it’s Deianira, though, who’s actions result in an unintentional catastrophe.

Chorus: Happy is he whoever knows how to bear the estate of slave or king and can match his countenance with either lot.  For he who bears his ills with even soul has robbed misfortune of its strength and heaviness. [225]

Deianira: He has scorned all men, who first has scorn of death; ’tis sweet to go against the sword.

Chorus: Whoever has left the middle course fares never in path secure. […]To our undoing, high fortunes are by ruin balanced. [675]

Hyllus: Why dost drag down a house already shaken?  From error spring wholly whatever crime is here.  He does no sin who sins without intent. [884]

Hyllus: Life has been granted many whose guilt lay in wrong judgement, not in act.  Who blames his own destiny? [900]

Hyllus: But Hercules himself slew Megara, pierced by his arrows, and his own sons as well, shooting Lernaean shafts with furious hand; still, though thrice murderer, he forgave himself, but not his madness.  At the source of Cinyps ‘neath Libyan skies he washed away his guilt and cleansed his hands. [903]

Deianira: […] sometimes death is a punishment, but often ’tis a boon, and to many a way of pardon has it proved. [929]

Hylus: Give o’er now, mother, I beseech thee, pardon thy fate; an error is not counted as a crime. [982]

Hercules: Whate’er in me was mortal and of thee, the vanquished flame has borne away my father’s part to heaven, thy part to the flames has been consigned. […] Let tears for the inglorious flow; valour fares starward, fear, to the realms of death. [1963]

At the conclusion, it’s explained that Hercules bore his death with a countenance “such as none e’er bore his life”, and that “joyous did he mount his funeral pyre”, with indifference to the flames.  Like a Stoic then: “How calmly he bore his fate!”

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Stoicism

Marcus Aurelius in Steinbeck’s East of Eden (1952)

The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius is mentioned in East of Eden (1952), the novel by John Steinbeck.  Brian Bannon discusses the literary and philosophical relationship between Marcus’ Stoicism and Steinbeck’s narrative in the article ‘A Tiny Volume Bound in Leather: The Influence of Marcus Aurelius on East Of Eden‘.  Steinbeck once said that The Book of Ecclesiastes and The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius were the two books that had most profoundly influenced his own outlook on life.  Some literary critics have found Stoic themes throughout the novel.  We can also find the following direct reference:

[Lee] lifted the breadbox and took out a tiny volume bound in leather, and the gold tooling was almost completely worn away—The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius in English translation.

Lee wiped his steel-rimmed spectacles on a dish towel. He opened the book and leafed through. And he smiled to himself, consciously searching for reassurance.

He read slowly, moving his lips over the words. “Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that which is remembered.

“Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and accustom thyself to consider that the nature of the universe loves nothing so much as to change things which are and to make new things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be.”

Lee glanced down the page. “Thou wilt die soon and thou are not yet simple nor free from perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in acting justly.”

Lee looked up from the page, and he answered the book as he would answer one of his ancient relatives. “That is true,” he said. “It’s very hard. I’m sorry. But don’t forget that you also say, ‘Always run the short way and the short way is the natural’—don’t forget that.” He let the pages slip past his fingers to the fly leaf where was written with a broad carpenter’s pencil, “Sam’l Hamilton.”

Suddenly Lee felt good. He wondered whether Sam’l Hamilton had ever missed his book or known who stole it. It had seemed to Lee the only clean pure way was to steal it. And he still felt good about it. His fingers caressed the smooth leather of the binding as he took it back and slipped it under the breadbox. He said to himself, “But of course he knew who took it. Who else would have stolen Marcus Aurelius?”  He went into the sitting room and pulled a chair near to the sleeping Adam.

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Stoicism

Stoicism and Love: Workshop Notes and Video

These are my rough notes for the “Stoicism & Love” workshop I did at the Stoicism Today conference in London, 2014…

To recap from earlier: Christopher Gill mentioned that some modern commentators, such as Richard Sorabji and Martha Nussbaum, question whether there’s much room for love in Stoicism, which they describe as involving “detachment” from other people.  He notes that this was not a criticism that was commonly levelled against Stoics in the ancient world, though.  The Stoics saw themselves, and I think were generally seen by others, as a philosophical school advocating a kind of affection for the rest of mankind, bound up with what is often called a philanthropic and cosmopolitan attitude.  Chris notes that the Stoics do challenge us nevertheless to love others in a way that is brutally honest and realistic about their mortality and our own, the transience of our relationships, and our lack of control over others.

So, on the one hand, many people, and possibly even a few academics, assume that Stoicism and love are somehow incompatible or at least in conflict.  On the other hand, Marcus Aurelius, in the very first chapter of The Meditations, describes the Stoic ideal as being “free from passions and yet full of love” – meaning irrational and unhealthy passions.  I think he later uses a similar expression to describe his own goal in life as a Stoic.  Marcus actually says he should love other people, not just superficially, but from the very bottom of his heart (Meditations, 10.1).  He seems pretty serious about the whole idea of loving mankind as if they were his brothers.  Likewise, Cicero explicitly says of the Stoic concept of love:

The Stoics actually both say that the wise man will experience love, and they define love itself as the effort to make a friendship from the semblance of beauty. (Tusculan Disputations, 4.72)

I’m pretty sure that by “the semblance of beauty” he means here inner beauty or virtue, as Socrates and the Stoics understood it.  So the Stoic Sage definitely experiences love, and presumably loves the virtuous in particular, although the “seeds” of wisdom and virtue are within everyone.  So he potentially loves all mankind in that respect.

Indeed, to start with, I’d just like to point out that philosophy, of course means “love of wisdom”, and that it seems to me the Stoics were very aware of that meaning and took it fairly literally.  Wisdom is more or less synonymous with virtue in Stoicism and love of wisdom is therefore synonymous with love of virtue, which is something the Stoics certainly appear to advocate.  Indeed, the supreme “healthy passion” they describe, rational “Joy” (chara), is basically a kind of rejoicing in the presence of virtue.  So ancient Stoicism entailed rejoicing in virtue and, literally, loving wisdom – and I think those themes are pretty clear in some of the texts, especially Marcus Aurelius.

In the translations of Marcus Aurelius I checked, incidentally, the word “love” is used about 40 times, far more than “virtue” for instance.  He talks about love all the time.  The Stoic literature is actually full of positive references to love, friendship, affection, and similar concepts.  Some of them very emphatic about the central role of “love for humanity” in Stoicism.  For example, Seneca wrote:

No school has more goodness and gentleness; none has more love for human beings, nor more attention to the common good.  (Seneca, On Clemency, 3.3)

Big Questions from Thursday’s Stoic-Week Discussion

  1. What does Marcus mean by being full of love, or natural affection, and yet free from (irrational or unhealthy) passions?
  2. To what extent does love or natural affection seem to play a role in Stoic philosophy?

Although some people perhaps read the Stoics in different ways on this point, Pierre Hadot thought Stoic philanthropy and cosmopolitanism were very similar to the Christian notion of brotherly-love:

It cannot, then, be said that “loving one’s neighbour as oneself” is a specifically Christian invention.  Rather, it could be maintained that the motivation of Stoic love is the same as that of Christian love. […] Even the love of one’s enemies is not lacking in Stoicism. (Hadot, 1998, p. 231)

There are many Stoic passages that support this, e.g., Marcus wrote:

It is a man’s especial privilege to love even those who stumble.  And this love follows as soon as you reflect that they are akin to you and that they do wrong involuntarily and through ignorance, and that within a little while both they and you will be dead; and this above all, that the man has done you no harm; for he has not made your “ruling faculty” worse than it was before. (Meditations, 7.22)

So the Stoic loves others because they are his kin, as citizens of the cosmos, and rational beings.  What if they don’t love us back, though?  The Earl of Shaftesbury wrote that Stoic love was “disinterested” and not dependent on reciprocation from the people loved:

Come on, let us see now if thou canst love disinterestedly.  “Thanks my good kinsman (brother, sister, friend), for giving me so generous a part, that I can love though not beloved.” (Shaftesbury, 2005, p. 108)

There’s a nice passage in Seneca (Letters, 9) where he says that the Stoic wise man naturally prefers to have friends but that he doesn’t need or crave them, and he is perfectly contented within himself if fate denies him the company of other people.

Big Questions from Thursday’s Stoic-Week Discussion

  1. How does love for others in Stoicism compare to the idea of love for others in Christianity, compassion in Buddhism, or brotherly-love in other philosophical or religious traditions?
  2. Also: How does Stoic love compare to the way romantic love tends to be portrayed in Hollywood films or in romantic novels?

The Stoics emphasise the concept of “natural affection”, the kind of love a parent has for their children, as the basis of their ethics.  Shaftesbury calls this attitude, extended to everyone as fellow citizens of the cosmos, Stoic “philanthropy” or love of mankind:

What is it to have Natural Affection?  Not that which is only towards relations, but towards all mankind; to be truly philanthrôpos [philanthropic, a lover of mankind], neither to scoff, nor hate, nor be impatient with them, nor abominate them, nor overlook them; and to pity in a manner and love those that are the greatest miscreants, those that are most furious against thyself in particular, and at the time when they are most furious? (Shaftesbury, 2005, p. 1)

Shaftesbury compares this Stoic attitude of natural affection for mankind to the loving attitude of a mother or nurse toward a sickly child.  The Stoics often sought to emulate Zeus, as their ideal, and the paternal affection Zeus was supposed to have for mankind, his children.  Musonius Rufus therefore describes the Stoic Zeus as the patron god of friendship and familial affection.  For the Stoics, to be philanthropic, to love mankind as one’s brothers and fellow world-citizens, is to be godlike, in a sense.

Musonius famously argued that women as well as men should study Stoic philosophy.  He claimed that Stoicism would actually make women more able to properly love their children, rather than somehow repressing their affection for them.  “Who, more than she [a female Stoic] would love her children more than life?” (Lectures, 3).  Indeed there are several places where Stoics suggest it would be fundamentally unnatural to suppress feelings such as parental love, and therefore irrational to do so.  Epictetus actually says that “when a child is born it is no longer in our power not to love it or care for it”; it’s natural for parents to care, for instance, if their child is hurt (Discourses, 1.11; 1.23).  We actually have a whole Discourse (1.11) from Epictetus dedicated to the topic of “Natural Affection” or philostorgia.

This natural affection, though, is clearly to be somehow transformed in Stoicism.  Epictetus asked his students: “How, then, shall I become loving and affectionate?” (Discourses, 3.24).  His answer was that Stoics should become affectionate in a manner consistent with the fundamental rules and doctrines of their philosophy.  In particular, we’re to love while bearing in mind the distinction between what’s up to us and what is not.  He also suggests that if what we’re calling “love” or “affection” makes us enslaved to our passions and miserable, then it’s not “good” for us, and that’s a sign something is wrong.   Put another way, this presumably means that Stoics should love in accord with the “reserve clause”.  So we should wish that others flourish and become wise and virtuous, but we should do so lightly, completely accepting that our wish may not be realised – accepting them as they are, in other words, warts and all.

Exercise: Love as Acceptance versus Well-Wishing

The Stoics wanted others to flourish, become wise and virtuous,

  1. Repeat the word “love” to yourself.
  2. Contemplate first, the attitude of love as acceptance, accepting yourself despite your imperfections, seeing your current situation as the only one possible given your nature and your past environment and experiences.
  3. Next contemplate the attitude of love as one of wishing yourself well, wanting yourself to flourish and attain goodness, virtue, and wisdom, now and in the future, fate permitting.
  4. Now try to do the same for another person, begin by contemplating love as acceptance of their flaws, even their follies or vices, etc.
  5. Now try to contemplate love as wishing for them to flourish and attain goodness, virtue, and wisdom, fate permitting.

So where does that leave us?  A good summary is in the article “Epictetus on How the Stoic Sage Loves”, by William O. Stephens, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 14, 193-210, 1996.

The Stoic loves other people in a very free, giving way.  His love is not at all conditional upon its being reciprocated by the person loved.  The Stoic does not compromise his own moral integrity or mental serenity in his love for others, nor is his love impaired by his knowledge of the mortality of his loved ones.  Rather, the Stoic’s love and natural affection are tempered by reason.  His love and affection serve only to enrich his humanity, never to subject him to [psychological] torment.

Some of the key concepts here:

  1. The Stoic ideal of wisdom and virtue definitely included loving other people – the Sage loves others and seeks friendship.
  2. The Stoic Sage’s love is unconditional; it doesn’t require reciprocation, which would be an “indifferent” for Stoics because it’s not up to us.
  3. The sort of love the Stoic Sage experiences is neither unhealthy nor excessive but healthy and consistent with virtue.
  4. This sort of love is inherently realistic about the transience of external things and the mortality of those loved.
  5. The love of the Stoic is fundamentally rational, meaning it’s consistent with reason and doesn’t lead to irrational behaviour.

 

Exercise: Hierocles and Metta Bhavana

The Stoic philosopher Hierocles, a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, described psychological practices for expanding oikeiôsis, our sense of “affinity” for others.  He says our relationships can be represented as a series of concentric circles, radiating out from ourselves and our closest kin.  Stoics should attempt to “draw the circles somehow toward the centre”, he said, voluntarily reducing psychological distance in their relationships.  He even suggests verbal techniques, not unlike calling acquaintances “friend” or calling close friends “brother”.  Hierocles elsewhere recommends treating our brothers as if they were parts of our own body, like our hands and feet.  Zeno’s saying that a friend is “another self”, perhaps likewise encourages us to take others deeper into the circle of our affinity and natural affection.  Hierocles’ comments about oikeiôsis might be turned into a contemplative exercise.

There’s a popular Buddhist meditation exercise called metta bhavana, which means “expanding loving-kindness”.  We might use this as a basis for developing Hierocles’ advice into a modern contemplative practice.

  1. It helps to prepare by choosing your examples in advance to visualise in a moment: yourself, a loved one, an acquaintance, an enemy,
  2. Close your eyes; take a few moments to relax and focus your attention inward.
  3. Picture a circle of light surrounding your own body and imagine that it symbolises a growing sense of rational self-love or affection toward yourself as a being capable of wisdom and virtue.  If you like, repeat a phrase such as “May I flourish and be happy” to yourself, to help focus on this attitude.
  4. Now imagine that circle is expanding to encompass a member of your family, a loved one or close friend, whom you now project natural affection toward, as if they were somehow part of your own body.  Focus on the seeds of virtue within them, and wish them well, perhaps repeating a phrase like “May you flourish and be happy”, while accepting that this is beyond your direct control.
  5. Next, imagine that circle expanding to encompass an acquaintance you encounter in daily life, toward whom you normally feel more neutral, perhaps colleagues you work alongside, and project feelings of natural affection toward them, as if they were members of your own family.
  6. Again, let the circle expand further to include even someone you dislike, perhaps someone who sees you as an “enemy”, and focusing as much as possible on their positive qualities or virtues, wish them well, picturing the sphere of your affection spreading to include them.
  7. Now let the circle encompass all of you together, allowing your feelings of affection to spread over the whole group.
  8. Imagine the circle now progressively growing to envelop your surrounding area and finally the entire world and the whole human race as one, allowing your feelings of rational affection to spread out to every other member of the human race, developing a sense of kinship with them insofar as they possess reason and therefore the capacity for progressing toward wisdom.

Try to continue this attitude throughout your daily activity.  Seneca argued that expanding natural affection into a philanthropic attitude that encompasses the rest of mankind teaches us to love more philosophically, without over-attachment to any specific individual.  He goes so far as to say: “he who has not been able to love more than one, did not even love that one much” (Letters, 63).  The Sage is not infatuated with anyone.  He loves everyone as much as he is able, while accepting that they are changeable and that one day they will die.

Categories
Stoicism

Three Unorthodox Stoics

Gem-Zeno-British-MuseumIn a nutshell…

One of the recurring questions that comes up in discussion forums is “What’s an ‘orthodox’ Stoic?”  I think most modern scholars would say that, first and foremost, it’s someone who believes that “virtue is the only true good”, as Cicero put it.  However, one of the main sources for our knowledge of early Stoicism, Diogenes Laertius, sheds some further light on this question.  He provides three examples of important students of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, who broke from the orthodox Stoic teachings of Zeno.  They changed their own beliefs in ways that caused them to be labelled “heterodox” and perhaps in some cases even caused them to split from the Stoic school completely, to go their own way, or join another school of philosophy.

  1. Aristo of Chios, discounted the value of studying Physics and Logic, believing Ethics to be the sole concern of philosophy.  He also argued that apart from virtue and vice, everything else is completely “indifferent”, seemingly rejecting the Stoic doctrine of “preferred” indifferents.  He sounds like someone leaning toward the older Cynic teachings.
  2. Herillus of Carthage, who argued that knowledge (episteme) in general was the true goal of life, rather than virtue, or knowledge specifically of the nature of the good.  However, he also seems to have argued that there are two fundamentally separate goals in life: the attainment of scholarly and scientific knowledge achieved only by the wise, and a “sub-goal” apparently pertaining to fulfilling one’s social and familial duties, which even the unwise could pursue.  The Stoics, by contrast, argued that the only goal is moral wisdom or virtue, and that this inherently entails acting for the welfare of others.  Herillus perhaps came to resemble the Academics or Aristotelians more than the Stoics, and may have been viewed as going to the opposite extreme compared to Aristo, in his arguments against Zeno.
  3. Dionysius of Heraclea, who disagreed with Zeno after suffering from a painful eye-infection, which led him to conclude that pleasure (hedone), and presumably the avoidance of pain, was the true goal of life rather than virtue.  He left the Stoa to join the Cyrenaic school, although this dispute perhaps prefigures the long-running arguments between the later Stoics and Epicureans.

Discussion

One of our main sources for the teachings of the early Stoics is The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius.  The organisation of the book is particularly interesting with regard to Stoicism.  Book Six of the Lives concerns the Cynics and begins with a chapter on Antisthenes, followed by chapters on Diogenes of Sinope, Crates, and several other Cynics.  Diogenes claims that Stoicism is part of a philosophical succession going back to Cynicism and prior to that Antisthenes, who was a friend and student of Socrates.  So the “Cynic-Stoic succession” is thereby traced all the way back to its supposed origin in the teachings of Socrates.  Modern scholars believe it’s unlikely Diogenes of Sinope, the first Cynic, actually met Antisthenes.  Nevertheless, it’s quite possible he was inspired by his writings, so there may be a grain of truth in the notion that Antisthenes was somehow the forerunner of the Cynic, and thereby the Stoic, tradition.  In any case, Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, was undoubtedly greatly influenced by Cynicism, and we’re told he studied under the Cynic Crates of Thebes for many years before founding the Stoa.

Book Seven of the Lives therefore deals with the Stoic philosophers, starting with Zeno.  The first chapter, which covers Zeno’s life, contains a lengthy outline of early Stoicism in general.  Book Seven also contains chapters on several other important philosophers of the early Stoic school, such as Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno, and it concludes with a lengthy chapter on Chrysippus, the third head of the school.  However, curiously, the chapter on Zeno and the early doctrines of the school is immediately followed by three chapters on lesser-known Stoics, described by Diogenes Laertius as “heterodox”, i.e., unorthodox, or renegades from the school.

[Among the pupils of Zeno were:] Ariston, the son of Miltiades and a native of Chios, who introduced the doctrine of things morally indifferent; Herillus of Carthage, who affirmed knowledge to be the end; Dionysius, who became a renegade to the doctrine of pleasure, for owing to the severity of his ophthalmia he had no longer the nerve to call pain a thing indifferent: his native place was Heraclea. (Diogenes Laertius, 7.1)

It may be noteworthy that although all three are described as pupils of Zeno, only Dionysius is actually labelled a renegade from the school, and he is the only one of whom we are specifically told that he joined another school, the Cyrenaics.  Before introducing these three, at the end of the chapter on Zeno, he also writes as follows referring to them as “Stoics”:

But the points on which certain of the Stoics differed from the rest are the following. (Diogenes Laertius, 7.1)

Diogenes concludes the three chapters on heterodox Stoics by saying:

These three, then, are the heterodox Stoics.  The legitimate successor to Zeno, however, was Cleanthes: of whom we have now to speak. (Lives, 7.4)

This can be taken as evidence that there were important internal disputes that helped to shape the early development of the Stoic school.  It’s not entirely clear to what extent these three philosophers were subsequently associated with the Stoics, except that we’re told Dionysius left to join the Cyrenaics.  Each was called heterodox because of doctrinal disagreements with Zeno, which happened to be quite different in each case.  Their reasons for being classed as “heterodox” or “renegade” Stoics are worth outlining as they provide an interesting overview of three distinct ways in which an early Stoic could be considered to have strayed so far from Zeno’s teachings that he was no longer considered a Stoic at all.  In other words, this gives us some insight into which beliefs were considered orthodox to early Stoicism.

1. Aristo of Chios

Also spelled “Ariston” and known as “Aristo the Bald”.  Although he came to disagree with Zeno’s teachings, Aristo seems to have been an important and influential teacher in his own right.  We’re told elsewhere that Marcus Aurelius was inspired to become a philosopher, many centuries later, by reading Aristo’s works.

Aristo rejected the value of studying Physics and Logic, and instead claimed that philosophers should only concern themselves with Ethics.  This attitude appears to resemble that of the Cynics.  Zeno started his own philosophical career as a Cynic but began to study at the Academy and the Megarian school, apparently because he felt that some understanding of Logic and Physics was important, and lacking from the Cynic philosophy.  Stoicism was therefore known for its threefold curriculum: Ethics, Physics and Logic.  However, different Stoics appear to have placed different degrees of importance on these three disciplines.  It’s often felt that the late Roman Stoics are primarily concerned with Ethics, and have noticeably less to say about Physics and Logic, although this may be partly a reflection of the fact that only a small fragment of their writings survive.  It sometimes appears that Logic and Physics are important to Stoicism, but perhaps not absolutely essential.  For instance, their heroes, such as Heracles and Diogenes, did not excel in Physics or Logic, and yet were considered role-models because of their moral character.  Aristo appears to have gone too far, though, by completely rejecting the value of Logic and Physics for philosophy.

Aristo also rejected Zeno’s concept of “preferred” indifferents and insisted that apart from virtue and vice, everything else must be regarded as totally indifferent.  In this respect, he also appears more aligned with the Cynics rather than the Stoics.  Although, curiously, he doesn’t appear to be considered particularly aligned with Cynicism by other ancient authors.  Again, some scholars see the introduction of the concept of “preferred” indifferents as one of the key things that distinguished Stoics from Cynics.

2. Herillus of Carthage

Also spelled “Erillus” and sometimes said to be of Chalcedon rather than Carthage, presumably due to an error in the ancient sources.

He argued that knowledge (episteme) should be regarded as the true goal of life, rather than virtue, and he appears to have said also that such knowledge takes different forms in different circumstances.  The early Stoics appear to have argued that virtue itself is a form of knowledge.  The highest virtue, wisdom, is described as the knowledge of good and evil, and of indifferent things, and the other virtues are defined in similar times as ethical knowledge in relation to different forms of action.  This suggests that Herillus broke from the teachings of Zeno by making knowledge in general the goal of life, whereas the Stoics considered only ethical knowledge, or moral wisdom, to be an end in itself.  They probably considered other forms of knowledge, or science, to be of some kind of subordinate value.  For example, Chrysippus reputedly taught that Physics is of value only insofar as it contributes to our understanding of Ethics.  Stoic literature is full of warnings against those who pursue abstract learning for its own sake, without grounding it somehow in the practicalities of living a virtuous life.  Diogenes Laertius has relatively little to say about him, but he writes:

Herillus of Carthage declared the end of action to be Knowledge, that is, so to live always as to make the scientific life the standard in all things and not to be misled by ignorance. Knowledge he defined as a habit of mind, not to be upset by argument, in the acceptance of presentations. Sometimes he used to say there was no single end of action, but it shifted according to varying circumstances and objects, as the same bronze might become a statue either of Alexander or of Socrates. He made a distinction between end-in-chief and subordinate end: even the unwise may aim at the latter, but only the wise seek the true end of life. Everything that lies between virtue and vice he pronounced indifferent. His writings, though they do not occupy much space, are full of vigour and contain some controversial passages in reply to Zeno.

We’re told he wrote several books on topics including, training exercises (askesis), the passions, on judgements or opinions (hupolepsis), and on Hermes, and Medea.  Diogenes Laertius tells us in his chapter on the life of Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno as head of the Stoa, that he wrote a book entitled “Reply to Herillus”.  This suggests that Herillus’ break from the Stoa and his criticisms of Zeno were significant enough for the second head of the school to attempt to refute them in writing.

It’s perhaps tempting to see Herillus as leaning away from the Stoa and more in the direction of Plato’s Academy, and perhaps the Aristotelians, in this respect.

3. Dionysius of Heraclea

Dionysius of Heraclea (c. 330 – c. 250 BC) was also known as “Dionysius the Renegade”, because of his radical break from the Stoic teachings of Zeno.  The Greek word literally means one who changes sides or changes his mind, i.e., a turn-coat or renegade.  It’s perhaps notable that neither Aristo nor Herillus are labelled as ones who changed sides, or renegades from the Stoic school.  Perhaps this is meant to imply that they remained Stoics, albeit unorthodox ones, whereas Dionysius actually left the Stoa.

He had previously studied philosophy in the Megarian school, before becoming a student of Zeno.  Dionysius left the Stoa because he came to value pleasure (hedone), and the absence of pain, as the goal of life, rather than virtue.  We’re actually told that Dionysius left the Stoa to join the Cyrenaic school, who made pleasure the goal of life.  We’re told Dionysius was driven to this conclusion by the intolerable pain and discomfort of an eye-infection.  In his chapter on the life of Zeno, Diogenes Laertius writes:

When Dionysius the Renegade asked [Zeno], “Why am I the only pupil you do not correct?” the reply was, “Because I mistrust you.”

We know little more about Dionysius. He wrote two books on freedom from passions (apatheia), two on training exercises (askesis), four on pleasure (hedone), among others.

Zeno classed pleasure and pain as key examples of morally “indifferent” things.  So Dionysius’ claim that pleasure is the goal of life would have constituted a very radical departure from “orthodox” Stoic teachings, so much so that he inevitably left and rebranded himself as a Cyrenaic.

The Cyrenaic school was quite different from the Epicurean school, which rose to prominence slightly later.  However, this schism in the early Stoa can probably be seen as prefiguring the subsequent and long-running disagreements between the Stoics and Epicureans.

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The Contemplation of Death: Sample Chapter from Teach Yourself Stoicism (2014)

Teach Yourself:

Stoicism and the Art of Happiness

Sample Chapter:

The Contemplation of Death

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The contemplation of death

In this chapter you will learn:

  • About the ancient concept of the “good death” and what it means to have a Stoic or philosophical attitude toward your own demise
  • How to practice the psychological exercise, common to different philosophical schools, which Socrates called the “meditation on death” (melete thanatou)
  • How facing death can transform life by helping us to value the “here and now”
  • What the Stoics meant by saying that life and death are “indifferent” to us and how they trained themselves to maintain this view

Reflect that no evils afflict one who has died, that the accounts which make the underworld a place of terror to us are mere tales, that no darkness threatens the dead, no prison, or rivers blazing with fire, no river of Forgetfulness, or seats of judgement, no sinners answering for their crimes, or tyrants a second time in that freedom which so lacks fetters: these are the imaginings of poets, who have tormented us with groundless fears. Death is a release from all pains, and a boundary beyond which our sufferings cannot go; it returns us to that state of peacefulness in which we lay before we were born. If someone pities those who have died, let him pity also those who have not been born. Death is neither a good nor an evil; for only that which is something can be a good or an evil but what is itself nothing and reduces everything to nothingness, delivers us to no category of fortune. (Seneca, Consolation to Marcia, 19)

Forget all else, Lucilius, and concentrate your thoughts on this one thing: not to fear the name of death. Through long reflection make death one of your close acquaintances, so that, if the situation arises, you are able even to go out and meet it. (Seneca, On Earthquakes)

Self-assessment: Stoic attitudes toward death

Before reading this chapter, rate how strongly you agree with the following statements, using the five-point (1-5) scale below, and then re-rate your attitudes once you’ve read and digested the contents.

(1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Agree, 5. Strongly agree)

  1. “Dying doesn’t frighten me very much.” (    )
  2. “It’s more important to have lived a good life than a long life.” (    )
  3. “Life and death are not intrinsically good or bad; it depends how we use them.” (    )

Why is contemplating your death important?

How prepared are you to meet your own death? What does death mean to you and what role does it play in your life?

One day you will die: Nature has provided you with ample evidence of this from the example of others. The Stoics, like most ancient philosophers, believed it was important to meditate often on the prospect of your own death, questioning the fear most people have of dying. Epictetus mentions that Roman generals were followed during their “triumph”, the celebration of a great military victory, by slaves who repeatedly whispered memento mori (“remember thou must die”) to help them remain circumspect and avoid vanity (Discourses, 3.24). Stoics developed a wide variety of similar strategies because they considered this the most important fear (or “aversion”) to overcome, through the discipline of desire and aversion.

The phrase memento mori is familiar to many people as a description of works of art, from the Vanitas paintings of the Renaissance to Damien Hirst’s animals preserved in formaldehyde. These works evoke a contemplative or philosophical attitude toward our own mortality. For example, Nicolas Poussin’s painting The Arcadian Shepherds depicts a tomb with the inscription et in Arcadia ego, through which Death reminds us: “Even in paradise, I will find you.” Similar themes are familiar from literature. The character of Ebeneezer Scrooge in Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol (1843) is confronted with his own grave by the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, and the experience leads to an epiphany that transforms his moral character. This notion of contemplative meditation on the inevitability of death, and the transience of life, was common in philosophy until recent centuries. The iconic image of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a young philosophy student, holding aloft the skull of his childhood friend Yorick would have been recognisable to Elizabethan audiences as an allusion to common philosophical practices that involved contemplating images of death.

The Stoics were particularly emphatic about the importance of constant training in overcoming our fear of death. Epictetus taught his students that they should contemplate the Stoic paradox that “the source of all human evils, and of mean-spiritedness and cowardice, is not death, but rather the fear of death.” It’s the most pernicious of all fears. If we want to make progress as Stoics, he says, we should try to dedicate all of our discussion, reading, and exercises to this fundamental goal of training ourselves to overcome the fear of death as this is the only way we can truly attain freedom and liberate ourselves from self-imposed slavery to the passions (Discourses, 3.25). According to Seneca, we should realise that, ironically, an excessive fear of dying often leads to an early death (On the Tranquillity of the Mind, 11). He actually goes so far as to say that the man who fears his own death will never do anything worthy of life.

Near the start of the Discourses, Epictetus presents an exemplary role-model, the highly-regarded Stoic philosopher Paconius Agrippinus who reacted with complete composure when informed of his own impending execution, sitting down to finish his lunch with friends. This is what it means to rehearse and assimilate the lessons taught by the Stoic discipline of desire and aversions, setting ourselves free from obstruction and the vicissitudes of external fortune.

I must die. If soon, then I die; whereas if a little later, I will take lunch now, since the hour for lunch has come, and afterwards I will die at the appointed time. How? As becomes the man who is giving back that which was another’s. (Discourses, 1.1)

In other words, to die is to return what belongs to Nature, and was merely “on loan” to us temporarily. Death is natural and inevitable, and so on the basis of natural philosophy, we should not view it as unexpected when the day finally comes, but death should find us long- prepared to let go of life magnanimously. This practice was common to most schools of philosophy and Seneca actually provides one of the most striking accounts of it while discussing the rival Epicurean school:

[Epicurus said:] ‘Practice death in advance,’ or if it is easier to convey his meaning, something like this: ‘It is a great thing to learn how to die.’ Perhaps you think it superfluous to learn something that can only be implemented once. This is the very reason we have to practise; we must always learn anything that we cannot test to see if we know it. ‘Practise death!’ The man who says this is bidding us practice liberty. The man who has learned to die has unlearned how to be a slave; he is above all power, or at least beyond its reach. What do prison and guards and locked doors mean to him? He has a free way out. There is only one chain that keeps us bound, the love of life, and even if this should not be rejected, it should be reduced so that if circumstances require nothing will hold us back or prevent us from being ready instantly for whatever action is needed. (Letters, 26)

This fundamental theme runs through the whole of Stoicism. In one of the most poignant passages of The Meditations, Marcus Aurelius asserts the Stoic and Socratic view that true philosophy consists above all in “waiting for death with good grace”, remembering that it is merely a natural and inevitable dispersal of atoms, and not to be feared as a catastrophe (Meditations, 2.17). Indeed, the meditation on death is the apex of all the Stoic exercises involving premeditation of adversity. By learning to adopt a philosophical attitude toward your own death, your way of acting may be fundamentally transformed, making this both a psychological and ethical training exercise. The Stoic ideal holds that the Sage, the man we should seek to emulate, “finds it a joy to live and in spite of that is not reluctant to die”, accepting his mortality and facing death with dignity when the time comes (Letters, 54). Marcus therefore advises contemplating death in each action, to focus our attention on its true worth: “During every one of your actions pause at each step and ask yourself: Is death deemed catastrophic because of the loss of this?” (Meditations, 10.29). Seneca likewise imagines that we should respond to those afraid to die by saying “So are you living now?” Paradoxically, we cannot be truly “alive” when we are enslaved by fears, especially the fear of death itself (Letters, 77). We make ourselves the puppets of fortune and, in particular, we become slaves to other men by valuing what is in their power. Stoic heroes like Cato were called “invulnerable” to tyrants like Caesar because they were not willing to sacrifice their values to save their own lives.

However, the theoretical notion that death is “indifferent” is not sufficient to bring about a personal transformation. The precepts of Stoicism are meant to be turned into a firmly-grasped certainty, which requires constant practice as part of a daily regime. Seneca therefore says the aspiring Stoic should practice first and foremost to look down upon death, with indifference, something that is “effective against all weapons and every kind of enemy” (Letters, 36). We naturally love our own lives from birth and death is understandably something terrifying; otherwise we would not need to train ourselves to view it differently. However, the Stoic aims to identify more fully with her nature as a rational being, which means rising above certain things we’re born fearing. Stoics therefore recommend picturing our own death regularly, perhaps even several times a day. We should think of it in slightly different ways, at different times.

Going to bed being grateful for our lives so far, for example, or awakening in the morning and planning our day as if it were our last chance to truly live. We can identify the following exercises in Stoic literature:

  1. Mentally picturing one’s own death, in various ways, as if you were able to observe it happening
  2. Reading about, discussing, and contemplating the “stories” of Cato and Socrates, as examples of good deaths
  3. Telling ourselves “tomorrow I must die” and contemplating those words at certain times
  4. Contemplating the transience of all material things and human mortality in general, as in the various cosmological meditations The contemplation of death therefore overlaps with other Stoic exercises and along with the “view from above” it may lie at the very heart of the discipline of desire and Stoic therapy of the passions.

For example, the contemplation of death is obviously linked to the Stoic practice of dwelling in the “here and now”. Ironically, reminding ourselves of death can intensify our experience of living. The need to “seize the day” because death is certain, was an extremely common theme in classical poetry, especially where it was influenced by Stoic philosophy.

In a world torn by hope and worry, dread and anger, imagine every day that dawns is the last you’ll see; the hour you never hoped for will prove a happy surprise. (Horace, Letters, 1.4)

The Stoic Persius likewise wrote:

Soon enough you’ll turn into dust, ghost, and hearsay. Live with death in mind; time flies – my words reduce it. (Satires, 5)

Seneca wrote: “Imagine this is your last day of life; or, if not, the next to last” (Letters, 15).  Musonius Rufus, likewise said: “It is not possible to live well today unless you treat it as your last day” (Fragments, 22). Marcus repeatedly dwells on this theme, continually reminding himself to live in the “here and now” as if certain death were looming on the horizon. We will make progress toward virtue and perfect our character, he says, if we can only carry out every action in life with a sense of purpose while passing through each day as if it were our last, and we could depart at any moment (Meditations, 2.11; 2.5; 7.69). As Hadot put it, the thought of our imminent death potentially “transforms our way of acting in a radical way, by forcing us to become aware of the infinite value of each instant” (2002, p. 137).

Case study: The death of Socrates

Xenophon wrote that his friend and teacher, Socrates, faced the death-sentence with absolute serenity and fortitude, and that it was “generally agreed that no one in the memory of man has ever met his death more nobly” (Memorabilia, 4.8). We’ve already mentioned the events surrounding the trial and execution of Socrates. The Stoics undoubtedly treat this as the example par excellence of a “good death”. In reading about Socrates’ preparing to meet his death, in a sense, we accompany him and prepare ourselves for our own deaths.

Plato wasn’t there himself but, in an eponymous dialogue, portrays Socrates’ friend Phaedo recounting his astonishment at the philosopher’s composure during his final hours.

“Although I was witnessing the death of one who was my friend, I had no feeling of pity, for the man appeared happy both in manner and words as he died nobly and without fear.” (Phaedo, 58e)

So what did Socrates do? Well, he acted normally. He saw his persecutors, the men responsible for his death, as simply misguided rather than hateful. The Enchiridion of Epictetus makes a point of concluding with a remarkable quotation attributed to him: “Anytus and Meletus [who brought the charges] can kill me, but they cannot harm me.” (Obi-wan Kenobi echoes this in the movie Star Wars!)  This may well be an allusion to the fact it was a favourite quote of Thrasea, the leader of the Stoic Opposition, who defiantly changed it to: “Nero can kill me, but he cannot harm me.”

In prison, awaiting execution, Socrates spent his final hours debating amiably with his friends about philosophy. Given the proximity of his own demise, he chose to explore the question of what happens to the soul after death, coolly examining several possibilities while keeping an open mind, tolerant of uncertainty. More importantly, he explains his view that philosophy is essentially a lifelong “meditation on death” (melete thanatou), as the reason for his surprising indifference. He says that those who practice philosophy in the right way are constantly training for death, and true philosophers fear dying least of all men (Phaedo, 67e).

The “contemplation of death” therefore emerged right at the most dramatic moment in the birth of Western philosophy, spoken at the heart of what Socrates called his philosophical swansong. When the time came, he calmly drank the poison and waited to die, something he’d clearly reconciled himself to, and faced with supreme equanimity and an attitude of philosophical curiosity.

Key idea: Life and death are indifferent

The Stoics did not generally believe in the immortality of the soul, which they saw as a subtle physical substance, composed of air or fire, extending through the body like the tentacles of an octopus. (Maybe a primitive precursor of our modern concept of neurological processes.)

Some Stoics perhaps believed the soul survives temporarily after the body’s death, but they accepted that we are all ultimately destined to be destroyed. However, both life and death are explicitly classed as “indifferents”, neither good nor bad in themselves. They may be used either wisely or foolishly, for either virtue or vice. Nevertheless, life is classed among the “preferred” indifferents, death among the “dispreferred” ones. Stoics therefore considered it natural for adult humans to prefer survival, as do animals and infants. With the acquisition of language and reason, though, our chief good becomes wisdom and the rational virtues. The mere fact of living or dying does not make us any more wise or virtuous. Both living and dying, nevertheless, may be approached with wisdom and virtue and be called “good”, in that sense.

For the Stoics, we should live to achieve progress toward wisdom, rather than pursuing wisdom in order to somehow extend our lives. By contrast, it would potentially be better not to live than to live a life of folly and injustice toward others.

Remember this: your death is certain

As we saw earlier, Epictetus described a three-stage procedure, forming part of the discipline of desire (Discourses, 3.24). He advises us to rehearse saying “I knew that I was mortal” in preparation, premeditating our death. This threefold strategy can be applied to the contemplation of death as follows:

  1. We should remind ourselves of the inevitability of death, in preparation, so that we can never feel it is “unexpected” or be surprised when the day finally arrives.
  2. We should recall that it is not “up to us” and therefore not an evil, but “indifferent” with regard to our ultimate Happiness and fulfilment.
  3. Death is a natural process and we should accept it as determined by the string of causes that constitutes the whole of Nature, and our fate in life –the thought Epictetus considered “most decisive”.

We’ll examine these aspects in turn, beginning with the prescription that we should be continually remember the inevitability of our own death. The poems of Horace return to this theme several times: “remember your death is certain” (Odes, 2.3).

How is it possible for us to forget our own mortality? And yet it seems that we so often do. Everyone perceives ample evidence that they must die eventually, at least in terms of physical life on Earth.  Perhaps religious beliefs about an afterlife may contradict this and introduce some uncertainty.  Nevertheless, we react as if it comes as a surprise that we must die, and so death continues to make us anxious. To firmly grasp the certainty of death is to remove the irrational sense of shock that contributes to emotional distress. Indeed, modern research on worry suggests that when we view something feared as certain it’s often less distressing than when we view it as uncertain or ambiguous.

We learn the certainty of death mainly by observing that all other people die. Hence, Marcus Aurelius several times reminds himself of the deaths of great historical figures (Meditations, 3.3; 4.48). Even great conquerors like Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar or great philosophers such as Socrates and Zeno – what has become of them?

Because death is inevitable and comes to all it was also widely referred to as the great leveller. Nobody can escape the fact that they will die eventually. Seneca says that it is a cardinal feature of nature that everyone arrives at death on an equal footing and the circumstances don’t essentially matter: “Death has the same force wherever it strikes” (On Earthquakes). As Marcus Aurelius put it, death reduced both Alexander the Great and his mule- driver to the same condition (Meditations, 6.24). Again, this theme recurs in the poems of Horace, death comes knocking at the poor man’s shack and the king’s palace alike (Odes, 1.5).

Whether rich or poor, “it’s all one; you and I are victims of never-relenting Orcus” or Death (Odes, 2.3). Shelley’s Ozymandias (1818) employs a related literary device, called ubi sunt (“Where are they now?”).

And on the pedestal these words appear:
“My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!”
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

Certain tombs and gravestones were designed to have this effect, reminding us not only of the deceased but of our own mortality. Seneca likewise observes that although many funeral processions went past the doors of his family and fellow Roman citizens they seldom reflected on their own mortality (Consolation to Marcia, 9). Yet we should learn from the fate that befalls others to prepare ourselves for the common lot of mankind, especially the day of our death. We can always reflect that around the world at any given time, thousands of humans and other living creatures are dying. We know that every journey has its end and should not be unprepared for the inevitability of our own demise.

In addition to the certainty of our ultimate demise, the Stoics very frequently reminded themselves that “The door is always open”. This was another Stoic slogan, which clearly meant that it’s always possible to voluntarily end your life.

The door stands open. Why grieve? (Discourses, 1.9)

Although there are some exceptional circumstances, perhaps, in which suicide is physically impossible, it is virtually always available as a way out. Whereas for many people this thought may seem morbid, for the Stoics it carried tremendous psychological and ethical force. We only remain here on Earth so long as we continue choosing to live – “the door is always open”, should we wish to depart. Like children playing a game, we can always say “I won’t play any longer” and take our leave, but if we choose to stay on in the “game” of life it’s hypocritical to keep complaining because we do so voluntarily (Discourses, 1.25).

The story goes that in old age, when he was frail and unable to continue lecturing, Zeno voluntarily committed suicide, after tripping upon the ground and then beating it with his hand as he joked: “I come of my own accord; why then call me?” (Lives, 7.1). Stoics go to their death willingly when the time comes.

Key idea: Remembering death is certain (memento mori)

Contemplating your own death and learning to adopt a courageous philosophical attitude toward it is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental exercises in Stoic practice. Epictetus told his students that day by day they should keep everything that seems catastrophic before their mind’s eye, but most of all death (Enchiridion, 21). This contemplative practice takes a variety of forms but permeates the whole Stoic tradition. Sometimes this may have involved written exercises, in a journal, such as we find in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. Often, it may have involved patiently visualising death. However, there are many references to the use of repeating verbal formulae to remind oneself of death.

Epictetus mentions that triumphant Roman generals would have the words memento mori (“Remember thou must die”) whispered in their ears. Somewhat notoriously, he then says that we should likewise whisper over our sleeping spouses and children “Tomorrow you will die”, and remind ourselves that we are kissing a mortal.  This is probably derived from a well-known anecdote.  When Xenophon was told that one of his sons had been slain in battle he said only: “I knew that he was mortal.” Epictetus, likewise, also instructed his Stoic students to repeatedly say to themselves the words: “I knew that I was mortal” (Discourses, 3.24).

In a similar vein, Seneca suggests we should tell ourselves “You may not wake up”, when going to sleep, and “You may not ever sleep again”, when waking in the morning, to remind us of our own mortality (Letters, 49). Elsewhere, he also says that as we go to sleep each night we should practice saying: “I have lived my life and run the course that Fortune gave” (Letters, 12). He claims that by doing so we may learn to be grateful for each new day that fate gives us.

Try it now: Contemplate the “good death” of a wise man

Read the account of Socrates’ last days in Plato’s Apology and Crito. Alternatively, read the account of Seneca’s death from the Annals of Tacitus, Cato’s death in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives, or any other praiseworthy examples you can find.

  1. Imagine yourself in the shoes of Socrates, Cato, Seneca, or whoever you’ve chosen, sharing their thoughts, actions, and feelings, in the face of death.
  2. What might you do, in their place, if you were acting with wisdom and courage? What would you do if sentenced to drink hemlock, for example, like Socrates?
  3. Would you handle things in the same way or differently? Compare your actions to theirs. How would it feel?

Try to contemplate several different examples, and compare them to each other. What lessons can you draw from this thought experiment that might apply to life in general?

Key idea: “The good death”

Death is “indifferent”, in itself, but we can die well by meeting our fate with wisdom and virtue so philosophers sometimes speak of the “good death”. For most Stoics, undoubtedly, Socrates provided the supreme example of a philosophical attitude in the face of death. For later Stoics, Cato was also treated as an important role-model in this respect. Stoic literature is full, however, of many different examples of “good deaths”.

Boethius wrote: “Some men at the price of a glorious death have won a fame that generations will venerate; some indomitable in the face of punishment have given others an example that evil cannot defeat virtue” (Consolation of Philosophy, 4.6). However, the most important aspect of the good death is the fact that it’s approached with wisdom and virtuous intentions, rather than the actual consequences for other people, which are largely in the hands of fate. Even someone who dies in obscurity can have a “good death”, if she can meet her fate with dignity and courage.

Try it now: Picture your own death

Take a few minutes to contemplate your own death as if it were happening now. Draw on what you’ve read in this chapter but also recall some of the exercises you learned in the chapter on premeditation of adversity. As you do so, recall the Stoic teaching that although it’s natural to prefer to live, death is not an “evil” but rather an opportunity for virtue.

  1. Tell yourself that death is inevitable and necessary, ordained as your fate by Nature.
  2. Take time to contemplate things as objectively as possible, without any value-judgements, as if you’re considering your death from a detached scientific perspective, as an inevitable natural event, stripping away the “mask” of catastrophic thinking.
  3. Next, try to imagine what is under your control, and the extent to which you would be able to exercise wisdom and virtue in the face of death.
  4. If it helps, return to the contemplation of wise men, especially the “good deaths” of philosophers such as Socrates, and imagine how the ideal Stoic Sage would respond to the same death you imagine facing. What would it be like to emulate their praiseworthy example?

An alternative approach would be to imagine witnessing your own funeral service, like Scrooge does in A Christmas Carol. Again, think about what lessons can be taken from this that might apply to life in general.

Remember this: The Stoic view of suicide or euthanasia

In the ancient world, people were more often faced with situations where suicide was considered a reasonable response, such as the threat of enslavement or torture. However, even today, many people face an old age in which the continuation of their life, through worsening physical frailty and illness, becomes a very serious moral dilemma. The Stoic position is highly relevant to the modern debate on the ethics of euthanasia (literally, a “good death”). Stoic Ethics, unlike some religions, does not consider suicide to be inherently wrong.

What matter are the judgments and intentions on which it’s based. It would be wrong for someone to take their own life because of unhealthy or irrational “passions”, meaning suicide caused by pathological depression would be wrong. However, in some cases suicide may be rational, if the decision is made “in sound mind” and wisely. The founders of Stoicism said that suicide was appropriate for wise, temperate, and courageous men, in many cases, but for the foolish, impulsive, or cowardly it is better to remain alive, rather than to take their own life for the wrong reasons. The Stoics believed it was rational for Socrates and Cato to take their own lives, under the exceptional circumstances facing them. According to one account, Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, “endured many hardships by reason of old age”, and eventually took his own life when he was in his seventies (Lives, 7.1).

Remember death is no evil

The Stoics also argued that it is irrational to judge something “evil” once we accept that it is inevitable, because calling something evil is tantamount to saying that it must be avoided at all costs.

When death appears to be an evil, we must have ready at hand the argument that it is our duty to avoid evils, and that death is an inevitable thing. (Discourses, 1.27)

The challenging concept that “death is not an evil” was fundamental to the whole genre of “consolation” letters in the ancient world, which are found across different philosophical traditions, but were particularly associated with the Stoics. For example, in his letter to Marcia who had been grieving the death of her son Metilius for over three years, Seneca puts the argument very forcefully that death is ultimately “indifferent” with regard to having a good life (Consolation to Marcia, 19). Only what is under our direct control can be truly “good” or “bad”, and our own life and death are classed as “indifferent”, being not entirely under our control. The Stoics also argued that life can be used badly, so it is not life itself that is good or bad but the use we make of it. In themselves, living and dying are “indifferent”; we make them “good” or “honourable” only insofar as we approach them with wisdom and virtue. Seneca quotes the words of another Stoic who explains that “it is no great thing to live” because slaves and cattle also live, but rather it is great to live and die honourably, wisely, and courageously (Letters, 77).

Stoic philosophy, like the magic wand of Hermes, can turn anything that befalls us into gold, and even death becomes an opportunity for exercising virtue:

“What will you make of death?” Why, what else but make it your glory, or an opportunity for you to show in deed thereby what sort of person a man is who follows the will of nature. (Discourses, 3.20)

Nevertheless, the Stoics would say that it is natural and rational for humans, like all other animals, to “prefer” their own life and not their own death, as long, as this accords with virtue.

“Preference” is only possible because the future is uncertain, though. Once our death, from a particular cause, becomes certain and unavoidable, it turns to something completely “indifferent”, which we have no choice but to accept. Death in general, the fact that we must ultimately die somehow, is always certain of course, and something we should accept unreservedly.

Plato’s Republic, written over three centuries before the New Testament, portrays Socrates saying that myths about the underworld should be completely expunged from literature to avoid planting irrational superstitions and fears about death in the minds of children (3.386). In the Phaedo, Socrates is then asked by his friends to speak to them as though a little child remains within their minds, who is afraid of death as if it were a bogeyman, and to reassure them there is nothing to fear. He replies: “You should sing a charm over him every day until you have charmed away his fears” (Phaedo, 77e). Stoics likewise compared death to a bogeyman and to scary masks that frighten small children by their appearance. We should strip away the myths and value-judgements that make death appear like a bogeyman: “Turn it about and learn what it is; see, it does not bite” (Discourses, 2.1). Seneca uses the same analogy to describe premeditation on adversity, like removing a scary mask that frightens children, ignorant that the person wearing it is actually harmless (Letters, 24).

The Stoics therefore rejected mythological accounts of the afterlife as superstitious tales designed to frighten small children. However, they also used many philosophical arguments, which they rehearsed repeatedly in different forms and memorised to help them develop a “firm grasp” of their moral principle that death is fundamentally indifferent. One of the simplest Stoic arguments was that “death is not intrinsically bad or catastrophic, otherwise it would seem so to everyone”. In other words, not everyone sees it the same way. The list below summarises various examples of this argument found in the Stoic literature.

Not everyone judges death to be bad:

  • Acrobats are willing to risk death for applause
  • Soldiers choose to face death for the sake of glory
  • Parents will sacrifice their own lives to protect their children
  • Lovers will often risk death for their loved ones
  • The elderly or infirm sometimes seek death (“euthanasia”) to avoid suffering
  • Many people commit suicide, for various (good or bad) reasons preferring death to life
  • More importantly: wise men, such as Socrates and Cato, did not see their own deaths as fearful or catastrophic

All these examples illustrate the point that people will sometimes judge other things to be more important than preserving their own life. Even the unwise will accept the risk of death in order to gain wealth, glory, or the affection of others. Marcus therefore says that a powerful way to train oneself to look down on death is remember how many foolish and vicious people have nevertheless managed risked death without fear (Meditations, 12.34). However, the wise will face death when it is necessary to do so in the service of virtue and eudaimonia, the supreme good in life. Can death be intrinsically bad, therefore, if so many people are willing to risk their lives for something they prize more highly?

This leads to the famous Stoic view that it is not actually death itself that is distressing or even harmful but rather our faulty value-judgement. The fear of death is worse than death itself because it is an irrational passion that does real harm to our mind, and prevents us flourishing.

In fact, this argument is central to Epictetus’ Handbook:

It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things. For example, death is nothing catastrophic, or else Socrates too would have thought so, but the judgement that death is catastrophic, this is the catastrophic thing. (Enchiridion, 5)

When facing death we must primarily have ready-to-hand in our minds a firm grasp of what is ours and what is not: “I must die: must I, then, die groaning too?” (Discourses, 1.1). These are the arguments that aspiring Stoics should exercise themselves in every single day, rehearsing them mentally and in writing, “from dawn to dusk”, until they become second nature. Seneca says that the Stoic ideal is to look upon one’s own death with the same expression, the same detachment and objectivity, as when one hears of a stranger’s death (On the Happy Life, 20). Our own death is as “external” to our volition as the death of someone on the other side of the world, or someone’s death in the distant past or distant future.

The fear of death is therefore regarded as one of the most fundamental and insidious of the irrational passions. The Stoics argue that we simply cannot imagine the ideal Sage would judge his own death to be an evil, otherwise he would potentially condemn himself to a life of cowardice and slavery. His death may be in the hands of a tyrant, and to avoid it he would then be forced to obey the demands of a wicked man. Whereas if he prizes virtue above preserving his own life, no tyrant has the power to coerce him anymore. Consider whose lives are more praiseworthy: those who fear death the most, and seek to preserve their lives at any cost, or those who “prefer” to live but are unafraid to die in the service of honour?

The Stoics also frequently mention arguments for the indifference of death based on the notion that it is merely a form of non-existence. For example, Seneca says the man who wishes to live another thousand years is as foolish as one who wishes he was born a thousand years earlier because we are returning to the same state of non-existence we were in before we were born (Letters, 77). Elsewhere he says: “Death brings no discomfort, for there would have to be someone whose discomfort it was” (Letters, 36).

No suffering is great if it has an end. Death is coming to you: it would have been worth fearing if it could coexist with you. But it must either not reach you, or pass you by. (Letters, 4)

Non-existence cannot be good or bad:

  • There is no person remaining to be either helped or harmed by the “experience” of being dead.
  • In fact, although we may be conscious of dying, being dead is not even an experience, let alone a good or bad one.
  • If non-existence were truly bad then the aeons of time before we were even born would be just as awful as the ones that follow death.

In addition to these arguments, the Stoics use an interesting paradox to challenge the fear of death. In his essay On Earthquakes, Seneca emphasises the folly of fearing death by earthquakes or any other specific thing, when death surrounds us and can strike in an infinite number of ways. We can as easily be killed by a single stone as an entire city collapsing on our heads. He writes: “If you wish to fear nothing, consider that all things are to be feared.”  Elsewhere he says: “It is not clear where death is waiting for you, so you should wait for it everywhere” (Letters, 26). Epictetus makes the same point: “Do you want me, then, to respect and do obeisance to all these things, and to go about as the slave of them all?” (Discourses, 4.7).

Death can come from any quarter, at any time. According to legend, the Greek playwright Aeschylus was killed by a tortoise dropped on him by an eagle flying overhead. You could be hit by a bus tomorrow. Our fears tend to be irrationally selective and when confronted with the stark logic of “If you worry about that you might as well worry about everything”, people are often forced to concede that becoming preoccupied with hypothetical catastrophes in general is a waste of time and energy. To be everywhere is to be nowhere, and to fear everything is to fear nothing.

Remember this: Fear of death is worse than death itself

The Stoics believed that the fear of death is one of the most insidious and toxic of the irrational passions. Paradoxically, therefore, the fear of death is worse than death itself. “Death you’ll think of as the worst of all bad things, though in fact there’s nothing bad about it at all except the thing which comes before it – the fear of it” (Seneca, Letters, 104). The Stoics actually believed that the fear of death lies at the root of most irrational fears, and the cardinal vice of cowardice.

Marcus says that in addition to the arguments concerning the “indifference” of death there’s a powerful “unphilosophical” argument, which is simply to ask ourselves: “Do we really want to emulate the sort of people who most fear their own death?” Go over the names of people who have tenaciously clung onto life and ask yourself whether they came any closer to genuine Happiness or fulfilment as a result (Meditations, 4.50). Epictetus had taught that the greatest harm that can befall man is “not death but rather the fear of death” and we should exert ourselves in particular to overcome this fear as doing so “is the only way in which men achieve freedom” (Discourses, 3.26).

Remember death is ordained by Nature

Epictetus said the most decisive step in the discipline of desire, regarding death, is to view it as ordained by Nature as a whole or by the divine will of Zeus. For ancient Stoics, accepting one’s fate as the divine will of Zeus was the essence of piety. Modern readers may struggle with this idea, especially if they are atheists or agnostic. However, Zeus was synonymous with Nature in Stoicism and there may still be ways in which we can learn to accept seemingly aversive events, even our own death, with equanimity, by viewing them within a larger context and as being ultimately determined by Nature as a whole. Indeed, the chief doctrine of Stoicism is that we should “live in agreement with Nature”, which means the same thing as accepting our fate, insofar as it is outside our control. Once we’ve accepted that death is the inevitable fate of all living things, the Stoics argue that it ultimately matters little whether our lives are long or short.

Not even death can bring terror to him who regards that alone as good which comes in due season, and to whom it is all one whether his acts in obedience to right reason are few or many, and a matter of indifference whether he look upon the world for a longer or a shorter time. (Meditations, 12.35)

Marcus elsewhere says that it’s of no consequence whether one lives three days or three centuries, these are as one from the perspective of eternity, when you “look at the yawning gulf of time behind you, and before you at another infinity to come” (Meditations, 4.50). To put it another way, we praise others for the quality of their lives, not their duration. It would be hypocritical to judge our own lives by a different standard. It is better to die honourably than to live a long life, foolishly and enslaved to fear and desire. Epictetus uses the ancient metaphor of a “festival” to illustrate the Stoic notion that we should constantly remember that our life is on “loan” from Nature. True piety consists, not in singing hymns in a church or temple, but in maintaining a heartfelt sense of gratitude for the opportunity to live, while accepting that it is temporary, and being willing to depart when the time comes without grumbling.

Indeed, death is a law of Nature, part of the very fabric of existence. Some of the Stoics even argued that we die a little every day. Death is seen as a lengthy gradual process that begins at birth and continues throughout our entire life. Seneca therefore says that if we want to replace fear of death with philosophical calm we should contemplate the thought very deeply in our hearts that we have been travelling along the road to death since the day we were born (Letters, 4).

Just as it is not the last drop that stops the water-clock but every drop that has previously fallen, so the last hour when we cease to exist is not the only one to cause death but the only one to complete it: we reach death then but we have been coming to it for a long time. (Letters, 24)

Marcus Aurelius suggests we should contemplate our lives in terms of distinct stages, and the transition from each to the next (“each step in the ladder of change”) as a kind of death. As we’ve grown from infants, into children, adolescents, and gone through various stages of adult life, many things have ceased or changed for us. The child dies when the man is born. We should ask ourselves: “Is there anything catastrophic here?” (Meditations, 9.21). Neither is there any catastrophe in the end of the whole process, our final demise. Viewing death as a daily event, a gradual process, rather than a single blow, grants us a lifetime of practice in coming to terms with our own mortality. Each day we take one step closer to death and we should willingly sacrifice a drop of our life to Nature, letting go of the day that has now gone, before retiring to sleep each night in preparation for letting go completely at the end of life.

As we’ve seen, Seneca advises that we should literally say such “I have lived my life and run the course that Fortune gave” each night as we go to sleep, accepting that everything happened exactly as Nature ordained, the past is behind us, and we may die tomorrow (Letters, 12). We will then meet each new day with a sense of gratitude, as a gift from Nature.

The Stoics also argue that as death is a natural and inevitable process it cannot be an evil as nothing of this kind is feared by the wise man. Marcus wrote that from the perspective of Stoic Physics, the duration of life is miniscule, the body continually prone to deterioration, and our future uncertain. He reminds himself that from the perspective of natural philosophy, death is merely a dispersal of atoms and that there is nothing terrible in the notion of one material substance being transformed into another, through a natural process. We should not be perturbed by our own inevitable death and the body’s putrefaction: “For it is in the way of Nature, and in the way of Nature there can be no evil” (Meditations, 2.17). Contemplating the decay of the body objectively, in a detached “scientific” manner, as a natural philosopher would, seems to have been an important form of the Stoic exercise we’ve called “physical definition”.

Death, like birth, is just a natural process, material elements combining, growing, decaying, and finally separating and completely dispersing (Meditations, 4.5).

Likewise, Epictetus taught his students to view death dispassionately as a return to nature.

“But now it is time to die.” Why say “die”? Make no tragic parade of the matter, but speak of it as it is: “It is now time for the material of which you are constituted to be restored to those elements from which it came.” And what is there catastrophic about that? What one of the things that make up the universe will be lost, what novel or unreasonable thing will have taken place? Is it for this that the tyrant inspires fear? (Discourses, 4.7)

In other words, if you look at “what it is to die” rationally and objectively, stripping away its phantom terrors, you will see it as merely a function of Nature, which it is childish to fear (Meditations 2.12). These natural processes of change are not entirely under our control, but ultimately in the hands of fate and external force. However, once again, what is “external” to our will is fundamentally indifferent to us according to Stoic Ethics. The Stoics forward several additional arguments about death as a natural process.

Death is a natural process, beyond our control:

  • Death is simply physical decay and no physical process is intrinsically good or bad.
  • Our body is subject to external influences beyond our control, and so our death is ultimately in the hands of fate.
  • All material things are transient (“everything flows”) and human mortality is just the most intimate example of this.
  • What is composite can always be separated, human beings are composite, therefore dissolution and death is inevitable.
  • You are already in the process of dying, it is not a single event but starts at birth, and occurs in stages, and so it’s too late to avoid it.
  • Death is ordained by the whole of Nature as our fate, it’s the will of Zeus and it would be “impious” to resent it.

From this perspective, the contemplation of death is particularly closely-related to Stoic Physics and overlaps with the contemplation of Nature as a whole, particularly the impermanence of all material things.

Try it now: Contemplate the transience of life

Take a few minutes, if you don’t mind, to really contemplate the transience of all human life and the fact that death is the common lot of all mankind.

  1. Name three historic individuals who achieved great “external” power or influence and contemplate that they are long dead despite their success. Consider briefly how they would have viewed their own death. For example, Marcus names Alexander the Great, Pompey, and Julius Caesar.
  2. Name three historic individuals you admire as having great wisdom and virtue and contemplate the fact that they are long dead despite their understanding. How would these individuals have viewed their own death? Marcus names Socrates, Diogenes, and Heraclitus.
  3. Contemplate how many people have died in the past, and how many will die in the future.
  4. Think of the demise of whole empires and civilisations, such as the Roman Empire, and that in the future your own civilisation will inevitably change and ultimately become extinct.
  5. Think about the demise of the planet Earth in the distant future, and perhaps even the possible end of the universe, such as the Stoics imagined in the “Great Conflagration” at the end of time.
  6. Contemplate the vast amount of time before you were born, during which you were non- existent, and the vast time after your death during which you will, once again, be no more.

How much difference it makes, from this perspective, whether your life is long or short? What seems most important about the way you now live your life? What other conclusions can you draw that might inform your general attitude toward life and death?

Remember this: Death is neither “good” nor “evil”

The Stoic view isn’t that death is “good”, that would be just as false as the view that it’s “bad”. Death itself is neither good nor bad, but the way we use it and our attitude toward it can be good or bad. “Life is what we make of it”, and the same proverb applies to death. Some people may nevertheless feel this aspect of Stoicism is morbid. Even the 17th century philosopher Spinoza, who has been called “more Stoic than the Stoics”, objected: “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life” (Ethica, 4.17). Others may say that it’s both natural and rational to be afraid of one’s own death. Life is precious, isn’t it? Don’t we risk valuing our own life too cheaply if we exercise ourselves in eliminating our fear of dying?

However, you don’t need to actually fear death to know not to walk off the edge of a cliff any more than you need to quake in fear at the prospect of getting wet to know not to stand outside in the rain. Neither is the contemplation of one’s own mortality meant as indulgence in a morbid or melancholic state. On the contrary, the purpose is precisely to confront and overcome fear or sadness caused by what is inevitable rather than to perpetuate distress or wallow in it. The ideal of the Stoic Sage, exemplified by Socrates, was both to love life and yet be unafraid of death. The Stoic’s love of life is conditional, she wishes to enjoy life and health, fate permitting. However, she is also willing to face death philosophically.

Focus Points (Summary)

The main points to remember from this chapter are:

  • Regular training in the contemplation of one’s own death (melete thanatou) is one of the most fundamental Stoic psychological exercises, which aims to replace fear with a more calm and philosophical attitude.
  • For Stoics, death is neither good nor bad, but “indifferent” with regard to eudaimonia and the good life.
  • However, health and life are “preferred” to their opposites, insofar as that is compatible with virtue – we don’t need to irrationally fear death to choose rational self-preservation.
  • Suicide or euthanasia are morally acceptable to Stoics but only when chosen soberly and courageously and not out of confusion, fear or emotional distress.
  • Seneca’s Letters (4, 24, 70 and 82)
  • Seneca’s Consolations to Marcia, Helvia and Polybius, and On Earthquakes

Copyright (c) Donald Robertson, 2013. All rights reserved.

This is a sample chapter. You can find out more about Teach Yourself Stoicism via this link.

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Stoicism

The Ancient Stoic Paradoxes

[Excerpt on the Stoic Paradoxes from Teach Yourself Stoicism by Donald Robertson.]

Although Stoicism was a philosophical system that prized rational understanding, the original philosophical arguments of Zeno were notoriously terse and unconvincing to his critics. Zeno proclaimed many famous “paradoxes”, which literally meant ideas that go against what the majority believe, flying in the face of popular opinion. They portrayed a radical but impressively coherent world-view that attracted many people who wanted to see if it could be defended more rigorously.

The third head of the Stoic School, Chrysippus, one of the very greatest intellectuals of the ancient world, attempted to do this, writing hundreds of volumes of detailed philosophical arguments in defence of Stoic doctrine, particularly engaging with the criticisms made by ancient Skeptics who represented a rival school, the Academy of Plato. He basically transformed Stoicism from the small movement founded by Zeno into one of the philosophical heavyweights of the ancient world.

For if Chrysippus had not lived and taught,
The Stoic school would surely have been naught. (Lives, 7.183)

We’re told he was known for making the striking remark to his teacher Cleanthes that he only wanted to be instructed in the core doctrines (dogmata) of Stoicism and that he would discover the arguments for and against them for himself (Lives, 7.179).

Many modern readers will likewise first be attracted to the attention-grabbing ideas of the Stoics, which promise to turn our prevailing philosophy of life on its head, and then seek to weigh them up rationally later. Some Stoics even referred to this upheaval in our world-view and system of values, turning away from the conventional view of the majority, as a philosophical “conversion” (epistrophê), literally a “turning around” or “U-turn” in life. In this regard, the Stoics were influenced by the Cynics, who we’re told would walk against the flow of the crowds leaving a theatre, or walk about backwards in public, to illustrate their desire to swim against the current in life and go in the opposite direction from the majority of people (Lives, 6.64; Anthology, 3.4).  The Stoics therefore recognised that they were saying things many people would struggle to accept at first, although they also believed that their philosophy was ultimately based on common sense assumptions, accessible to everyone on reflection.

For example, Cicero defends six notoriously cryptic “Stoic Paradoxes” in his short book of that title:

  1. Virtue, or moral excellence, is the only good (conventional “goods” such as health, wealth and reputation fundamentally count as nothing with regard to living a good life)
  2. Virtue is completely sufficient for Happiness and fulfilment, a man who is virtuous lacks no requirement of the good life
  3. All forms of virtue are equal as are all forms of vice (in terms of the benefit or harm they do to the individual himself)
  4. Everyone who lacks perfect wisdom is insane (which basically means everyone alive; we’re all essentially mad)
  5. Only the wise man is really free and everyone else is enslaved (even when the wise man is imprisoned by a tyrant or sentenced to death like Socrates, he is still freer than everyone else, including his oppressors)
  6. Only the wise man is truly rich (even if, like Diogenes the Cynic, he owns nothing that he can’t carry in his knapsack)

These puzzles require some explaining, as we’ll see. Musonius Rufus apparently used to say that students were expected to be left in stunned silence following his lectures rather than applauding him. They felt that they’d heard something unnerving but powerful and were often unsure what to make of it all at first. I’d say that this is true for modern readers as well. If we don’t feel at least slightly unsettled by what the Stoics are saying then we’re probably missing something. Yet despite the paradoxes, Stoicism was in many respects the most down-to-earth of the Athenian philosophical schools, being grounded in our experience of daily life. We’re told Cleanthes, the second head of the Stoa, used to remark: “Possibly the philosophers say what is contrary to opinion [or “paradoxical”], but assuredly not what is contrary to reason” (Epictetus, Discourses, 4.1).

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Stoicism

Maverick Stoics: Dionysius the Renegade

Medieval eye surgery
Medieval eye surgery

Dionysius “the Renegade” (or “Deserter”), of Heraclea (c. 330 – c. 250 BC) was a heterodox , or maverick, Stoic and presumably initially a student of Zeno, the founder of the school.  You can read a short chapter about his life and thought in Diogenes Laertius.  Before becoming a Stoic he studied philosophy under the physicist Heraclides of Heraclea, the Megarian philosopher Alexinus of Elis, who we know was critical of Zeno of Citium, and Menedemus, founder of the Eretrian school of philosophy, who appears to have studied under Stilpo and the Megarian school.  This tells us Dionysius was an experienced and eclectic student of philosophy before becoming a follower of Zeno, although he also apparently shared with Zeno a background in the Megarian philosophical tradition. We know he also studied poetry and literature and sought to imitate the great Stoic-influenced poet Aratus.

However, we’re told Dionysius broke away from Stoicism after suffering a painful bout of ophthalmia, inflammation of the eyes.  He declared that pleasure (hedone) was the true goal (telos) of life and not an “indifferent” as Zeno claimed. His story shows that although Zeno was in a sense a highly eclectic philosopher, and Stoicism apparently tolerated some internal disagreement and debate, belief in the “indifference” of pain was considered an essential doctrine.  Once someone rejected that view it no longer made sense for them to call themselves a “Stoic”.  This was in part because the doctrine of the indifference of pain was considered so central to Stoicism.  However, it was probably also because by arguing that “pleasure” is the true goal of life Dionysius effectively drew closer to the position held by rival schools of philosophy, such as the Cyrenaics and possibly the Epicureans.  Dionysius’ story suggests that, like Epicurus, he defined “pleasure” in part as the absence of physical pain.

Indeed, we’re told that Dionysius did leave  the Stoa to join the Cyrenaic school following his change of heart.  In his chapter on the life of Zeno, Diogenes Laertius says that:

When Dionysius the Renegade asked [Zeno], “Why am I the only pupil you do not correct?” the reply was, “Because I mistrust you.”

This perhaps implies a haughty attitude on the part of Dionysius, who might be taken to be suggesting that his views were above criticism, whereas Zeno’s response takes him down a peg, by suggesting that he is actually beneath criticism.

Diogenes Laertius also includes the following brief reference to Dionysius in a list of Zeno’s most important famous students:

Dionysius, who became a renegade to the doctrine of pleasure, for owing to the severity of his ophthalmia he had no longer the nerve to call pain a thing indifferent: his native place was Heraclea.

We know little more about Dionysius.  He wrote two books on freedom from passions (apatheia), two on training exercises (askesis), and four on pleasure (hedone), among others.  However, Diogenes Laertius also wrote in his account of Heraclides, the natural philosopher, and former teacher of Dionysius:

Moreover, Dionysius, called the Renegade, or as some say Spentharus [the Spark], wrote a tragedy called Parthenopaeus, and forged the name of Sophocles to it. And Heraclides was so much deceived that he took some passages out of one of his works, and cited them as the words of Sophocles; and Dionysius, when he perceived it, gave him notice of the real truth; and as he would not believe it, and denied it, he sent him word to examine the first letters of the first verses of the book, and they formed the name of Panculus, who was a friend of Dionysius. And as Heraclides still refused to believe it, and said that it was possible that such a thing might happen by chance, Dionysius sent him back word once more, “You will find this passage too:

An aged monkey is not easily caught;
He’s caught indeed, but only after a time.”

And he added, “Heraclides knows nothing of letters, and has no shame.”