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Socrates

Parenting: What Socrates Said

According to legend, Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, was inspired to become a philosopher after reading Book Two of Xenophon’s famous Memorabilia of Socrates. The second chapter of this book portrays Socrates engaging in a short Socratic dialogue with his own son, Lamprocles.   It may have been a conversation Xenophon actually witnessed, or heard about from Socrates.  It gives us some interesting insights into Socrates’ attitudes toward parenting and his relationship with his own son.

Socrates had three sons, by his notoriously hot-tempered wife Xanthippe, of whom Lamprocles was the eldest.  Lamprocles was a young boy when Socrates was executed. His two younger brothers, Menexenus and Sophroniscus, were still small children, at least one of them was being carried by Xanthippe like a baby when Socrates was in prison.

According to Xenophon, Socrates one day noticed that Lamprocles was becoming increasingly irritable with Xanthippe, his mother.  So he decided to employ the Socratic method of questioning to help improve his son’s relationship with her.   Socrates’ method consists mainly in asking questions, although he sometimes ends up offering practical advice on what to do if the other person gets stuck.  I’ve paraphrased the discussion below, and inserted a few comments, although I’ve stayed very close to the original dialogue.

Part One: Defusion

Socrates begins by asking his son, Lamprocles, what we typically mean when call someone ungrateful.  He asks “What do people do to earn this name?”  Lamprocles says that we call someone ungrateful if they’ve been treated well and could show gratitude in return but don’t.  Socrates asks him if that means ingratitude is a bad thing and Lamprocles agrees that it is.  So from the outset they have both agreed this definition as common ground upon which to begin working.

Then Socrates asks a trickier question: Could it perhaps be that it’s wrong to show ingratitude toward our friends but right to show ingratitude to our enemies?  He asks that question, incidentally, because Lamprocles would have been familiar with a Greek saying that a good man helps his friends and harms his enemies, which Socrates thought was a very wrong-headed way of understanding justice.

Lamprocles says he’s thought about this already and disagrees with it, perhaps because he’s heard Socrates criticize this view.  (We can almost imagine him thinking “Hmmm… I’ve heard this one before.”) So instead the boy says that whether someone is a friend or an enemy, either way, as long as we’ve received a favour from them then we should show them gratitude in return.  They both agree that being ungrateful to anyone who does you a favour, friend or enemy, would be the height of injustice.  Socrates asks if that means that the greater a favour someone receives without showing gratitude in return, the more unjust they are being, and his son agrees.

Well, says Socrates, what greater favour could there be than that shown by parents to their children?  Parents benefit their children by having them and giving them their very existence.  So every other good thing they can possibly experience depends upon that fact.   (My six-year-old daughter Poppy’s comment on this is that it’s like saying we should be grateful to the man who built our house because we can eat in it and watch television and sleep, and it gives us the space to do other good things.)  Indeed, Socrates says, most people believe that their own life is so valuable that they would do anything to hang on to it.  The greatest crimes were punished by the death sentence in Athens because everyone assumed life was the most precious thing and nobody wanted to lose it.  (Of course, elsewhere Socrates himself questions whether death is an evil and there’s a hint of irony here because we all know he later receives the death penalty from an Athenian court himself.)

Socrates reminds Lamprocles that parents sacrifice a lot because they want to have children.  Mothers carry around the weight of the baby inside them for months and then, in ancient Greece, they actually risk their own lives in giving birth to them.  Socrates’ mother, Phaenarete, was reputedly a midwife, an esteemed middle-class profession in Athens.  His empathy with mothers here, surprising for a man of his time, perhaps hints at Phaenarete’s influence on him.  Once a baby is born, he says, its mother feeds it and cares for it, even though it has never done her any favours.  The baby doesn’t even know anything about its parents yet but still receives their care and attention.  For years, the mother has to go through all sorts of drudgery, day and night, rearing her infant without knowing whether she’ll ever receive any gratitude in return.  Not only do the parents care for the child by clothing and feeding them but they also try to educate them.  They try to share any knowledge with them that they think might be important.  If they think it would be better taught by someone else, they pay for teachers and trainers as well.  So there are lots of reasons to be grateful, at least to a typical conscientious Athenian mother like Xanthippe.

This sounds like it’s at risk of turning into a bit of a finger-wagging sermon on being grateful to your mother for everything she’s sacrificed, etc., although maybe quite a reasonable and articulate one.  Lamprocles isn’t convinced, though.  He says, “Well, all that might be true, but nevertheless you can’t expect anyone to put up with her temper!”  He’s trying to say that negates everything else.  This leads Socrates into an interesting examination of how to cope with difficult people.  If it’s much easier to deal with Xanthippe’s temper than their son assumes then he’s got no reason to be ungrateful to her, given everything else she’s done for him.  Her sharp-tongue becomes something trivial.  Indeed, elsewhere we’re told that even when she threw cold water over Socrates or tore the shirt from his back in public, he just shrugged it off with indifference.

Next Socrates asks the odd-sounding question: Is it harder to bear with the ferocity of a wild beast or with that of your own mother?  Lamprocles exclaims “With a mother, if she’s like mine!”  That’s interesting and perhaps the key point at stake for them both.  Lamprocles is half-joking.  When people are half-joking about what upsets them, that’s often a signal.  It often means they’ve said something that they believe emotionally although they realize logically that it can’t actually be true.  We often use humour to mask the contradictions in our thinking.  Socrates doesn’t let his son off the hook, though…

He asks: Has your mother ever injured you by biting or kicking, like wild animals do?  “Of course not”, says the boy, “but she says things you wouldn’t want to put up with every day of the week.”  Socrates points out that his son has actually been doing things all his life that worry and upset his mother, so he should remember it cuts both ways.  “Yes,” says Lamprocles, “but I’ve never said or done anything to make her ashamed of me.”

Then Socrates says something very peculiar indeed: Do you think it’s harder for you to listen to the things your mother says than it is for actors in tragedies when they’re yelling abuse at one another?  (If I remember right, he uses the same argument somewhere else as well.)  We might think he’s come very close here to the familiar English adage: “Sticks and stones may break my bones but words can never hurt me.”  This profound indifference (apatheia) to criticism from others is an aspect of Socrates’ original philosophy that may have influenced Antisthenes and the Cynics, and later the Stoics.

Lamprocles quite naturally responds “That’s all well and good but actors in tragedies don’t actually believe that those verbally abusing them intend to punish or harm them.” They’re just pretending, playing a role on the sage.  It’s make-believe.  This is where Socrates finally reveals his hand, though.  “Yes and you do get angry with your mother,” he says, “even though you know well enough that she doesn’t intend to harm you either, any more than the the performers arguing on stage mean to harm one another.”  Here Socrates is reminding Lamprocles of something he’s already acknowledged, which contradicts what he’s now trying to say.  Even though Xanthippe gets angry and can be argumentative, it’s not devoid of any kind intention.  Paradoxically, it’s because she loves her son and wants to do him good.  “Or do you imagine”, asks Socrates, “that she means to harm you?” Lamprocles acknowledges that she doesn’t.

Xanthippe wants to help her son. Socrates reminds Lamprocles that she always does her best to look after him when he’s sick, and tends to his every need.  She’s always praying to the gods for his welfare.  For Lamprocles to say that his mother is unbearable is therefore to say that what actually does him good is unbearable.  So, in a nutshell, it’s not someone’s words that should concern us, no matter how sharp-tongued they’re being, but their real underlying intentions.  As Lamprocles genuinely accepts that his mother doesn’t intend to harm him then why should he be bothered by her bluster?  He should remind himself that it’s just a misleading appearance like the actors yelling verbal abuse at one another on stage.  This recalls one of Socrates’ most famous analogies, when he elsewhere compares our fear of death to that of small children who are frightened by grotesque “bogeyman” masks, perhaps worn by older children during ancient Greek festivals – like modern-day Halloween.  The wise man removes the mask and inspecting what’s behind it finds nothing terrifying.  He looks beyond surface appearances, and that’s what Lamprocles should learn to do when Xanthippe is screaming and shouting at him.

Part Two: Functional Analysis

Socrates then shifts perspective, adopting a new line of argument.  The first part of the dialogue helps Lamprocles to question his initial impression that Xanthippe’s behaviour is awful or intolerable and to perceive it with greater indifference.  That’s a typical strategy in both Socratic philosophy and Stoicism.  Next, Socrates draws his son’s attention to the negative consequences of his old way of looking at things.  Again, this is a familiar strategy, both Socratic and Stoic.  Imagining the broader and longer-term consequences of some course of action is still used today as a way of evaluating it and building motivation to change.

Socrates asks: Do you think there’s anyone else in life who deserves your respect?  Lamprocles admits that there are, of course, people such as teachers, military officers, city officials, etc., whom it’s appropriate to respect and obey.  He also asks Lamprocles whether he wants to be liked by his neighbours.  “So that he may offer you a light for your fire when you need one,” says Socrates, “or contribute to your success and give you prompt and friendly help should you ever meet with misfortune.”  Take the example of a fellow traveller, or anyone else you might encounter, he adds.  Would it make no difference to you whether he became your friend or your enemy?  He asks if Lamprocles should care at all whether the people he meets in life want to help him or harm him.  He agrees that we should prefer people to have goodwill toward us, where possible.

So you think it’s worthwhile concerning yourself with whether strangers are friendly toward you, says Socrates, and yet not to be concerned for your relationship with your mother, who loves you more than anyone else does?  He mentions that the Athenian state doesn’t normally punish ingratitude but that people who show disregard for their parents are penalized and debarred from holding public office.  This is because such offices often involved offering traditional sacrifices to the gods, which requires someone known for possessing good character.  The Athenians didn’t trust men who disrespected their own parents.  Indeed, Socrates notes, even someone who fails to tend the graves of his dead parents might have that held as a serious charge against him when applying for public office.

So my son, Socrates concludes, if you’re prudent you’ll ask the gods to forgive you for any disregard you’ve shown toward your mother in the past, and you’ll take care that your fellow Athenians don’t observe you neglecting your parents in the future.  That’s a sure fire way to lose their respect and friendship, he adds, as they’re bound to conclude, if they think about it, that from someone who has shown ingratitude toward his own parents  nobody can expect to receive gratitude in return for doing them a favour.

Addenda

It’s worth mentioning that similar remarks about Xanthippe are attributed to Socrates by Diogenes Laertius.  We’re told that when she scolded him and then throw water over him, he merely joked about his indifference: “Did I not say that Xanthippe’s thunder would end in rain?”  Much like Lamprocles in the dialogue above, we’re told that Alcibiades, Socrates’ friend and military messmate, once complained to him that Xanthippe’s tongue-lashings were simply intolerable.  Socrates replied that like the rattling of a windlass (used to winch heavy weights, perhaps when Socrates worked as a stonemason) he’d simply grown used to it and didn’t notice it anymore.   

Socrates asked Alcibiades in return “Do you not mind the cackling of geese?”  Alcibiades responds that he does not but that they furnish him with eggs and goslings to which Socrates replies “And Xanthippe is the mother of my children.”  That sounds a lot like the underlying argument presented to Lamprocles above.  Socrates also frequently states that in the same way trainers hone their skills by working with spirited horses, he strengthens his character and is better able to cope with other hardships by rehearsing his skills with Xanthippe.  (Which probably makes a play on the fact that her name means “Yellow Horse”.)

So there are three distinct aspects to this argument in total:

  1. The behaviour of Xanthippe is in itself indifferent and harmless.
  2. Xanthippe does good things, which are of greater importance, such as providing Socrates with children and caring for them.
  3. If Socrates approaches it wisely, her behaviour actually provides him with the opportunity to strengthen his character and attain greater virtue, which is a good.
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Stoicism

Three Sources of Joy in the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius

Many people assume that Stoicism is synonymous with being unemotional.  I think this is often because they confuse stoicism (lower-case), the “stiff upper lip” personality trait, with Stoicism (upper-case) the school of Greek philosophy.  (Here’s an article explaining the difference.)   In fact, the Stoics teach us how to replace unhealthy emotions with healthy ones, and the latter play an important role in their philosophy.  They have a system for classification of both.  The Stoic term “passion” actually encompasses both what we call desires and emotions and the healthy ones, termed eupatheiai by the Stoics, are divided into three broad categories:

  1. Joy or delight (chara), the enjoyment of perceiving goodness in ourselves and others, which is the healthy alternative to hedonistic pleasure; we’re told it includes both feelings of cheerfulness (euphrosunos) and peaceful contentment (euthumia).
  2. Caution or discretion (eulabeia), a healthy and rational aversion to vice, which we might perhaps compare to feelings of conscience; we’re told it includes dignity or self-respect (aidô) and a sense of aversion to what is profane or impure (agneia)
  3. Wishing or willing (boulêsis), a healthy and rational desire for what is good, or goodwill toward ourselves and others, perhaps encompassing a rational form of love or friendship; we’re told it includes benevolence (eunoia), kindness (eumeneia), acceptance (aspasmos) and affection (agapêsis)

Diogenes Laertius says that good passions such as joy (chara) and cheerfulness (euphrosunos) are not strictly-speaking virtues but that they “supervene” on the virtues, a kind of side-effect of them.  He also describes them as being more transitory than virtues.  Hence, these sort of healthy feelings and desires are not the goal of Stoicism per se but rather a byproduct of the underlying attitudes that constitute genuine wisdom and goodness.  We can nevertheless say that the ideal Stoic Sage is someone who feels relatively calm and cheerful in the face of adversity, has a sense of dignity or conscience that prevents him doing what he senses is wrong, and feels goodwill, a sense of kindness, and even affection toward others, and presumably also toward himself.

It’s perhaps worth mentioning that the Stoics typically held up Socrates as their supreme role model and it’s easy to see how he might fit this description.  Far from being stuffy or a cold fish, Socrates is generally portrayed as a very lively character.  Both Xenophon and Plato wrote dialogues entitled the Symposium where he is depicted drinking and feasting with his friends.  Indeed, Xenophon opens by saying that he thinks it’s important not only to portray great men in more serious situations, presumably with the trial and execution of Socrates in mind, but also to show the sort of people they were during lighter moments, enjoying banter with their friends.  Plato even notes that Socrates looked like Silenus, the mythic drunken tutor of Dionysus (shown above), who exemplified both humour and wisdom.

Indeed, Socrates is cheerful and good humoured, even in the face of adversity such as facing his own execution.  He’s kind and gentle toward his friends, and treats them with obvious affection.   Socrates was also famously guided by a mysterious daimonion or inner voice, which warned him not to undertake certain courses of action.  I think we can obviously compare this to the Stoic concept of eulabeia, a healthy feeling of aversion to folly and wrongdoing.  The Stoics point to Socrates as an example of their ideal so the vivid descriptions of his character found in Plato and Xenophon, etc., undoubtedly help us to interpret what the Stoics have in mind when speaking of the “healthy passions” exhibited by the wise.

However, I also want to say something about three sources of joy described by Marcus Aurelius in The Meditations, as I think these help to shed some light on what the Stoics had in mind.  First of all, Marcus says the wise man’s sense of delight comes from one thing alone: acting consistently in accord with wisdom and virtue (6.7).  This certainly appears to be the most important source of joy for Stoics but Marcus also mentions two others. 

Different people find their joy in different things; and it is my joy to keep my ruling centre unimpaired, and not turn my back on any human being or on anything that befalls the human race, but to look on all things with a kindly eye, and welcome and make use of each according to its worth. (8.43)

These three types of joy correspond to a recurring threefold structure that should be very familiar to readers of The Meditations.  They broadly correspond with the virtues of wisdom (ruling faculty), justice (human race), and the combination of temperance and courage (external events).  

Elsewhere, Marcus returns to these forms of joy in separate different passages:

  1. Contemplating virtue in ourselves.  Marcus describes this as the primary source of both “serenity” and “joy” for the Stoic Sage (7.28).
  2. Contemplating virtue in others. However, he also tells says that when he wants to gladden his heart, he should meditate on the good qualities of those close to him, such as modesty, generosity, etc. (6.48).
  3. Welcoming our fate (amor fati). Marcus tells himself that rather than desiring things that are absent, as the majority do, he should train himself to develop gratitude by reflecting on the pleasant aspects of what he already has before him, and contemplate how he would miss them if they were not there (7.27).

The second source of joy for Stoics, the contemplation of virtue in others, is presumably related to religious sentiments such as piety or love of Zeus, as well as love of the ideal Sage.  Likewise, in Book One of The Meditations, Marcus seems to provide numerous examples of virtues among his family members and teachers, which gladden his heart in this way.  Contemplating the virtue of others was an important source of inspiration for ancient Stoics.  They recognized that we learn by emulating the examples set by others, role models such as Socrates or Zeno, whose characters we admire.  Students once enjoyed the company of teachers such as these and were inspired by knowing them in person.

The third source of joy is perhaps the one most often overlooked in discussions of Stoicism.  So it’s worth quoting the key passage in full:

Do not think of things that are absent as though they were already at hand, but pick out the [the best] from those that you presently have, and with these before you, reflect on how greatly you would have wished for them if they were not already here. At the same time, however, take good care that you do not fall into the habit of overvaluing them because you are so pleased to have them, so that you would be upset if you no longer had them at some future time. (7.27)

The word Marcus actually uses here to describe a healthy and moderate sense of enjoyment in those external things that deserve to be valued is charis or gratitude.  It is is related to chara the more general word for the healthy passion of Stoic joy.  He means the kind of gratitude that we would experience when we perceive that someone has done us a favour or shown goodwill toward us.  (If like the Stoics, we think of Zeus or Nature as being providential and caring for our welfare, then this would resemble Christian joy in the grace [charis] of God.)

Marcus seems to be saying here that in addition to rejoicing in virtue, his own and that of others, the Sage will experience joy or gratitude by contemplating what Stoics call “preferred indifferents”.  These are external things to which it’s reasonable to assign value (axia), within reasonable bounds, such as health, property, and friendship.  External things such as these aren’t strictly “good” because they don’t contribute directly to the goal of wisdom and virtue but it is nevertheless rational to prefer health over sickness, life over death, property over poverty, and friendship over having enemies, etc.

For Stoics, the two most valued externals or preferred indifferents are life and the company of friends who are wise and good.  These are probably the two things for which we should be most grateful, as they’re both externals granted to us by fortune.  There are many things such as food and shelter which contribute to life and Stoics are grateful for these insofar as they have value in supporting life, providing us with the opportunity to flourish by acquiring wisdom and virtue.  However, as Marcus emphasized above, we should not become so attached to them that we would be distressed if they were lost.

The attitude we should seek to cultivate is described by Epictetus in the Handbook and Discourses as that of someone who has been invited to a banquet or festival and behaves like a good guest.

Remember that in life you ought to behave as at a banquet. Suppose that something is carried round and is opposite to you. Stretch out your hand and take a portion with decency. Suppose that it passes by you. Do not detain it. Suppose that it is not yet come to you. Do not send your desire forward to it, but wait till it is opposite to you. Do so with respect to children, so with respect to a wife, so with respect to magisterial offices, so with respect to wealth, and you will be some time a worthy partner of the banquets of the gods. (Encheiridion, 15)

We should, in other words, be grateful for what life gives us, as if we were receiving a gift or a favour, without becoming over-attached to them, greedily craving things we don’t have or clinging on to those of which we must let go.  However, he does goes on to say that Diogenes the Cynic, Heraclitus, and other wise philosophers like them, were regarded as divine because they did not even take as much as they could have and looked down on such externals with an even greater sense of indifference than the Stoics.  Perhaps this is an allusion to the Stoic notion that the Cynic way of life, which involved greater renunciation and voluntary hardship, can provide a shortcut to virtue.  Epictetus appears to have believed, though, that the austere life of a Cynic is only suitable for certain exceptional individuals.  Stoics typically adopted a more moderate way of life which allowed them to participate in ordinary society, to earn a living and attend social events, etc., as long as they don’t place more importance on the externals they value than they do on their own character, or living wisely and in accord with reason and virtue.

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Stoicism

Why everything isn’t totally indifferent to Stoics

One of the most common misinterpretations of Stoicism is the notion that Stoics believe all external things are totally indifferent.  That’s arguably closer to the philosophy of the Cynics, or possibly of the Skeptics or even the renegade Stoic, Aristo of Chios, as we’ll see.  For these philosophers, everything except virtue and vice is classed as indifferent.  That includes things like health, wealth, property, reputation, and so on, which philosophers called “externals” because they’re external to the mind, or more specifically external to our volition or  faculty of moral choice.  As Epictetus put it, only our actions are good or evil, and everything else is indifferent.

However, when Zeno founded the Stoic school he distinguished it from earlier philosophies precisely by asserting that although externals were, in one sense, indifferent, in another sense they were not. 

“Indifferent” has two meanings. In one sense [used by the Stoics] it signifies the things that contribute neither to happiness [eudaimonia] nor unhappiness, like wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy even without these things, though depending on how they are used they contribute to happiness or unhappiness. But in another [non-Stoic] sense “indifferent” signifies things that excite neither attraction nor aversion, as is the case with having an odd or even number of hairs on one’s head, or with extending or bending one’s finger. But it was not in this sense that the things mentioned above [such as health] are called “indifferent” [by the Stoics], since they are able to excite attraction and aversion. This is why some of the indifferent things are selected and others rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense provides no grounds for choosing or avoiding. (Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno)

For Stoics, external things are not good or bad in the strongest sense.  They don’t make our souls better or worse, or affect our fulfilment (eudaimonia) in life.  What matters ultimately is the use we make of them, good or bad, virtuous or vicious.  However, Zeno said that they do have another sort of value (axia), which allows us to choose between them.  Indeed, it’s perfectly natural and rational to prefer some externals over others.  We’re quite right to prefer life over death, health over sickness, and friends over enemies, generally speaking, as long as we do so “lightly”, to borrow a phrase from Epictetus.  Put simply, we shouldn’t place so much value on these external things that we become upset if we get what we don’t want, or don’t get what we do want.  The Stoics talk about “preferring” or “dispreferring” externals, as opposed to strongly desiring them.  We choose between them, without becoming attached to them, or strongly averse to them.

More than this, however, Zeno and the Stoics argued that wisdom, and the other virtues, consist precisely in our ability to distinguish rationally between the value of different external things.  Ironically, someone who discounts all externals as totally indifferent, or equally indifferent, would therefore be foolish according to the Stoics.  They would lack prudence.  They’d also lack the ability to exercise justice by knowing what it’s fair and benevolent to give other people or to do for them.  They’d also lack the virtues of courage and moderation because they wouldn’t be able to distinguish rationally between things worth enduring or renouncing and things not.

In De Finibus, Cicero portrays a conversation between himself and Cato, representing the “complete Stoic”.  He begins by tackling precisely this misconception of Stoicism.  After Cato asserts the Stoic principle that virtue (moral worth) is the only true good, Cicero replies:

“What you have said so far, Cato,” I answered, “might equally well be said by a follower of Pyrrho or of Aristo. They, as you are aware, think as you do, that this Moral Worth you speak of is not merely the chief but the only Good […] Do you then,” I asked, “commend these philosophers, and think that we ought to adopt this view of theirs?” “I certainly would not have you adopt their view,” he said; “for it is of the essence of virtue to exercise choice among the things in accordance with nature; so that philosophers who make all things absolutely equal, rendering them indistinguishable either as better or worse, and leaving no room for selection among them, have abolished virtue itself.” (De Finibus)

Notice that he says very clearly that virtue itself is effectively destroyed if we treat all externals as equal.  In Discourse 2.23, Epictetus discusses in depth the importance of assigning value to externals.  

Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget the things which are superior to them. But indeed for the power of seeing and hearing, and indeed for life itself, and for the things which contribute to support it, for the fruits which are dry, and for wine and oil give thanks to God: but remember that he has given you something else better than all these, I mean the power of using them, proving them and estimating the value of each.

He emphasizes that reason is supremely important because it assigns value to everything else.

What then? does any man despise the other faculties? I hope not. Does any man say that there is no use or excellence in the speaking faculty? I hope not. That would be foolish, impious, ungrateful towards God. But a man renders to each thing its due value. For there is some use even in an ass, but not so much as in an ox: there is also use in a dog, but not so much as in a slave: there is also some use in a slave, but not so much as in citizens: there is also some use in citizens, but not so much as in magistrates. Not indeed because some things are superior, must we undervalue the use which other things have.

Despite the fact he’s speaking of externals, Epictetus actually tells his students that those who fail to make any distinction between the value of speaking well and speaking badly or between beauty and ugliness are not only fools but cowards. 

But this is the great matter […] to learn what is the most excellent of all things, and to pursue this always, to be diligent about this, considering all other things of secondary value compared with this, but yet, as far as we can, not neglecting all those other things. For we must take care of the eyes also, not as if they were the most excellent thing, but we must take care of them on account of the most excellent thing, because it will not be in its true natural condition, if it does not rightly use the other faculties, and prefer some things to others.

Virtue, in other words, consists precisely in our ability to apply reason by weighing-up the value of different external things.  Cato returns to this  point later:

“Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. (De Finibus)

For instance, some Cynics believed it was courageous to endure self-immolation, burning themselves alive to protest.  The Stoics, however, would say that if the protest is futile then this isn’t courage but rather folly.  Marcus Aurelius says that although Stoics believe suicide can be a reasonable decision it’s only appropriate to prefer one’s death to life when based on sound judgement, given certain circumstances such as euthanasia in extreme old age and sickness, or self-sacrifice in warfare for the greater good.  By contrast, the Christians, he says, endure death (martyrdom) out of foolish obstinacy and a desire to make a tragic spectacle of themselves (11.3). 

Marcus Aurelius elsewhere defines social virtue as treating our fellow man “kindly and justly, according to the natural law of companionship, though aiming at the same time at what he deserves with regard to things that are morally indifferent” (3.11). He means that justice requires helping others to obtain things that are morally indifferent, though reasonably preferred. What those things are will vary depending on the individual and their circumstances, although the Stoics typically say it’s rational to prefer health to disease, wealth to poverty, and having friends to having enemies, within certain bounds.

Epictetus actually spells this out to his students very clearly:

“But my mother grieves when she does not see me.” So why has she not learnt these doctrines? I am not saying that it is wrong to take care that she should not lament; but that we are not to wish absolutely what is not in our own power. Now, the grief of another is not in my power; but my own grief is. I will, therefore, absolutely oppose my own grief, for that is in my power; and I will endeavour to prevent another’s grief as far as I am able: but not absolutely […] (Discourses, 3.24.22–23)

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Marcus Aurelius Stoicism

Lady Stoics #3: Annia Cornificia Faustina Minor

We don’t know much about female Stoics, except perhaps some of the daughters of famous Stoics who appear also to have been influenced by Stoics.  For example, Porcia Catonis, the daughter of Cato of Utica, is portrayed in a manner that suggests she may have been a Stoic, as is Fannia, the daughter of Thrasea, the leader of the Stoic Opposition.

One of the daughters of Marcus Aurelius, Annia Cornificia Faustina Minor (160-212 AD), may perhaps also have learned something of Stoicism from her famous father.  At least, Cornificia appears to have been more committed to honouring her father’s memory and following his moral example than her younger brother Commodus was, though.

When she was in her fifties the tyrannical emperor Caracalla had her executed, by forced suicide, as part of a purge.

[Caracalla], when about to kill Cornificia, bade her choose the manner of her death, as if he were thereby showing her especial honour. She first uttered many laments, and then, inspired by the memory of her father, Marcus, her grandfather, Antoninus, and her brother, Commodus, she ended by saying: “Poor, unhappy soul of mine, imprisoned in a vile body, fare forth, be freed, show them that you are Marcus’ daughter, whether they will or no.” Then she laid aside all the adornments in which she was arrayed, having composed herself in seemly fashion, severed her veins and died.

Other than that we don’t know much about her.  However, if she actually said “show them that you are Marcus’ daughter” as she faced death then it suggests she may perhaps have been inspired by his Stoicism.