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The Contemplation of Death: Sample Chapter from Teach Yourself Stoicism (2014)

Teach Yourself:

Stoicism and the Art of Happiness

Sample Chapter:

The Contemplation of Death

Teach Yourself Stoicism Cover 2013

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The contemplation of death

In this chapter you will learn:

  • About the ancient concept of the “good death” and what it means to have a Stoic or philosophical attitude toward your own demise
  • How to practice the psychological exercise, common to different philosophical schools, which Socrates called the “meditation on death” (melete thanatou)
  • How facing death can transform life by helping us to value the “here and now”
  • What the Stoics meant by saying that life and death are “indifferent” to us and how they trained themselves to maintain this view

Reflect that no evils afflict one who has died, that the accounts which make the underworld a place of terror to us are mere tales, that no darkness threatens the dead, no prison, or rivers blazing with fire, no river of Forgetfulness, or seats of judgement, no sinners answering for their crimes, or tyrants a second time in that freedom which so lacks fetters: these are the imaginings of poets, who have tormented us with groundless fears. Death is a release from all pains, and a boundary beyond which our sufferings cannot go; it returns us to that state of peacefulness in which we lay before we were born. If someone pities those who have died, let him pity also those who have not been born. Death is neither a good nor an evil; for only that which is something can be a good or an evil but what is itself nothing and reduces everything to nothingness, delivers us to no category of fortune. (Seneca, Consolation to Marcia, 19)

Forget all else, Lucilius, and concentrate your thoughts on this one thing: not to fear the name of death. Through long reflection make death one of your close acquaintances, so that, if the situation arises, you are able even to go out and meet it. (Seneca, On Earthquakes)

Self-assessment: Stoic attitudes toward death

Before reading this chapter, rate how strongly you agree with the following statements, using the five-point (1-5) scale below, and then re-rate your attitudes once you’ve read and digested the contents.

(1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Agree, 5. Strongly agree)

  1. “Dying doesn’t frighten me very much.” (    )
  2. “It’s more important to have lived a good life than a long life.” (    )
  3. “Life and death are not intrinsically good or bad; it depends how we use them.” (    )

Why is contemplating your death important?

How prepared are you to meet your own death? What does death mean to you and what role does it play in your life?

One day you will die: Nature has provided you with ample evidence of this from the example of others. The Stoics, like most ancient philosophers, believed it was important to meditate often on the prospect of your own death, questioning the fear most people have of dying. Epictetus mentions that Roman generals were followed during their “triumph”, the celebration of a great military victory, by slaves who repeatedly whispered memento mori (“remember thou must die”) to help them remain circumspect and avoid vanity (Discourses, 3.24). Stoics developed a wide variety of similar strategies because they considered this the most important fear (or “aversion”) to overcome, through the discipline of desire and aversion.

The phrase memento mori is familiar to many people as a description of works of art, from the Vanitas paintings of the Renaissance to Damien Hirst’s animals preserved in formaldehyde. These works evoke a contemplative or philosophical attitude toward our own mortality. For example, Nicolas Poussin’s painting The Arcadian Shepherds depicts a tomb with the inscription et in Arcadia ego, through which Death reminds us: “Even in paradise, I will find you.” Similar themes are familiar from literature. The character of Ebeneezer Scrooge in Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol (1843) is confronted with his own grave by the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, and the experience leads to an epiphany that transforms his moral character. This notion of contemplative meditation on the inevitability of death, and the transience of life, was common in philosophy until recent centuries. The iconic image of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a young philosophy student, holding aloft the skull of his childhood friend Yorick would have been recognisable to Elizabethan audiences as an allusion to common philosophical practices that involved contemplating images of death.

The Stoics were particularly emphatic about the importance of constant training in overcoming our fear of death. Epictetus taught his students that they should contemplate the Stoic paradox that “the source of all human evils, and of mean-spiritedness and cowardice, is not death, but rather the fear of death.” It’s the most pernicious of all fears. If we want to make progress as Stoics, he says, we should try to dedicate all of our discussion, reading, and exercises to this fundamental goal of training ourselves to overcome the fear of death as this is the only way we can truly attain freedom and liberate ourselves from self-imposed slavery to the passions (Discourses, 3.25). According to Seneca, we should realise that, ironically, an excessive fear of dying often leads to an early death (On the Tranquillity of the Mind, 11). He actually goes so far as to say that the man who fears his own death will never do anything worthy of life.

Near the start of the Discourses, Epictetus presents an exemplary role-model, the highly-regarded Stoic philosopher Paconius Agrippinus who reacted with complete composure when informed of his own impending execution, sitting down to finish his lunch with friends. This is what it means to rehearse and assimilate the lessons taught by the Stoic discipline of desire and aversions, setting ourselves free from obstruction and the vicissitudes of external fortune.

I must die. If soon, then I die; whereas if a little later, I will take lunch now, since the hour for lunch has come, and afterwards I will die at the appointed time. How? As becomes the man who is giving back that which was another’s. (Discourses, 1.1)

In other words, to die is to return what belongs to Nature, and was merely “on loan” to us temporarily. Death is natural and inevitable, and so on the basis of natural philosophy, we should not view it as unexpected when the day finally comes, but death should find us long- prepared to let go of life magnanimously. This practice was common to most schools of philosophy and Seneca actually provides one of the most striking accounts of it while discussing the rival Epicurean school:

[Epicurus said:] ‘Practice death in advance,’ or if it is easier to convey his meaning, something like this: ‘It is a great thing to learn how to die.’ Perhaps you think it superfluous to learn something that can only be implemented once. This is the very reason we have to practise; we must always learn anything that we cannot test to see if we know it. ‘Practise death!’ The man who says this is bidding us practice liberty. The man who has learned to die has unlearned how to be a slave; he is above all power, or at least beyond its reach. What do prison and guards and locked doors mean to him? He has a free way out. There is only one chain that keeps us bound, the love of life, and even if this should not be rejected, it should be reduced so that if circumstances require nothing will hold us back or prevent us from being ready instantly for whatever action is needed. (Letters, 26)

This fundamental theme runs through the whole of Stoicism. In one of the most poignant passages of The Meditations, Marcus Aurelius asserts the Stoic and Socratic view that true philosophy consists above all in “waiting for death with good grace”, remembering that it is merely a natural and inevitable dispersal of atoms, and not to be feared as a catastrophe (Meditations, 2.17). Indeed, the meditation on death is the apex of all the Stoic exercises involving premeditation of adversity. By learning to adopt a philosophical attitude toward your own death, your way of acting may be fundamentally transformed, making this both a psychological and ethical training exercise. The Stoic ideal holds that the Sage, the man we should seek to emulate, “finds it a joy to live and in spite of that is not reluctant to die”, accepting his mortality and facing death with dignity when the time comes (Letters, 54). Marcus therefore advises contemplating death in each action, to focus our attention on its true worth: “During every one of your actions pause at each step and ask yourself: Is death deemed catastrophic because of the loss of this?” (Meditations, 10.29). Seneca likewise imagines that we should respond to those afraid to die by saying “So are you living now?” Paradoxically, we cannot be truly “alive” when we are enslaved by fears, especially the fear of death itself (Letters, 77). We make ourselves the puppets of fortune and, in particular, we become slaves to other men by valuing what is in their power. Stoic heroes like Cato were called “invulnerable” to tyrants like Caesar because they were not willing to sacrifice their values to save their own lives.

However, the theoretical notion that death is “indifferent” is not sufficient to bring about a personal transformation. The precepts of Stoicism are meant to be turned into a firmly-grasped certainty, which requires constant practice as part of a daily regime. Seneca therefore says the aspiring Stoic should practice first and foremost to look down upon death, with indifference, something that is “effective against all weapons and every kind of enemy” (Letters, 36). We naturally love our own lives from birth and death is understandably something terrifying; otherwise we would not need to train ourselves to view it differently. However, the Stoic aims to identify more fully with her nature as a rational being, which means rising above certain things we’re born fearing. Stoics therefore recommend picturing our own death regularly, perhaps even several times a day. We should think of it in slightly different ways, at different times.

Going to bed being grateful for our lives so far, for example, or awakening in the morning and planning our day as if it were our last chance to truly live. We can identify the following exercises in Stoic literature:

  1. Mentally picturing one’s own death, in various ways, as if you were able to observe it happening
  2. Reading about, discussing, and contemplating the “stories” of Cato and Socrates, as examples of good deaths
  3. Telling ourselves “tomorrow I must die” and contemplating those words at certain times
  4. Contemplating the transience of all material things and human mortality in general, as in the various cosmological meditations The contemplation of death therefore overlaps with other Stoic exercises and along with the “view from above” it may lie at the very heart of the discipline of desire and Stoic therapy of the passions.

For example, the contemplation of death is obviously linked to the Stoic practice of dwelling in the “here and now”. Ironically, reminding ourselves of death can intensify our experience of living. The need to “seize the day” because death is certain, was an extremely common theme in classical poetry, especially where it was influenced by Stoic philosophy.

In a world torn by hope and worry, dread and anger, imagine every day that dawns is the last you’ll see; the hour you never hoped for will prove a happy surprise. (Horace, Letters, 1.4)

The Stoic Persius likewise wrote:

Soon enough you’ll turn into dust, ghost, and hearsay. Live with death in mind; time flies – my words reduce it. (Satires, 5)

Seneca wrote: “Imagine this is your last day of life; or, if not, the next to last” (Letters, 15).  Musonius Rufus, likewise said: “It is not possible to live well today unless you treat it as your last day” (Fragments, 22). Marcus repeatedly dwells on this theme, continually reminding himself to live in the “here and now” as if certain death were looming on the horizon. We will make progress toward virtue and perfect our character, he says, if we can only carry out every action in life with a sense of purpose while passing through each day as if it were our last, and we could depart at any moment (Meditations, 2.11; 2.5; 7.69). As Hadot put it, the thought of our imminent death potentially “transforms our way of acting in a radical way, by forcing us to become aware of the infinite value of each instant” (2002, p. 137).

Case study: The death of Socrates

Xenophon wrote that his friend and teacher, Socrates, faced the death-sentence with absolute serenity and fortitude, and that it was “generally agreed that no one in the memory of man has ever met his death more nobly” (Memorabilia, 4.8). We’ve already mentioned the events surrounding the trial and execution of Socrates. The Stoics undoubtedly treat this as the example par excellence of a “good death”. In reading about Socrates’ preparing to meet his death, in a sense, we accompany him and prepare ourselves for our own deaths.

Plato wasn’t there himself but, in an eponymous dialogue, portrays Socrates’ friend Phaedo recounting his astonishment at the philosopher’s composure during his final hours.

“Although I was witnessing the death of one who was my friend, I had no feeling of pity, for the man appeared happy both in manner and words as he died nobly and without fear.” (Phaedo, 58e)

So what did Socrates do? Well, he acted normally. He saw his persecutors, the men responsible for his death, as simply misguided rather than hateful. The Enchiridion of Epictetus makes a point of concluding with a remarkable quotation attributed to him: “Anytus and Meletus [who brought the charges] can kill me, but they cannot harm me.” (Obi-wan Kenobi echoes this in the movie Star Wars!)  This may well be an allusion to the fact it was a favourite quote of Thrasea, the leader of the Stoic Opposition, who defiantly changed it to: “Nero can kill me, but he cannot harm me.”

In prison, awaiting execution, Socrates spent his final hours debating amiably with his friends about philosophy. Given the proximity of his own demise, he chose to explore the question of what happens to the soul after death, coolly examining several possibilities while keeping an open mind, tolerant of uncertainty. More importantly, he explains his view that philosophy is essentially a lifelong “meditation on death” (melete thanatou), as the reason for his surprising indifference. He says that those who practice philosophy in the right way are constantly training for death, and true philosophers fear dying least of all men (Phaedo, 67e).

The “contemplation of death” therefore emerged right at the most dramatic moment in the birth of Western philosophy, spoken at the heart of what Socrates called his philosophical swansong. When the time came, he calmly drank the poison and waited to die, something he’d clearly reconciled himself to, and faced with supreme equanimity and an attitude of philosophical curiosity.

Key idea: Life and death are indifferent

The Stoics did not generally believe in the immortality of the soul, which they saw as a subtle physical substance, composed of air or fire, extending through the body like the tentacles of an octopus. (Maybe a primitive precursor of our modern concept of neurological processes.)

Some Stoics perhaps believed the soul survives temporarily after the body’s death, but they accepted that we are all ultimately destined to be destroyed. However, both life and death are explicitly classed as “indifferents”, neither good nor bad in themselves. They may be used either wisely or foolishly, for either virtue or vice. Nevertheless, life is classed among the “preferred” indifferents, death among the “dispreferred” ones. Stoics therefore considered it natural for adult humans to prefer survival, as do animals and infants. With the acquisition of language and reason, though, our chief good becomes wisdom and the rational virtues. The mere fact of living or dying does not make us any more wise or virtuous. Both living and dying, nevertheless, may be approached with wisdom and virtue and be called “good”, in that sense.

For the Stoics, we should live to achieve progress toward wisdom, rather than pursuing wisdom in order to somehow extend our lives. By contrast, it would potentially be better not to live than to live a life of folly and injustice toward others.

Remember this: your death is certain

As we saw earlier, Epictetus described a three-stage procedure, forming part of the discipline of desire (Discourses, 3.24). He advises us to rehearse saying “I knew that I was mortal” in preparation, premeditating our death. This threefold strategy can be applied to the contemplation of death as follows:

  1. We should remind ourselves of the inevitability of death, in preparation, so that we can never feel it is “unexpected” or be surprised when the day finally arrives.
  2. We should recall that it is not “up to us” and therefore not an evil, but “indifferent” with regard to our ultimate Happiness and fulfilment.
  3. Death is a natural process and we should accept it as determined by the string of causes that constitutes the whole of Nature, and our fate in life –the thought Epictetus considered “most decisive”.

We’ll examine these aspects in turn, beginning with the prescription that we should be continually remember the inevitability of our own death. The poems of Horace return to this theme several times: “remember your death is certain” (Odes, 2.3).

How is it possible for us to forget our own mortality? And yet it seems that we so often do. Everyone perceives ample evidence that they must die eventually, at least in terms of physical life on Earth.  Perhaps religious beliefs about an afterlife may contradict this and introduce some uncertainty.  Nevertheless, we react as if it comes as a surprise that we must die, and so death continues to make us anxious. To firmly grasp the certainty of death is to remove the irrational sense of shock that contributes to emotional distress. Indeed, modern research on worry suggests that when we view something feared as certain it’s often less distressing than when we view it as uncertain or ambiguous.

We learn the certainty of death mainly by observing that all other people die. Hence, Marcus Aurelius several times reminds himself of the deaths of great historical figures (Meditations, 3.3; 4.48). Even great conquerors like Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar or great philosophers such as Socrates and Zeno – what has become of them?

Because death is inevitable and comes to all it was also widely referred to as the great leveller. Nobody can escape the fact that they will die eventually. Seneca says that it is a cardinal feature of nature that everyone arrives at death on an equal footing and the circumstances don’t essentially matter: “Death has the same force wherever it strikes” (On Earthquakes). As Marcus Aurelius put it, death reduced both Alexander the Great and his mule- driver to the same condition (Meditations, 6.24). Again, this theme recurs in the poems of Horace, death comes knocking at the poor man’s shack and the king’s palace alike (Odes, 1.5).

Whether rich or poor, “it’s all one; you and I are victims of never-relenting Orcus” or Death (Odes, 2.3). Shelley’s Ozymandias (1818) employs a related literary device, called ubi sunt (“Where are they now?”).

And on the pedestal these words appear:
“My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!”
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

Certain tombs and gravestones were designed to have this effect, reminding us not only of the deceased but of our own mortality. Seneca likewise observes that although many funeral processions went past the doors of his family and fellow Roman citizens they seldom reflected on their own mortality (Consolation to Marcia, 9). Yet we should learn from the fate that befalls others to prepare ourselves for the common lot of mankind, especially the day of our death. We can always reflect that around the world at any given time, thousands of humans and other living creatures are dying. We know that every journey has its end and should not be unprepared for the inevitability of our own demise.

In addition to the certainty of our ultimate demise, the Stoics very frequently reminded themselves that “The door is always open”. This was another Stoic slogan, which clearly meant that it’s always possible to voluntarily end your life.

The door stands open. Why grieve? (Discourses, 1.9)

Although there are some exceptional circumstances, perhaps, in which suicide is physically impossible, it is virtually always available as a way out. Whereas for many people this thought may seem morbid, for the Stoics it carried tremendous psychological and ethical force. We only remain here on Earth so long as we continue choosing to live – “the door is always open”, should we wish to depart. Like children playing a game, we can always say “I won’t play any longer” and take our leave, but if we choose to stay on in the “game” of life it’s hypocritical to keep complaining because we do so voluntarily (Discourses, 1.25).

The story goes that in old age, when he was frail and unable to continue lecturing, Zeno voluntarily committed suicide, after tripping upon the ground and then beating it with his hand as he joked: “I come of my own accord; why then call me?” (Lives, 7.1). Stoics go to their death willingly when the time comes.

Key idea: Remembering death is certain (memento mori)

Contemplating your own death and learning to adopt a courageous philosophical attitude toward it is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental exercises in Stoic practice. Epictetus told his students that day by day they should keep everything that seems catastrophic before their mind’s eye, but most of all death (Enchiridion, 21). This contemplative practice takes a variety of forms but permeates the whole Stoic tradition. Sometimes this may have involved written exercises, in a journal, such as we find in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. Often, it may have involved patiently visualising death. However, there are many references to the use of repeating verbal formulae to remind oneself of death.

Epictetus mentions that triumphant Roman generals would have the words memento mori (“Remember thou must die”) whispered in their ears. Somewhat notoriously, he then says that we should likewise whisper over our sleeping spouses and children “Tomorrow you will die”, and remind ourselves that we are kissing a mortal.  This is probably derived from a well-known anecdote.  When Xenophon was told that one of his sons had been slain in battle he said only: “I knew that he was mortal.” Epictetus, likewise, also instructed his Stoic students to repeatedly say to themselves the words: “I knew that I was mortal” (Discourses, 3.24).

In a similar vein, Seneca suggests we should tell ourselves “You may not wake up”, when going to sleep, and “You may not ever sleep again”, when waking in the morning, to remind us of our own mortality (Letters, 49). Elsewhere, he also says that as we go to sleep each night we should practice saying: “I have lived my life and run the course that Fortune gave” (Letters, 12). He claims that by doing so we may learn to be grateful for each new day that fate gives us.

Try it now: Contemplate the “good death” of a wise man

Read the account of Socrates’ last days in Plato’s Apology and Crito. Alternatively, read the account of Seneca’s death from the Annals of Tacitus, Cato’s death in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives, or any other praiseworthy examples you can find.

  1. Imagine yourself in the shoes of Socrates, Cato, Seneca, or whoever you’ve chosen, sharing their thoughts, actions, and feelings, in the face of death.
  2. What might you do, in their place, if you were acting with wisdom and courage? What would you do if sentenced to drink hemlock, for example, like Socrates?
  3. Would you handle things in the same way or differently? Compare your actions to theirs. How would it feel?

Try to contemplate several different examples, and compare them to each other. What lessons can you draw from this thought experiment that might apply to life in general?

Key idea: “The good death”

Death is “indifferent”, in itself, but we can die well by meeting our fate with wisdom and virtue so philosophers sometimes speak of the “good death”. For most Stoics, undoubtedly, Socrates provided the supreme example of a philosophical attitude in the face of death. For later Stoics, Cato was also treated as an important role-model in this respect. Stoic literature is full, however, of many different examples of “good deaths”.

Boethius wrote: “Some men at the price of a glorious death have won a fame that generations will venerate; some indomitable in the face of punishment have given others an example that evil cannot defeat virtue” (Consolation of Philosophy, 4.6). However, the most important aspect of the good death is the fact that it’s approached with wisdom and virtuous intentions, rather than the actual consequences for other people, which are largely in the hands of fate. Even someone who dies in obscurity can have a “good death”, if she can meet her fate with dignity and courage.

Try it now: Picture your own death

Take a few minutes to contemplate your own death as if it were happening now. Draw on what you’ve read in this chapter but also recall some of the exercises you learned in the chapter on premeditation of adversity. As you do so, recall the Stoic teaching that although it’s natural to prefer to live, death is not an “evil” but rather an opportunity for virtue.

  1. Tell yourself that death is inevitable and necessary, ordained as your fate by Nature.
  2. Take time to contemplate things as objectively as possible, without any value-judgements, as if you’re considering your death from a detached scientific perspective, as an inevitable natural event, stripping away the “mask” of catastrophic thinking.
  3. Next, try to imagine what is under your control, and the extent to which you would be able to exercise wisdom and virtue in the face of death.
  4. If it helps, return to the contemplation of wise men, especially the “good deaths” of philosophers such as Socrates, and imagine how the ideal Stoic Sage would respond to the same death you imagine facing. What would it be like to emulate their praiseworthy example?

An alternative approach would be to imagine witnessing your own funeral service, like Scrooge does in A Christmas Carol. Again, think about what lessons can be taken from this that might apply to life in general.

Remember this: The Stoic view of suicide or euthanasia

In the ancient world, people were more often faced with situations where suicide was considered a reasonable response, such as the threat of enslavement or torture. However, even today, many people face an old age in which the continuation of their life, through worsening physical frailty and illness, becomes a very serious moral dilemma. The Stoic position is highly relevant to the modern debate on the ethics of euthanasia (literally, a “good death”). Stoic Ethics, unlike some religions, does not consider suicide to be inherently wrong.

What matter are the judgments and intentions on which it’s based. It would be wrong for someone to take their own life because of unhealthy or irrational “passions”, meaning suicide caused by pathological depression would be wrong. However, in some cases suicide may be rational, if the decision is made “in sound mind” and wisely. The founders of Stoicism said that suicide was appropriate for wise, temperate, and courageous men, in many cases, but for the foolish, impulsive, or cowardly it is better to remain alive, rather than to take their own life for the wrong reasons. The Stoics believed it was rational for Socrates and Cato to take their own lives, under the exceptional circumstances facing them. According to one account, Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, “endured many hardships by reason of old age”, and eventually took his own life when he was in his seventies (Lives, 7.1).

Remember death is no evil

The Stoics also argued that it is irrational to judge something “evil” once we accept that it is inevitable, because calling something evil is tantamount to saying that it must be avoided at all costs.

When death appears to be an evil, we must have ready at hand the argument that it is our duty to avoid evils, and that death is an inevitable thing. (Discourses, 1.27)

The challenging concept that “death is not an evil” was fundamental to the whole genre of “consolation” letters in the ancient world, which are found across different philosophical traditions, but were particularly associated with the Stoics. For example, in his letter to Marcia who had been grieving the death of her son Metilius for over three years, Seneca puts the argument very forcefully that death is ultimately “indifferent” with regard to having a good life (Consolation to Marcia, 19). Only what is under our direct control can be truly “good” or “bad”, and our own life and death are classed as “indifferent”, being not entirely under our control. The Stoics also argued that life can be used badly, so it is not life itself that is good or bad but the use we make of it. In themselves, living and dying are “indifferent”; we make them “good” or “honourable” only insofar as we approach them with wisdom and virtue. Seneca quotes the words of another Stoic who explains that “it is no great thing to live” because slaves and cattle also live, but rather it is great to live and die honourably, wisely, and courageously (Letters, 77).

Stoic philosophy, like the magic wand of Hermes, can turn anything that befalls us into gold, and even death becomes an opportunity for exercising virtue:

“What will you make of death?” Why, what else but make it your glory, or an opportunity for you to show in deed thereby what sort of person a man is who follows the will of nature. (Discourses, 3.20)

Nevertheless, the Stoics would say that it is natural and rational for humans, like all other animals, to “prefer” their own life and not their own death, as long, as this accords with virtue.

“Preference” is only possible because the future is uncertain, though. Once our death, from a particular cause, becomes certain and unavoidable, it turns to something completely “indifferent”, which we have no choice but to accept. Death in general, the fact that we must ultimately die somehow, is always certain of course, and something we should accept unreservedly.

Plato’s Republic, written over three centuries before the New Testament, portrays Socrates saying that myths about the underworld should be completely expunged from literature to avoid planting irrational superstitions and fears about death in the minds of children (3.386). In the Phaedo, Socrates is then asked by his friends to speak to them as though a little child remains within their minds, who is afraid of death as if it were a bogeyman, and to reassure them there is nothing to fear. He replies: “You should sing a charm over him every day until you have charmed away his fears” (Phaedo, 77e). Stoics likewise compared death to a bogeyman and to scary masks that frighten small children by their appearance. We should strip away the myths and value-judgements that make death appear like a bogeyman: “Turn it about and learn what it is; see, it does not bite” (Discourses, 2.1). Seneca uses the same analogy to describe premeditation on adversity, like removing a scary mask that frightens children, ignorant that the person wearing it is actually harmless (Letters, 24).

The Stoics therefore rejected mythological accounts of the afterlife as superstitious tales designed to frighten small children. However, they also used many philosophical arguments, which they rehearsed repeatedly in different forms and memorised to help them develop a “firm grasp” of their moral principle that death is fundamentally indifferent. One of the simplest Stoic arguments was that “death is not intrinsically bad or catastrophic, otherwise it would seem so to everyone”. In other words, not everyone sees it the same way. The list below summarises various examples of this argument found in the Stoic literature.

Not everyone judges death to be bad:

  • Acrobats are willing to risk death for applause
  • Soldiers choose to face death for the sake of glory
  • Parents will sacrifice their own lives to protect their children
  • Lovers will often risk death for their loved ones
  • The elderly or infirm sometimes seek death (“euthanasia”) to avoid suffering
  • Many people commit suicide, for various (good or bad) reasons preferring death to life
  • More importantly: wise men, such as Socrates and Cato, did not see their own deaths as fearful or catastrophic

All these examples illustrate the point that people will sometimes judge other things to be more important than preserving their own life. Even the unwise will accept the risk of death in order to gain wealth, glory, or the affection of others. Marcus therefore says that a powerful way to train oneself to look down on death is remember how many foolish and vicious people have nevertheless managed risked death without fear (Meditations, 12.34). However, the wise will face death when it is necessary to do so in the service of virtue and eudaimonia, the supreme good in life. Can death be intrinsically bad, therefore, if so many people are willing to risk their lives for something they prize more highly?

This leads to the famous Stoic view that it is not actually death itself that is distressing or even harmful but rather our faulty value-judgement. The fear of death is worse than death itself because it is an irrational passion that does real harm to our mind, and prevents us flourishing.

In fact, this argument is central to Epictetus’ Handbook:

It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things. For example, death is nothing catastrophic, or else Socrates too would have thought so, but the judgement that death is catastrophic, this is the catastrophic thing. (Enchiridion, 5)

When facing death we must primarily have ready-to-hand in our minds a firm grasp of what is ours and what is not: “I must die: must I, then, die groaning too?” (Discourses, 1.1). These are the arguments that aspiring Stoics should exercise themselves in every single day, rehearsing them mentally and in writing, “from dawn to dusk”, until they become second nature. Seneca says that the Stoic ideal is to look upon one’s own death with the same expression, the same detachment and objectivity, as when one hears of a stranger’s death (On the Happy Life, 20). Our own death is as “external” to our volition as the death of someone on the other side of the world, or someone’s death in the distant past or distant future.

The fear of death is therefore regarded as one of the most fundamental and insidious of the irrational passions. The Stoics argue that we simply cannot imagine the ideal Sage would judge his own death to be an evil, otherwise he would potentially condemn himself to a life of cowardice and slavery. His death may be in the hands of a tyrant, and to avoid it he would then be forced to obey the demands of a wicked man. Whereas if he prizes virtue above preserving his own life, no tyrant has the power to coerce him anymore. Consider whose lives are more praiseworthy: those who fear death the most, and seek to preserve their lives at any cost, or those who “prefer” to live but are unafraid to die in the service of honour?

The Stoics also frequently mention arguments for the indifference of death based on the notion that it is merely a form of non-existence. For example, Seneca says the man who wishes to live another thousand years is as foolish as one who wishes he was born a thousand years earlier because we are returning to the same state of non-existence we were in before we were born (Letters, 77). Elsewhere he says: “Death brings no discomfort, for there would have to be someone whose discomfort it was” (Letters, 36).

No suffering is great if it has an end. Death is coming to you: it would have been worth fearing if it could coexist with you. But it must either not reach you, or pass you by. (Letters, 4)

Non-existence cannot be good or bad:

  • There is no person remaining to be either helped or harmed by the “experience” of being dead.
  • In fact, although we may be conscious of dying, being dead is not even an experience, let alone a good or bad one.
  • If non-existence were truly bad then the aeons of time before we were even born would be just as awful as the ones that follow death.

In addition to these arguments, the Stoics use an interesting paradox to challenge the fear of death. In his essay On Earthquakes, Seneca emphasises the folly of fearing death by earthquakes or any other specific thing, when death surrounds us and can strike in an infinite number of ways. We can as easily be killed by a single stone as an entire city collapsing on our heads. He writes: “If you wish to fear nothing, consider that all things are to be feared.”  Elsewhere he says: “It is not clear where death is waiting for you, so you should wait for it everywhere” (Letters, 26). Epictetus makes the same point: “Do you want me, then, to respect and do obeisance to all these things, and to go about as the slave of them all?” (Discourses, 4.7).

Death can come from any quarter, at any time. According to legend, the Greek playwright Aeschylus was killed by a tortoise dropped on him by an eagle flying overhead. You could be hit by a bus tomorrow. Our fears tend to be irrationally selective and when confronted with the stark logic of “If you worry about that you might as well worry about everything”, people are often forced to concede that becoming preoccupied with hypothetical catastrophes in general is a waste of time and energy. To be everywhere is to be nowhere, and to fear everything is to fear nothing.

Remember this: Fear of death is worse than death itself

The Stoics believed that the fear of death is one of the most insidious and toxic of the irrational passions. Paradoxically, therefore, the fear of death is worse than death itself. “Death you’ll think of as the worst of all bad things, though in fact there’s nothing bad about it at all except the thing which comes before it – the fear of it” (Seneca, Letters, 104). The Stoics actually believed that the fear of death lies at the root of most irrational fears, and the cardinal vice of cowardice.

Marcus says that in addition to the arguments concerning the “indifference” of death there’s a powerful “unphilosophical” argument, which is simply to ask ourselves: “Do we really want to emulate the sort of people who most fear their own death?” Go over the names of people who have tenaciously clung onto life and ask yourself whether they came any closer to genuine Happiness or fulfilment as a result (Meditations, 4.50). Epictetus had taught that the greatest harm that can befall man is “not death but rather the fear of death” and we should exert ourselves in particular to overcome this fear as doing so “is the only way in which men achieve freedom” (Discourses, 3.26).

Remember death is ordained by Nature

Epictetus said the most decisive step in the discipline of desire, regarding death, is to view it as ordained by Nature as a whole or by the divine will of Zeus. For ancient Stoics, accepting one’s fate as the divine will of Zeus was the essence of piety. Modern readers may struggle with this idea, especially if they are atheists or agnostic. However, Zeus was synonymous with Nature in Stoicism and there may still be ways in which we can learn to accept seemingly aversive events, even our own death, with equanimity, by viewing them within a larger context and as being ultimately determined by Nature as a whole. Indeed, the chief doctrine of Stoicism is that we should “live in agreement with Nature”, which means the same thing as accepting our fate, insofar as it is outside our control. Once we’ve accepted that death is the inevitable fate of all living things, the Stoics argue that it ultimately matters little whether our lives are long or short.

Not even death can bring terror to him who regards that alone as good which comes in due season, and to whom it is all one whether his acts in obedience to right reason are few or many, and a matter of indifference whether he look upon the world for a longer or a shorter time. (Meditations, 12.35)

Marcus elsewhere says that it’s of no consequence whether one lives three days or three centuries, these are as one from the perspective of eternity, when you “look at the yawning gulf of time behind you, and before you at another infinity to come” (Meditations, 4.50). To put it another way, we praise others for the quality of their lives, not their duration. It would be hypocritical to judge our own lives by a different standard. It is better to die honourably than to live a long life, foolishly and enslaved to fear and desire. Epictetus uses the ancient metaphor of a “festival” to illustrate the Stoic notion that we should constantly remember that our life is on “loan” from Nature. True piety consists, not in singing hymns in a church or temple, but in maintaining a heartfelt sense of gratitude for the opportunity to live, while accepting that it is temporary, and being willing to depart when the time comes without grumbling.

Indeed, death is a law of Nature, part of the very fabric of existence. Some of the Stoics even argued that we die a little every day. Death is seen as a lengthy gradual process that begins at birth and continues throughout our entire life. Seneca therefore says that if we want to replace fear of death with philosophical calm we should contemplate the thought very deeply in our hearts that we have been travelling along the road to death since the day we were born (Letters, 4).

Just as it is not the last drop that stops the water-clock but every drop that has previously fallen, so the last hour when we cease to exist is not the only one to cause death but the only one to complete it: we reach death then but we have been coming to it for a long time. (Letters, 24)

Marcus Aurelius suggests we should contemplate our lives in terms of distinct stages, and the transition from each to the next (“each step in the ladder of change”) as a kind of death. As we’ve grown from infants, into children, adolescents, and gone through various stages of adult life, many things have ceased or changed for us. The child dies when the man is born. We should ask ourselves: “Is there anything catastrophic here?” (Meditations, 9.21). Neither is there any catastrophe in the end of the whole process, our final demise. Viewing death as a daily event, a gradual process, rather than a single blow, grants us a lifetime of practice in coming to terms with our own mortality. Each day we take one step closer to death and we should willingly sacrifice a drop of our life to Nature, letting go of the day that has now gone, before retiring to sleep each night in preparation for letting go completely at the end of life.

As we’ve seen, Seneca advises that we should literally say such “I have lived my life and run the course that Fortune gave” each night as we go to sleep, accepting that everything happened exactly as Nature ordained, the past is behind us, and we may die tomorrow (Letters, 12). We will then meet each new day with a sense of gratitude, as a gift from Nature.

The Stoics also argue that as death is a natural and inevitable process it cannot be an evil as nothing of this kind is feared by the wise man. Marcus wrote that from the perspective of Stoic Physics, the duration of life is miniscule, the body continually prone to deterioration, and our future uncertain. He reminds himself that from the perspective of natural philosophy, death is merely a dispersal of atoms and that there is nothing terrible in the notion of one material substance being transformed into another, through a natural process. We should not be perturbed by our own inevitable death and the body’s putrefaction: “For it is in the way of Nature, and in the way of Nature there can be no evil” (Meditations, 2.17). Contemplating the decay of the body objectively, in a detached “scientific” manner, as a natural philosopher would, seems to have been an important form of the Stoic exercise we’ve called “physical definition”.

Death, like birth, is just a natural process, material elements combining, growing, decaying, and finally separating and completely dispersing (Meditations, 4.5).

Likewise, Epictetus taught his students to view death dispassionately as a return to nature.

“But now it is time to die.” Why say “die”? Make no tragic parade of the matter, but speak of it as it is: “It is now time for the material of which you are constituted to be restored to those elements from which it came.” And what is there catastrophic about that? What one of the things that make up the universe will be lost, what novel or unreasonable thing will have taken place? Is it for this that the tyrant inspires fear? (Discourses, 4.7)

In other words, if you look at “what it is to die” rationally and objectively, stripping away its phantom terrors, you will see it as merely a function of Nature, which it is childish to fear (Meditations 2.12). These natural processes of change are not entirely under our control, but ultimately in the hands of fate and external force. However, once again, what is “external” to our will is fundamentally indifferent to us according to Stoic Ethics. The Stoics forward several additional arguments about death as a natural process.

Death is a natural process, beyond our control:

  • Death is simply physical decay and no physical process is intrinsically good or bad.
  • Our body is subject to external influences beyond our control, and so our death is ultimately in the hands of fate.
  • All material things are transient (“everything flows”) and human mortality is just the most intimate example of this.
  • What is composite can always be separated, human beings are composite, therefore dissolution and death is inevitable.
  • You are already in the process of dying, it is not a single event but starts at birth, and occurs in stages, and so it’s too late to avoid it.
  • Death is ordained by the whole of Nature as our fate, it’s the will of Zeus and it would be “impious” to resent it.

From this perspective, the contemplation of death is particularly closely-related to Stoic Physics and overlaps with the contemplation of Nature as a whole, particularly the impermanence of all material things.

Try it now: Contemplate the transience of life

Take a few minutes, if you don’t mind, to really contemplate the transience of all human life and the fact that death is the common lot of all mankind.

  1. Name three historic individuals who achieved great “external” power or influence and contemplate that they are long dead despite their success. Consider briefly how they would have viewed their own death. For example, Marcus names Alexander the Great, Pompey, and Julius Caesar.
  2. Name three historic individuals you admire as having great wisdom and virtue and contemplate the fact that they are long dead despite their understanding. How would these individuals have viewed their own death? Marcus names Socrates, Diogenes, and Heraclitus.
  3. Contemplate how many people have died in the past, and how many will die in the future.
  4. Think of the demise of whole empires and civilisations, such as the Roman Empire, and that in the future your own civilisation will inevitably change and ultimately become extinct.
  5. Think about the demise of the planet Earth in the distant future, and perhaps even the possible end of the universe, such as the Stoics imagined in the “Great Conflagration” at the end of time.
  6. Contemplate the vast amount of time before you were born, during which you were non- existent, and the vast time after your death during which you will, once again, be no more.

How much difference it makes, from this perspective, whether your life is long or short? What seems most important about the way you now live your life? What other conclusions can you draw that might inform your general attitude toward life and death?

Remember this: Death is neither “good” nor “evil”

The Stoic view isn’t that death is “good”, that would be just as false as the view that it’s “bad”. Death itself is neither good nor bad, but the way we use it and our attitude toward it can be good or bad. “Life is what we make of it”, and the same proverb applies to death. Some people may nevertheless feel this aspect of Stoicism is morbid. Even the 17th century philosopher Spinoza, who has been called “more Stoic than the Stoics”, objected: “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life” (Ethica, 4.17). Others may say that it’s both natural and rational to be afraid of one’s own death. Life is precious, isn’t it? Don’t we risk valuing our own life too cheaply if we exercise ourselves in eliminating our fear of dying?

However, you don’t need to actually fear death to know not to walk off the edge of a cliff any more than you need to quake in fear at the prospect of getting wet to know not to stand outside in the rain. Neither is the contemplation of one’s own mortality meant as indulgence in a morbid or melancholic state. On the contrary, the purpose is precisely to confront and overcome fear or sadness caused by what is inevitable rather than to perpetuate distress or wallow in it. The ideal of the Stoic Sage, exemplified by Socrates, was both to love life and yet be unafraid of death. The Stoic’s love of life is conditional, she wishes to enjoy life and health, fate permitting. However, she is also willing to face death philosophically.

Focus Points (Summary)

The main points to remember from this chapter are:

  • Regular training in the contemplation of one’s own death (melete thanatou) is one of the most fundamental Stoic psychological exercises, which aims to replace fear with a more calm and philosophical attitude.
  • For Stoics, death is neither good nor bad, but “indifferent” with regard to eudaimonia and the good life.
  • However, health and life are “preferred” to their opposites, insofar as that is compatible with virtue – we don’t need to irrationally fear death to choose rational self-preservation.
  • Suicide or euthanasia are morally acceptable to Stoics but only when chosen soberly and courageously and not out of confusion, fear or emotional distress.
  • Seneca’s Letters (4, 24, 70 and 82)
  • Seneca’s Consolations to Marcia, Helvia and Polybius, and On Earthquakes

Copyright (c) Donald Robertson, 2013. All rights reserved.

This is a sample chapter. You can find out more about Teach Yourself Stoicism via this link.

Teach Yourself Stoicism on Google Books

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Seneca’s Stoic Role-Models

Seneca’s Stoic Role-Models

Copyright (c) The Trusteest of the British MuseumCopyright © Donald Robertson, 2013.  All rights reserved.  An excerpt from Teach yourself Stoicism.  Image of Zeno, copyright the trustees of the British Museum.

The followers of Epicurus placed importance on possessing portraits or rings bearing his likeness, which may perhaps have helped them imagine his salutary presence accompanying them in life (Hadot, 2002, p. 124).  The British Museum actually possess an ornate gem from the Roman imperial period depicting Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, which possibly served a similar purpose.  Seneca likewise says that Stoics should keep likenesses of great men and even celebrate their birthdays (Letters, 64). He lists his favourite philosophical role-models as:

  • Socrates
  • Plato – somewhat surprisingly for a Stoic!
  • Zeno, the founder of Stoicism
  • Cleanthes, the second head of the Stoa
  • Laelius the Wise, one of the first famous Roman Stoics
  • Cato of Utica, the great Roman Stoic political hero

There are some notable things about this list:

  1. It begins with Socrates, whom most Stoics appear to treat as their supreme role model.
  2. It includes Plato.  Zeno’s Republic, the founding text of Stoicism, was a scathing critique of Plato’s book of the same name.  However, Panaetius and Posidonius reputedly integrated Stoicism and Platonism, so this may indicate that Seneca is more aligned with the Middle Stoa, which would arguably be consistent with the rest of his writings.
  3. It includes Zeno and Cleanthes, the first two Stoic scholarchs, although Seneca seldom mentions them in his writings.  Yet it ignores Chrysippus, the third scholarch and most frequently cited of all Stoics.
  4.  Seneca makes a point of including two famous Roman Stoics: Laelius and Cato.
  5. The inclusion of Laelius the Wise, a student of Panaetius, highlights his importance, and that of the Scipionic Circle to Stoicism.
  6. Epictetus, by comparison, most frequently cites Socrates, Diogenes the Cynic, and Zeno, as his influences, and he also quotes Pythagoras and mentions Heraclitus with admiration.
  7. Marcus Aurelius lists Socrates, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Epictetus, and Chrysippus, as philosophers he particularly admires.
  8. Seneca does not include any reference to Diogenes or other Cynics in this list, which perhaps suggests he aligned with a branch of (Middle) Stoicism that distanced itself from the Cynics and placed more emphasis on Platonism instead.

Elsewhere, he gives a beautiful account of this practice, drawing on Epicurean teachings:

‘We need to set our affections on some good man and keep him constantly before our eyes, so that we may live as if he were watching us and do everything as if he saw what we were doing.’ This, my dear Lucilius, is Epicurus’ advice, and in giving it he has given us a guardian and a moral tutor – and not without reason, either: misdeeds are greatly diminished if a witness is always standing near intending doers. The personality should be provided with someone it can revere, someone whose influence can make even its private, inner life more pure. Happy the man who improves other people not merely when he is in their presence but even when he is in their thoughts! And happy, too, is the person who can so revere another as to adjust and shape his own personality in the light of recollections, even, of that other. (Letters, 11)

The image of this exemplary person should therefore be recalled frequently “either as your guardian or as your model”, as someone observing us, and perhaps offering guidance, or as an ideal to emulate. Seneca puts it nicely when he says that we need the concept of a genuinely “wise and good” person as a standard against which to measure ourselves because “Without a ruler to do it against you won’t make the crooked straight.”

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Stoicism and the Death of Socrates

Excerpt from Teach yourself Stoicism and the Art of Happiness (2013), copyright © Donald Robertson.

Xenophon wrote that his friend and teacher, Socrates, faced the death-sentence with absolute serenity and fortitude, and that it was “generally agreed that no one in the memory of man has ever met his death more nobly” (Memorabilia, 4.8). We’ve already mentioned the events surrounding the trial and execution of Socrates. The Stoics undoubtedly treat this as the example par excellence of a “good death”. In reading about Socrates’ preparing to meet his death, in a sense, we accompany him and prepare ourselves for our own deaths.

Plato wasn’t there himself but, in an eponymous dialogue, portrays Socrates’ friend Phaedo recounting his astonishment at the philosopher’s composure during his final hours. “Although I was witnessing the death of one who was my friend, I had no feeling of pity, for the man appeared happy both in manner and words as he died nobly and without fear” (Phaedo, 58e). So what did Socrates do? Well, he acted normally. He saw his persecutors, the men responsible for his death, as simply misguided rather than hateful. The Enchiridion of Epictetus makes a point of concluding with a remarkable quotation attributed to him: “Anytus and Meletus [who brought the charges] can kill me, but they cannot harm me.” (Obi-wan Kenobi echoes this in the movie Star Wars!)

In prison, awaiting execution, Socrates spent his final hours debating amiably with his friends about philosophy. Given the proximity of his own demise, he chose to explore the question of what happens to the soul after death, coolly examining several possibilities while keeping an open mind, tolerant of uncertainty. More importantly, he explains his view that philosophy is essentially a lifelong “meditation on death” (melete thanatou), as the reason for his surprising indifference. He says that those who practice philosophy in the right way are constantly training for death, and true philosophers fear dying least of all men (Phaedo, 67e). The “contemplation of death” therefore emerged right at the most dramatic moment in the birth of Western philosophy, spoken at the heart of what Socrates called his philosophical swansong. When the time came, he calmly drank the poison and waited to die, something he’d clearly reconciled himself to, and faced with supreme equanimity and an attitude of philosophical curiosity.

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Stoics are not unemotional!

Why, they [the Stoics] maintain that one wise man is friendly to another even when he does not know him. There is, in truth, nothing more lovable than virtue, and the man who has attained to that will possess our affection in whatever part of the world he is.

Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods

The misconception that Stoics are unemotional like robots, or like the Vulcan “Mister Spock” in Star Trek, is so widespread that I’ve decided to put together some brief notes to summarise the opposing view, taken with modifications from my book Teach yourself Stoicism and the Art of Happiness (2013).

The founder of Greek Skepticism, Pyrrho of Elis, was jokingly said to be so apathetic, or indifferent to the world, that his followers had to chase around after him to prevent him walking off cliffs or into the path of speeding horse-drawn wagons.  That joke was never made about the Stoics because, by contrast, they were well-known for their active engagement in family life and politics.  Likewise, the Epicureans made the attainment of tranquillity, or the avoidance of pain, the goal of life, and saw no intrinsic value in fellowship with other human beings.  This often led them to withdraw from politics or family life, and even to live in relative seclusion. 

By contrast, the Stoics, for whom tranquillity is only good when it accompanies the virtues of wisdom and justice, believed that fellowship with the rest of mankind is natural and fundamental to the goal of life, which entails “living in agreement” with reason, the Nature of the universe, and the rest of mankind.  In fact, the founding text of Stoicism, Zeno’s Republic, centred on his “dream” of an ideal Stoic society, consisting of enlightened and benevolent friends, living in harmony together, under the patronage of Eros, the god of love.

Epictetus therefore said that it’s the Stoic concept of “appropriate action”, in our family and civil relationships, and of the “discipline of action” through which Stoics train themselves to act justly and philanthropically, which lay to rest the misconception that they are aloof and unemotional like certain other ancient philosophers (Discourses, 3.2). The Stoics believed that we are essentially rational and social animals who experience a feeling of “natural affection” for those closest to us, which it is natural and rational to extend to the rest of mankind, forming the basis of an attitude sometimes called Stoic “philanthropy”. However, arguably, by placing value on others, even in a somewhat detached manner, Stoics also open themselves up to a variety of naturally-occurring emotional reactions, including distress when valued things appear to be threatened.

For how can a vine be moved not [i.e., grow] in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of an olive tree? or on the other hand how can an olive tree be moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner of a vine? It is impossible: it cannot be conceived. Neither then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements [i.e., feelings] of a man; and even those [eunuchs] who are deprived of their genital members are not able to deprive themselves of man’s desires. (Epictetus, Discourses, 2.20)

According to the ancient Stoics, even the perfect Sage feels natural affection, or love for other human beings, and is not completely insensitive to other feelings that naturally follow from maintaining these affectionate social relationships.  For example, Marcus Aurelius surely loved his notoriously wayward son Commodus (shown above dressed as Hercules), while accepting that it was ultimately beyond his control completely to remedy his heir’s folly and vicious character.  Indeed, Marcus described the ideal Stoic character, as exemplified by his own teacher, Sextus of Chaeronea, as being “full of love and yet free from passion” (Meditations, 1.6).  The Greek word for love that he uses can also be translated as “natural affection” or “family affection” – it’s the kind of love parents have for their children.

The Stoics, indeed, sought to emulate Zeus, the father of mankind, by extending their natural affection to the whole of mankind.  This dilutes the emotion and prevents it from becoming an infatuation with any individual, or an irrational “passion” of the kind they sought to free themselves from.  Hence the word he joins this expression with, apatheia, means absence of irrational, unhealthy, or excessive “passions”.  As we’ll see, the Stoics repeatedly emphasised that by this they did not mean “apathy” or complete lack of feeling for other people.  Later, Marcus wonders when he will ever attain such a state of affection and contentment himself (Meditations, 10.1).  Scholars have noted, however, that various Roman authors of the period, specifically portrayed Marcus as being renowned for his “philanthropic” attitude, or love of mankind.

As this is a common misconception about ancient Stoicism, it’s worth briefly reviewing some of their own comments. For example, after describing the Stoic theory of irrational passions, Diogenes Laertius wrote of the founders of Stoicism, probably meaning either Zeno or Chrysippus:

They say the wise man is also without passions [apathê, whence our word “apathy”], because he is not vulnerable to them. But the bad man is called “without passions” in a different sense, which means the same as “hard-hearted” and “insensitive”. (Lives, 7.117)

Epictetus says something quite similar, that Stoics ought not to be free from passions (apathê) in the sense of being unfeeling “like a statue”, and that this has to do with “appropriate action” and maintaining one’s natural and acquired relationships, as a family member and a citizen (Discourses, 3.2).

Cicero portrays the Stoic Laelius as saying that it would be the greatest possible mistake to try to eliminate feelings of friendship, because even animals experience natural affection for their offspring, which Stoics viewed as the foundation of human love and friendship (Laelius, 13). We would not only be dehumanising ourselves by eliminating natural affection between friends, he says, but reducing ourselves below animal nature to something more like a mere tree-trunk or a stone and we should turn a deaf ear to anyone who foolishly suggests that the good life entails having “the hardness of iron” in terms of our emotions. Seneca, likewise, says:

There are misfortunes which strike the sage – without incapacitating him, of course – such as physical pain, infirmity, the loss of friends or children, or the catastrophes of his country when it is devastated by war. I grant that he is sensitive to these things, for we do not impute to him the hardness of a rock or of iron. There is no virtue in putting up with that which one does not feel. (On the Constancy of the Sage, 10.4)

There’s a problem, as Seneca points out, with the notion that the Stoic Sage is completely devoid of emotion. It recalls a story about Diogenes the Cynic, who was asked by a Spartan if he was feeling cold, when training himself by stripping naked and embracing a bronze statue in winter. Diogenes said he was not, and the Spartan replied: “What’s so impressive about what you’re doing then?” (Plutarch, Spartan Sayings, 233a).

As Seneca implies, the virtues of courage and self-discipline appear to require that the Stoic Sage must actually experience something akin to fear and desire – otherwise he has no feelings to overcome. A brave man isn’t someone who doesn’t experience any trace of fear whatsoever but someone who acts courageously despite feeling anxiety. A man who has great self-discipline or restraint isn’t someone who feels no inkling of desire but someone who overcomes his cravings, by abstaining from acting upon them. The Sage conquers his passions by becoming stronger than them not by eliminating all emotion from his life. The Stoic ideal is therefore not to be “passionless” (apathê) in the sense of being “apathetic”, “hard-hearted”, “insensitive” or “like a statue” of stone or iron. Rather, it is to experience natural affection for ourselves, our loved-ones, and other human beings, and to value our lives in accord with nature, which arguably opens us up to experiencing emotional reactions to loss or frustration. Seneca elsewhere explains that whereas the Epicureans mean “a mind immune to feeling” when they speak of apatheia, this “unfeelingness” is actually the opposite of what the Stoics intended (Letters, 9). “This is the difference between us Stoics and the Epicureans; our wise man overcomes every discomfort but feels it, theirs does not even feel it.” The virtue of the Sage consists in his ability to endure painful feelings and rise above them, with magnanimity, while continuing to maintain his relationships and interaction with the world.

Elsewhere Seneca wrote:

I do not withdraw the wise man from the category of man, nor do I deny to him the sense of pain as though he were a rock that has no feelings at all.  I remember that he is made up of two parts: the one part is irrational, — it is this that may be bitten, burned, or hurt; the other part is rational, — it is this which holds resolutely to opinions, is courageous, and unconquerable. […] You must not think that our human virtue transcends nature; the wise man will tremble, will feel pain, will turn pale, for all these are sensations of the body. (Seneca, Letters 71)

Addenda

Since I wrote this article, Brad Inwood’s excellent Stoicism: A Very Brief Introduction has been published, in which the author makes essentially the same point:

There is a stereotype of Stoicism familiar to everyone, the claim that Stoicism involves being relentlessly rational, but without a trace of emotion—Mr Spock from Star Trek, only more so. That this isn’t the right view of Stoicism is now generally understood, and specialists will even point out that the passions (pathē) from which the Stoic wise person is said to be free are not what we mean by emotions but a more narrowly defined group of states of mind that are by definition pathological. The wise person may well be perfectly rational, but that doesn’t deprive him or her of all affective or emotional experience.

Brad Inwood is one of the leading academic scholars of Stoicism, and a professor of philosophy and classics at Yale.

And following that, another excellent introduction to Stoicism by a leading academic scholar in this field was published: Lessons in Stoicism by John Sellars.

In modern English the word ‘stoic’ has come to mean unfeeling and without emotion, and this is usually seen as a negative trait. […] When the ancient Stoics recommended that people ought to avoid emotions, it was these negative emotions [such as anger] that they primarily had in mind.

He adds,

Contrary to the popular image, the Stoics do not suggest that people can or should become unfeeling blocks of stone. All humans will experience what Seneca calls ‘first movements’. These are when we are moved by some experience, and we might feel nervous, shocked, excited or scared, or we might even cry. All these are quite natural reactions; they are physiological responses of the body, but not emotions in the Stoic sense of the word. Someone who is upset and momentarily contemplates vengeance, but does not act on it, is not angry according to Seneca, because he remains in control.

And he concludes,

The Stoics certainly do not envisage turning people into unfeeling blocks of stone. So, we’ll still have the usual reactions to events – we’ll jump, flinch, get momentarily frightened or embarrassed, cry – and we’ll still have strong caring relationships with those close to us. What we won’t do, however, is develop the negative emotions of anger, resentment, bitterness, jealousy, obsession, perpetual fear or excessive attachment. These are the things that can ruin a life and that the Stoics think are best avoided.

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Stoicism and Rational Psychotherapy

Charles Baudouin and Stoicism

Copyright © Donald Robertson, 2012.  All rights reserved.

The French academic, Charles Baudouin was actually one of the first modern authors to integrate Stoic philosophy with psychotherapy, several decades before CBT or even its precursor REBT. Baudouin explored the relationship between psychotherapy and various religions and philosophies, including Christianity, Buddhism, and Stoicism in his book entitled The Inner Discipline (Baudouin & Lestchinsky, 1924).

Baudouin was a follower of the father of modern self-help Émile Coué, who developed hypnotism into his immensely popular “conscious autosuggestion” method. He was also influenced by the Swiss psychiatrist, Paul Dubois, who had earlier drawn on elements of Stoicism, particularly Seneca, in expounding his “rational persuasion” psychotherapy, an early precursor of CBT. However, Baudouin dedicated a whole chapter of The Inner Discipline to Stoicism and its use in modern therapy and self-help. He wrote that “one of the most original characteristics of Stoicism was the stress it laid upon a vigorous discipline, upon the education of the character”, and for this reason he considered it the branch of classical philosophy most relevant to modern therapy. Baudouin stressed the need for regular daily practice in therapy and self-help, which he found also emphasised in Stoicism. He provides a particularly good account of the morning and evening meditation practices, which he recommends to his readers and patients.

Baudouin says that self-mastery, of the kind espoused by the Stoics, can only be acquired by daily training. He agreed that one of the first philosophical precepts we must master is the distinction between things that are in our power and those that are not. In particular, the first hour of every day demands our attention as a time for mental preparation and rehearsal of philosophical precepts “for the attitude we adopt at this time sets our course for the day”. Baudouin cites the fact that the Pythagoreans “recommended silence and meditation during the first hour after waking”, quoting Marcus Aurelius’ remark about them having us lift our eyes to the heavens at dawn (Meditations, 11.27). Baudouin suggests we follow Marcus’ advice that good resolutions can be made with the best effect at the start of the day, and that we should take this opportunity to counter slothful tendencies: “This initial victory will pave the way for the victories of subsequent hours.” Baudouin advises us that we can acquire good habits of living through daily practice in this way, becoming watchful of our thoughts and actions, and continually exercising our minds in a healthy direction: “Thanks to the suppleness acquired by this course of moral gymnastics, the mind will be enabled to overcome all obstacles.”

Like Dubois before him, Baudouin agreed with the Stoic view that a “scientific” belief in universal determinism is of profound psychotherapeutic importance. He found that contemplating this helped to remind him how many things are beyond our direct control, and of the ultimate worthlessness of the countless things our passions crave. With regard to things not within our power, he employed Epictetus’ maxim, “endure and renounce”, which he calls the principle of “economy of effort”. We must do nothing without a purpose and must not waste our energies by running our heads against a brick wall: “We must not wish for the impossible, or try to do what is impossible.” He quotes Phocylides, a poet from the 6th century BC, who wrote “Do not let past evils disturb you, for what is done cannot be undone.” Baudouin compares this Stoic attitude to a modern adage: “If we can’t get what we like, we must like what we have”, adding, “instead of lamenting because we cannot change our lot, let us learn to love it.”

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Zeno meets King Antigonus (Excerpt from Teach Yourself Stoicism)

Zeno of Citium Poster

Copyright © Donald Robertson, 2013.  All rights reserved.

Excerpt from Teach Yourself Stoicism and the Art of Happiness (2013).

Following on from his example of a musician, a cithara-player, with stage fright, anxiety about impressing his audience, Epictetus refers to the contrasting example of Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. Zeno had some intensive training in overcoming social anxiety when he first began to study philosophy, and attached himself to the great Cynic philosopher Crates of Thebes. We’re told, after his shipwreck, as he wandered Athens penniless, at first he felt overly-concerned about what others would think of him. So one day Crates asked him to carry a clay pot full of lentil soup through the busy crowds in the potters’ district in Athens. This sort of thing was actually a common Cynic exercise in developing “shamelessness”. Zeno was worried looking foolish and tried to conceal the pot under his cloak. When Crates spotted this he smashed it with his staff, splattering the soup all over Zeno’s body, so it ran down his legs. “Courage my little Phoenician”, said Crates, “it’s nothing terrible, only soup!” In modern CBT deliberate “shame-attacking” exercises, such as walking around a shopping centre with a banana on a leash, are sometimes used to help people progressively overcome their sense of shame about looking foolish in public.

Anyway, repeated exercises like these eventually seem to have cured Zeno of his self-consciousness, as Epictetus advises us to contemplate his exemplary lack of anxiety when meeting the powerful Macedonian king Antigonus II Gonatas, several decades later. Antigonus was the ruler of many lands, and a powerful military leader, who sought the company of intellectuals and philosophers, including some Cynics. He travelled to Athens several times to listen to Zeno teach at the Stoa Poikilê. According to the story, Zeno was completely unconcerned when first meeting him because Antigonus had power over absolutely nothing that Zeno saw as important in life, and Zeno desired nothing that Antigonus possessed. Antigonus was more anxious about meeting Zeno, because he desired to make a good impression on the philosopher, although that was beyond his direct control. There’s a famous legend, almost certainly a myth, that Alexander the Great once visited Diogenes the Cynic, whom he greatly admired, and asked if he could do anything for him. Notoriously, Diogenes was said to have replied: “Yes, could you step aside, you’re blocking the sunlight right now.” In both these stories, a great king, despite his material wealth and power, is suddenly reduced in status when faced with a penniless philosopher who’s completely “indifferent” to external things.

As Chrysippus reputedly said, the famous Stoic paradox would have it that “Besides being free the wise are also kings, since kingship is rule that is answerable to no one” (Laertius, Lives, 7.122). Zeno was the true “king” here, because he needed nothing except virtue, which was entirely under his own rule; whereas Antigonus was a king only over “indifferent” external things, and perhaps, like most people, still a slave with regard to his own passions. According to Plutarch, Antigonus became particularly attached to the teachings of Zeno, and he may well have considered himself an aspiring Stoic. We’re told he later wrote to Zeno pleading him to travel to Macedonia and become his personal tutor. By that time Zeno was too old and frail to make the journey himself so he sent Persaeus instead, one of his best students (Laertius, Lives, 7.6). Antigonus reputedly wrote him a letter saying: “While in fortune and fame I deem myself your superior, in reason and education I own myself inferior, as well as in the perfect Happiness [eudaimonia] which you have attained.”

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The Choice of Hercules in Stoicism

Copyright © Donald Robertson, 2013.  All rights reserved.

Zeno was reputedly inspired to study philosophy after reading the second book of Xenophon’s Memorablia of Socrates. This actually begins with a chapter in which Socrates recounts a story known as “The Choice of Hercules” (or “Heracles” to the Greeks), attributed to the highly-regarded ancient sophist Prodicus (Memorabilia, 2.1). Antisthenes, the Cynics, and the Stoics apparently all agreed that Hercules, the greatest of Zeus’ sons, provided an ideal example of the self-discipline and endurance required to be a true philosopher. The story symbolises the great challenge of deciding whom we actually want to be in life, what type of life we want to live, the promise of philosophy, and the temptation of vice. Zeno himself was perhaps compared to Hercules by his followers and we know that his successor Cleanthes was dubbed “a second Hercules”, on account of his self-mastery.

The story goes that Hercules, when a young man, found himself at an isolated fork in the road, where he sat to contemplate his future. Uncertain which path to take in life he found himself confronted by two goddesses. One, a very beautiful and alluring woman, was called Kakia, although she claimed that her friends call her “Happiness” (Eudaimonia). She charged in front to ensure she spoke first, promising him that her path was “easiest and pleasantest”, and that it provided a shortcut to “Happiness”. She claimed he would avoid hardship and enjoy luxury beyond most men’s wildest dreams, produced by the labour of others. After hearing this, Hercules was approached by the second goddess, called Aretê, a plain-dressed and humble woman, though naturally beautiful. To his surprise, she told him that her path would require hard work from him and it would be “long and difficult”. In fact the path Hercules chose would be dangerous beyond belief, he would be tested by many hardships, perhaps more than any man who had lived before, and have to endure great loss and suffering along the way. “Nothing that is really good and admirable”, said Aretê, “is granted by the gods to men without some effort and application.” However, Hercules would have the opportunity to face each adversity with courage and self-discipline, and of showing wisdom and justice despite great danger. He would earn true Happiness by reflecting on his own praiseworthy and honourable deeds.

Hercules, of course, chose the path of Aretê or “Virtue” and was not seduced by Kakia or “Vice”. He faced continual persecution, from the goddess Hera and her minions, and was forced to undertake the legendary Twelve Labours, including slaying the Hydra and ultimately entering Hades, the Underworld itself, to capture Cerberus with his bare hands. He died in the most extreme agony, poisoned by clothing soaked in the Hydra’s blood. However, Zeus was so impressed by his greatness of soul that he elevated him to the status of a God in his own right. Of course, the Stoics took this all as a kind of metaphor for the good life: that it’s better to face hardships, rise above them, and thereby excel, than to embrace easy-living and idleness, and allow your soul to shrink and deteriorate as a result. It would therefore make sense if Socrates retelling of “The Choice of Hercules” was indeed the part of the Memorabilia that inspired Zeno’s conversion to the life of a philosopher. However, it may certainly have served this purpose for later generations of Stoics.

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Stoic Fatalism, Determinism, and Acceptance

This is a brief excerpt from my book, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, published by Routledge and available to order online from Amazon, and everywhere they sell books.


Whatever sorrow the fate of the Gods may here send us
Bear, whatever may strike you, with patience unmurmuring;
To relieve it, so far as you can, is permitted,
But reflect that not much misfortune has Fate given to the good. – The Golden Verses of Pythagoras

Paul Dubois was perhaps the first modern “rational” psychotherapist to explicitly argue that emotional problems could be made worse by certain, often unspoken, philosophical assumptions about freewill and determinism which prevail in modern society.

Patience towards unavoidable events, depending neither upon us nor upon others, is synonymous with fatalism; it is a virtue, and it is the only stand to take in face of the inevitable. […] The idea of necessity is enough for the philosopher. We are all in the same situation towards things as they are, and towards things that we cannot change. The advantage will always lie with him who, for some reason or other, knows how to resign himself tranquilly. (Dubois, 1909, pp. 240-241)

This notion is equally prominent in Stoic literature. In the Handbook, Epictetus boldly asserts that if we merely train ourselves in wishing things to happen as they do, instead of expecting them to happen as we wish, then our lives will go smoothly (Enchiridion, 8). In the Discourses, he actually defines the practice of philosophy in terms of such acceptance, when he writes, ‘Being educated [in Stoic philosophy] is precisely learning to will each thing just as it happens’ (Discourses, 1.12.15). In an extant fragment from his other teachings, he says that the man who refuses to accept his fortune is a “layman in the art of life” (Fragment 2).

The conceptual and metaphysical problem of freewill has been a central theoretical concern throughout the entire history of Western philosophy. However, Dubois, the Stoics, and others, have seen confusion over precisely this issue as a central psychotherapeutic concern. Dubois dedicates a whole chapter of his textbook on psychotherapy to the issue of determinism in which he asserts, ‘My convictions on this subject have been of such help to me in the practise of psychotherapy that I can not pass this question by in silence’ (Dubois, 1904, p. 47). However, in modern society we take certain metaphysical views regarding freewill for granted, and seldom examine whether they are well-founded, or even logically consistent.

There are some conclusions which we easily arrive at by using the most elementary logic, and which we dare not express. They seem to be in such flagrant contradiction to public opinion that we fear we should be stoned, morally speaking, and we prudently keep our light under a bushel. The problem of liberty is one of those noli me tangere [“do not touch me”] questions.

If you submit it to a single individual in a theoretical discussion, in the absence of all elementary passion, he will have no difficulty in following your syllogisms; he will himself furnish you with arguments in favour of determinism. But address yourself to the masses, or to the individual when he is under the sway of emotion caused by a revolting crime, and you will call forth clamours of indignation, – you will be put under the ban of public opinion. (Dubois, 1904, p. 47)

The philosophical debate concerning “freewill versus determinism” in modern academic philosophy is incredibly complex. Dubois only engages with it at a very superficial level. However, one aspect of the debate can perhaps be made explicit by means of a very crude syllogism of the kind Dubois had in mind.

Most people seem to assume that we generally act on the basis of freewill, which is constrained to varying degrees by obstacles in their environment. So a man is free from extrinsic restrictions or limitations, and therefore completely responsible for his actions, unless he is held at gunpoint, or brainwashed, etc. However, this popular way of looking at things seems to confuse two different concepts of “freedom”, that of freedom from the effects of preceding causal factors, and that of freedom to pursue future goals without obstruction. By contrast, the simple determinist position of Dubois can be outlined as follows,

  1. All physical activity of the brain is wholly determined by antecedent causal factors.
  2. All mental activity is wholly determined by physical activity in the brain.
  3. Therefore, all mental activity is wholly determined by antecedent causal factors.

There are many variations of this argument, exhibiting different degrees of philosophical complexity and sophistication. However, this simple “premise-conclusion” format should at least be sufficient to expose the basic controversy. As Dubois observes, if we accept the physiological basis of the mind, ‘all thought being necessarily bound to the physical or the chemical phenomena of which the brain is the seat’, we are ultimately forced to abandon the metaphysical theory of freewill (Dubois & Gallatin, 1908, p. 9).

Doing so does not logically entail apathy and inertia, as many people falsely assume. Indeed, a man may be causally determined to respond to the perception of universal determinism with a sense of renewed commitment to his ideals, and to vigorous action.

At the exact moment that a man puts forth any volition whatever his action is an effect. It could not either not be or be otherwise. Given the sensory motor state, or the state of the intellect of the subject, it is the product of his real mentality. […] But it is nowhere written that the individual is going to persist henceforward in a downward course, that he is fatally committed to evil. But the fault having been committed, it should now be the time for some educative influence to be brought to bear, to bring together in his soul all the favourable motor tendencies and intellectual incentives, to arouse pity and goodness, or found on reason the sentiment of moral duty. (Dubois, 1904, pp. 55-56)

To a large extent, the defence of freewill has been a central concern of medieval Christian ethics and traditionally depends upon making a sharp metaphysical division between the body and the mind, such that our will can be considered the unfettered activity of a soul which exists independently of the body, a “ghost in the machine”, as Gilbert Ryle famously put it (Ryle, 1949).

However, if we accept the argument for determinism at face value it has radical implications for our attitudes toward ourselves and other people. It forces us to see other people as the product of genetics and environment and therefore acting in a manner which they cannot be “blamed” for in the ordinary sense of the word, i.e., in an absolute, metaphysical sense. We are all, to a large extent, victims of circumstance, insofar as we do what we do with the brains and the upbringing that nature has given us. Dubois puts this quite eloquently,

I know of no idea more fertile in happy suggestion than that which consists in taking people as they are, and admitting at the time when one observes them that they are never otherwise than what they can be.

This idea alone leads us logically to true indulgence, to that which forgives, and, while shutting our eyes to the past, looks forward to the future. When one has succeeded in fixing this enlightening idea in one’s mind, one is no more irritated by the whims of an hysterical patient than by the meanness of a selfish person.

Without doubt one does not attain such healthy stoicism with very great ease, for it is not, we must understand, merely the toleration of the presence of evil, but a stoicism in the presence of the culprit. We react, first of all, under the influence of our sensibility; it is that which determines the first movement, it is that which makes our blood boil and calls forth a noble rage.

But one ought to calm one’s emotion and stop to reflect. This does not mean that we are to sink back into indifference, but, with a better knowledge of the mental mechanism of the will, we can get back to a state of calmness. We see the threads which pull the human puppets, and we can consider the only possible plan of useful action – that of cutting off the possibility of any renewal of wrong deeds, and of sheltering those who might suffer from them, and making the future more certain by the uplifting of the wrong-doer. (Dubois, 1904, p. 56)

In other words, contemplation of determinism, the idea that human actions are definitely caused by a complex network of multiple preceding factors, mitigates our anger toward other people, and leads us closed to a healthy sense of understanding and forgiveness. We are also more enlightened regarding our practical responses and more inclined to reform rather than punish wrongdoers. When Socrates argued in The Republic that the Sage wishes to do good even to his enemies, he meant that the Sage sought to educate and enlighten others, seeing that as their highest good. That harmonious attitude is the polar opposite of the one which seeks revenge through moralising punishment. It leads to a sense of generosity and equanimity, and resolves anger, resentment, and contempt.

The Paradox of Freewill versus Determinism

Like Dubois after them, the Stoics were determinists, who believed that all events in life, including our own actions, are predetermined to happen as they do. However, paradoxically, they were also passionately in favour of increased personal responsibility and belief in one’s freedom to act and make decisions in accord with reason. Hence, Epictetus constantly reminds his students that no matter what happens to them they still have the opportunity to make of life what they will.

Sickness is an impediment to the body, but not to the faculty of choice, unless that faculty itself wishes it to be one. Lameness is an impediment to one’s leg, but not to the faculty of choice. And say the same to yourself with regard to everything that befalls you; for you will find it to be an impediment to something else, but not to yourself. (Enchiridion, 9)

Epictetus himself was famously lame, reputedly after being brutally crippled by his master when enslaved, so these remarks must have carried an extra poignancy, given his obvious physical disability.

To many people this seems confusing and contradictory. How can the Stoics emphasise both freedom and determinism? However, as often proves the case in philosophy, it is not the answer which is confused but the question. The Stoics evidently believe that the concepts of freedom and determinism are compatible.

It is virtually certain that Epictetus’ concept of a free will, far from requiring the will’s freedom from fate (i.e., a completely open future or set of alternative possibilities or choices), presupposes people’s willingness to comply with their predestined allotment. The issue that concerns him is neither the will’s freedom from antecedent causation nor the attribution to persons of a completely open future and indeterminate power of choice. Rather, it is freedom from being constrained by (as distinct from going along with) external contingencies, and freedom from being constrained by the errors and passions consequential on believing that such contingencies must influence or inhibit one’s volition. (Long, 2002, p. 221)

Confusion is caused because of a well-known and long-standing ambiguity in the popular notion of “freewill”. Metaphysical “freedom” refers to the freedom of the soul to act independently of antecedent causal factors. However, by contrast, “freedom” in common parlance merely refers to the ability of something to perform its prescribed function without external impediment or obstruction. A wheel turns freely unless, for instance, it is buckled or stopped by a rock. People act freely unless, for instance, other people restrain them physically or mentally. ‘For he is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can restrain’ (Discourses, 1.12.8).

The great Stoic academic, Chrysippus explained the Stoic theory of freewill and determinism by means of his famous “cylinder analogy”. In this example, it is argued that if we roll a cylinder along the ground, the initial impetus to move is given by someone pushing it, but the direction in which the cylinder moves, in a straight line, is determined by its own shape. The push is an example of what Stoics call an “external cause” coming from without, whereas the shape of the cylinder is the “internal cause” of the direction it takes, its own constitution. External causes impinge upon the human mind through the senses, and through other effects upon the body. However, the constitution, or character, of our mind determines how we will respond, acting as an “internal cause” of our response.

The mind is therefore autonomous to the extent that it can determine the direction in which it acts on the basis of its own character, however, external events impinge upon it and trigger its responses. Our actions are like the movement of the cylinder, insofar as both are due to a combination of “internal” and “external” factors. The cylinder is free to move according to its own nature so long as no further external causes obstruct it.

Whatever happens to you has been waiting to happen since the beginning of time. The twining strands of fate wove both of them together: your own existence and the things that happen to you. (Meditations, 10.5)

In this sense of the word “freedom”, which we should remind ourselves happens to be the normal sense, there is no incompatibility whatsoever with the notion of determinism because there is no reference made to the preceding causes which make the wheel turn, or the person act, in the first place. The cylinder rolls freely, its movement determined by antecedent events.

The notion of being free from preceding causes, by comparison, is a much more unusual and problematic concept. As Skinner argues at length in Beyond Freedom & Dignity, as our scientific understanding advances with regard to human behaviour, the notion that we were somehow exempt from universal determinism is very much eroded (1971, p. 21). He adds, ‘Although people object when a scientific analysis traces their behaviour to external conditions and thus deprives them of credit and the chance to be admired, they seldom object when the same analysis absolves them of blame’ (Skinner, 1971, p. 75).

But what of the inner feeling of freewill? Whatever sensations or impressions we might feel of “effort”, the idea that our actions are free is simply a sign that we are ignorant of their causes.

We do not think enough about the yoke inside, the result of ideas so thoroughly adopted that they seem like our own. That is what Spinoza meant when he said, “Men think themselves free only because they get a clear view of their actions, they do not think of the motives that determined them.” (Dubois, 1909, p. 53)

My freedom toward the future is a different matter and down to my specific circumstances in each situation, i.e., whether I am obstructed by external events or not.

When people are told that things happen because they have been determined by the preceding chain of causes they usually respond, at first, by complaining that there’s no point trying to change anything in that case. The Stoics and other ancient philosophers knew this as the “lazy argument”, and considered an obvious fallacy. The theory of determinism does not hold, as this fallacy requires, that all events are completely determined only by external causes, i.e., that people are completely passive in relation to the world. Rather, it holds that events are co-determined by the interaction of internal and external causes. My actions are part of the causal network, and therefore have an effect upon the things which happen. Nevertheless, accepting those things which are genuinely beyond my control, with philosophical resignation, is a key rational therapeutic strategy, and employed extensively by Stoics in the face of adversity.


This is a brief excerpt from my book, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, published by Routledge and available to order online from Amazon, and everywhere they sell books.

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The Serenity Prayer and Stoicism

This is a brief excerpt from my book, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, published by Routledge and available to order online from Amazon, and everywhere they sell books.


The most fundamental principle of Stoic psychotherapy can be found in the very first sentence of the famous Enchiridion or Stoic “handbook” of Epictetus: “Some things are up to us and others are not.”   The importance of this maxim and the wider implications of absorbing its meaning and implications are explored in detail throughout the ancient Stoic literature.

The Enchiridion is a condensed guidebook to Stoic life which draws upon the more lengthy Discourses of Epictetus, which claim to record discussions held between the Stoic teacher and groups of students.  Just like the Enchiridion, however, the Discourses begin with a chapter dedicated to the theme: “On what is in our power, and what is not.”  Epictetus begins by explaining the Stoic view that our judgements and opinions are pre-eminently within our power to control, whereas external events, especially sources of wealth and reputation, are ultimately in the hands of Fortune.  Hence, the Stoic should always strive to cope with adversity by having ready “at hand” precepts that remind him “what is mine, and what is not mine, what is within my power, and what is not” (Discourses, 1.1.21).  Indeed, Epictetus goes so far as to define Stoicism itself as the study of this distinction.

And to become educated [in Stoic philosophy] means just this, to learn what things are our own, and what are not. (Discourses, 4.5.7)

This distinction forms the premise for two closely-related principles.  First, that the Stoic should cultivate continual self-awareness, mindful of his thoughts and judgements, as these lie at the centre of his sphere of control.  Second, that he should adopt a “philosophical attitude to life”, as we now say, meaning that one should Stoically accept those things which are none of our concern or outside of our power to control.  Epictetus attempts to sum up these notions in a laconic maxim of the kind which the Stoics meant to be easy to memorise and constantly “ready to hand”.

What, then, is to be done?  To make the best of what is in our power, and take the rest as it naturally happens. (Discourses, 1.1.17)

Elsewhere, Epictetus expresses the same point by saying, “And thus, this paradox becomes neither impossible nor a paradox, that we must be at once cautious and courageous: courageous in what does not depend upon choice, and cautious in what does” (Discourses, 2.1.40).  By “nor a paradox” he means “not contrary to commonsense”, i.e., that this advice seems strange at first but should appear self-evidently true upon reflection.  Modern therapists will probably recognise this as the basis of the “Serenity Prayer”, used by members of Alcoholics Anonymous and other therapeutic and self-help approaches, which usually takes the following form,

God grant me serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
Courage to change the things I can,
And wisdom to know the difference.

It allegedly derives from a similar prayer written by the protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr in the 1940s (Pietsch, 1990, p. 9).  However, the resemblance both to Stoic doctrine and terminology is unmistakable to anyone familiar with the literature of the subject.  As it happens, courage and wisdom are two of the four cardinal virtues of classical Greek philosophy, along with self-control and justice.


This is a brief excerpt from my book, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, published by Routledge and available to order online from Amazon, and everywhere they sell books.

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Example Stoic Philosophy Regime

This is a brief excerpt from my book, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy: Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy, which is now in its revised second edition, from Routledge.

Update: Since I wrote this article, people have been asking me for a short guide so I created a five-page PDF called The Stoic Therapy Toolkit, which you can download free of charge from my e-learning site.

Copyright © Donald Robertson, 2010.  All rights reserved.


It is difficult, probably impossible, to do justice to the variety of therapeutic concepts, strategies, and techniques recommended by Stoic philosophers in an outline such as this. Nevertheless, I hope that by attempting to do so in relatively plain English, I will help to clarify their “art of living” somewhat, in a manner that may be of service to those who wish to make use of classical philosophy in modern life, for the purposes of self-help or personal development. It probably requires the self-discipline for which Stoics were renowned to follow a regime like this in full, and I imagine that the intention was to begin by attempting one step at a time. I certainly don’t propose this as an evidence-based treatment protocol but rather as an attempt to reconstruct the Stoic regime for discussion.

General

The chief goal of Stoicism, from the time of its founder Zeno, was expressed as “follow nature”.  Chrysippus distinguished between two senses implicit in this: following our own nature and following the Nature of the world.  Hence, Epictetus later expressed a general principle at the start of his famous Handbook, which the latterday Stoic the Early of Shaftesbury called the “Sovereign” precept of Stoicism:

Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control.  Under our control are conception [the way we define things], intention [the voluntary impulse to act], desire [to get something], aversion [the desire to avoid something], and, in a word, everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, our property, reputation, position [or office] in society, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing. (Enchiridion, 1)

Those things that our under our control, essentially our own voluntary thoughts and actions, should be performed in harmony with our nature as rational beings, i.e., with wisdom and the other forms of excellence (arete).  Those things outside of our direct control should be accepted as Fated by the “string of causes” that forms the universe, as if they were the Will of God, and indifferent with regard to the perfection of our own nature, which constitutes human “happiness” or flourishing (eudaimonia).  Following nature in this way, according to the Stoics, is living wisely and leads to freedom (eleutheria), fearlessness (aphobia), overcoming irrational fear and desire (apatheia), absence of distress (ataraxia), serenity (euroia) and a “smooth flow of life”.

Mornings

1. Meditation

1.1. Take time to calm your mind and gather your thoughts before preparing for the day ahead.  Be still and turn your attention inward, withdraw into yourself, or isolate yourself from others and walk in silence in a pleasant and serene environment.

1.2. The View from Above. Observe (or just imagine) the rising sun and the stars at daybreak, and think of the whole cosmos and your place within it.

2. The Prospective Morning Meditation 

2.1. Mentally rehearse generic precepts, e.g., the “Sovereign” general precept of Stoicism: “Some things are under our control and others are not”.

2.2. Mentally rehearse any potential challenges of the day ahead, and the specific precepts required to cope wisely with them, perhaps making use of the previous evening’s self-analysis.  When planning any activity, even something trivial like visiting a public bath, imagine beforehand the type of things that could go wrong or hinder your plans and tell yourself: “I want to do such-and-such and at the same time to keep my volition [prohairesis] in harmony with nature” (Enchiridion, 4).  That way if your actions are later obstructed you can say: “Oh well, this was not all that I had willed but also to keep my volition in harmony with nature and I cannot do so if I am upset at what’s going on” (Enchiridion, 4).  (In other words, plan to act with the “reserve clause” for you are not upset by things but by your judgement about what you desired to achieve or avoid, and what is good or bad.)

2.2.1. Praemeditatio Malorum.  Periodically contemplate apparent “catastrophes” such as illness, poverty, bereavement and especially your own death, rehearse facing such calamities “philosophically”, i.e., with rational composure, in order to overcome your attachment to external things (Enchiridion, 21).  Contemplate the uncertainty of the future and the value of enjoying the here and now. Remember you must die, i.e., that as a mortal being each moment counts and the future is uncertain.

3. Contemplation of the Sage

3.1. Periodically contemplate the ideal of the Sage, try to put his philosophical attitudes into a few plain words, what must he tell himself when faced with the same adversities you must overcome? Memorise these precepts and try to apply them yourself. Adopt a role-model such as Socrates, or someone whose wisdom and other virtues you admire.  When you’re not sure how to handle some encounter, ask yourself: “What would Socrates or Zeno have done in this situation?” (Enchiridion, 33)

Throughout the Day

1. Mindfulness of the Ruling Faculty (prosoche). Identify with your essential nature as a rational being, and learn to prize wisdom and the other virtues as the chief good in life.  Continually bring your attention back to your character, actions, and judgements, in the here and now, during any given situation.  When dealing with externals, be like a passenger who has temporarily gone ashore on a boat trip, keep one eye on the boat at all times (on yourself, your character) and be prepared at any moment to have to return onboard at the call of the captain, i.e., to abandon externals and give your whole attention again to yourself, your own attitudes and actions (Enchiridion, 7).  As if you were walking barefoot and cautious not to tread on something sharp, be mindful continually of your leading faculty (your intellect and volition) and guard against it being harmed (corrupted) by your own foolish actions (Enchiridion, 38).  All of your attention should focus on the care of your mind (Enchiridion, 41).  In response to every situation in life, ask yourself what faculty or virtue nature has given you to best deal with it, e.g., courage, restraint, etc., and continually seek opportunities to exercise these virtues (Enchiridion, 10).

2. Indifference & Acceptance. View external things with indifference.  Tell yourself: “For me every event is beneficial if I so wish, because it is within my power to derive benefit from every experience” (Enchiridion, 18) – cf. Nietzsche: “From the military school of life [Stoicism?]: What does not kill me can only make me stronger.”  Serenely accept the given moment as if you had chosen your own destiny, “will your fate” after it has happened (Enchiridion, 8). Accept the hand which fate has dealt you.

3. Evaluating Profit (lusiteles).  Think of life as a series of transactions, selling your actions and judgements in return for experiences.  What does it profit you to gain the whole world if you lose yourself?  However, virtue is always profitable, because it is a reward enough in itself but also leads to many other good things, such as friendship. Accepting that your fate entails the occasional loss of external things is the price nature demands for your sanity (Enchiridion, 12).  If the price you pay for external things is that you enslave yourself to them or to other people then be grateful that if you renounce them you have profited by saving your freedom, if upon that you put a higher value (Enchiridion, 25).

4. Cognitive Distancing.  When you are upset, tell yourself that it is your judgement that upsets you and not, e.g., external events or the actions of others.  First of all, then, try not to be swept along by the impression but delay responding to the situation until you have had time to regain your composure and self-control (Enchiridion, 20).  Likewise, when you  have the automatic thought that something is pleasurable or desirable, be cautious that you don’t get carried away by appearances, but generally delay your response (Enchiridion, 34).  Then contemplate together both the experience of enjoying the pleasure and any negative consequences or feelings of regret that are likely to follow; compare this to the image of yourself praising yourself for abstaining from it (Enchiridion, 34).  When some apparent misfortune befalls you, consider how you would view it if it befell someone else, e.g., when someone else loses a loved one we might say, “Such things happen in life” (Enchiridion, 26).

5. Empathic Understanding.  When someone acts like your enemy, insults or opposes you, remember that he was only doing what seemed to him the right thing, he didn’t know any better, and say: “It seemed so to him” (Enchiridion, 42).  When you witness someone apparently doing something badly, abandon your value judgement and stick with a description of the bare facts of his behaviour, because you cannot know what he did was bad without knowing his judgements and intentions (Enchiridion, 45).

6. Physical Self-Control Training.  Train yourself, in private without making a show of it, to endure physical hardship and renounce unnecessary desires, e.g., practice drinking only water, or when thirsty holding water in your mouth for a moment and then spitting it out without drinking it (Enchiridion, 47).  Withdraw your aversion (or desire to avoid) from things not under your control and focus it instead on what is against your own nature (or unhealthy) among your own voluntary judgements and actions (Enchiridion, 2).  Likewise, abandon desire for things outside of your control.  However, Epictetus also advises students of Stoicism to temporarily suspend desire for the good things under their control, until they have a firmer grasp of these things (Enchiridion, 2).  Engage in physical exercise, but primarily to develop your psychological endurance and self-discipline rather than your body.

7. Impermanence & Acceptance.  Contemplate the transience of material things, how things are made and then destroyed over time, and the temporary nature of pleasure, pain, and reputation. View external things as gifts on loan from the gods and rather than say “I have lost it” say “I have given it back” (Enchiridion, 11).  Think of the essence of things, and what they really are.

8. Act with the “Reserve Clause”.  At first, rather than being guided by your feelings for or against things (desire or aversion), use judgement to guide your voluntary actions (or “impulses”) toward and away from things, but do so lightly and without straining and with the “reserve clause”, i.e., adding “Fate permitting” to every intention to act upon externals (Enchiridion, 2).

9. Natural Affection (Philostorgia) & Philanthropy. Contemplate the virtues of both your friends and enemies. Empathise with everyone. Try to understand their motives and imagine what they are thinking. Praise even a spark of strength and wisdom and try to imitate what is good. Ask yourself what errors might cause those who offend you to act in an inconsiderate, unhappy or unenlightened manner. Love mankind, and wish your enemies to become so happy and enlightened that they cease to be your enemies, Fate permitting.

10. Affinity (Oikeiôsis) and Cosmic Consciousness. Think of yourself as part of the whole cosmos, indeed imagine the whole of space and time as one and your place within it. Imagine that everything is inter-connected and determined by the whole, and that you and other people are like individual cells within the body of the universe.

Evenings

1. The Retrospective Evening Meditation

Mentally review the whole of the preceding day three times from beginning to end, and even the days before if necessary.

1.1. What done amiss?  Ask yourself what mistakes you made and condemn (not yourself but) what actions you did badly; do so in a moderate and rational manner.

1.2. What done?  Ask yourself what virtue, i.e., what strength or wisdom you showed, and sincerely praise yourself for what you did well.

1.3. What left undone?  Ask yourself what could be done better, i.e., what you should do instead next time if a similar situation occurs.

2. Relaxation  & Sleep

2.1. Adopt an attitude of contentment and satisfaction with the day behind you. (As if you could die pleased with your life so far.) Relax your body and calm your mind so that your sleep is as tranquil and composed as possible, the preceding exercise will help you achieve a sense of satisfaction and also tire your mind.

CONTINUE TO REPEAT THIS PROCESS EVERY DAY

Appendix: Summary of Stoic Practices

To give you an idea of the breadth of Stoic practice, I’ve added a bullet-point list of some of the techniques found in the literature…

  1. Contemplation of the Sage: Imagine the ideal Sage or exemplary historical figures (Socrates, Diogenes, Cato) and ask yourself: “What would he do?”, or imagine being observed by them and how they would comment on your actions.
  2. Contemplating the Virtues of Other People: Look for examples of virtues among your friends, family, colleagues, etc.
  3. Self-Control Training: Take physical exercise to strengthen self-discipline, practice drinking just water, eat plain food, live modestly, etc.
  4. Contemplating the Whole Cosmos: Imagine the whole universe as if it were one thing and yourself as part of the whole.
  5. The View from Above: Picture events unfolding below as if observed from Mount Olympus or a high  watchtower.
  6. Objective Representation: Describe events to yourself in objective language, without rhetoric or value judgements.
  7. Contemplation of Death: Contemplate your own death regularly, the deaths  of loved ones and even the demise of the universe itself.
  8. Premeditation of Adversity: Mentally rehearse potential losses or misfortunes and view them as “indifferent” (decatastrophising), also view them as natural and inevitable to remove any sense of shock or surprise.
  9. The Financial Metaphor: View your actions as financial transactions and consider whether your behaviour is profitable, e.g., if you sacrifice externals but gain virtue that’s profitable but, by contrast, “What does it profit a man if he gains the whole world but loses himself.”
  10. Accepting Fate (Amor Fati): Rather than seeking for things to be as you will, rather will for things to be as they are, and your life will go smoothly and serenely.
  11. Say to External Things: “It is nothing to me.”
  12. Say Over Loved-Ones: “Tomorrow you will die.”
  13. Cognitive Distancing: Tell yourself it is your judgement that upset you and not the thing itself.
  14. Postponement: Delay responding to things that evoke passion until you have regained your composure.
  15. Picture the Consequences: Imagine what will happen if you act on a desire and compare this to what will happen if you resist it.
  16. Double Standard: When something upsetting happens to you, imagine how you would view the same thing if it befell someone else and say, “Such things happen in life.”
  17. Empathy: Remember that no man does evil knowingly and when someone does what doesn’t seem right, say to yourself: “It seemed so to him.”
  18. Contemplate the Transience of all Things: When you lose something or someone say “I have given it back” instead of “I have lost it”, and view change as natural and inevitable.

This is a brief excerpt from my book, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, published by Routledge and available to order online from Amazon, and everywhere they sell books.

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